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From: Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>
To: speck@linutronix.de
Subject: [MODERATED] Re: [patch 07/11] [PATCH v2 07/10] Linux Patch #7
Date: Mon, 23 Apr 2018 14:01:32 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <338dd556-fe22-d17b-050b-0cc116363f67@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180423175151.GA21779@dhcp-10-159-147-220.vpn.oracle.com>

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On 04/23/2018 01:51 PM, speck for Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>
>> Additional: I spoke with Intel a few minutes ago to impress upon them
>> that we'll (RH) have to leave MD disabled by default unless they drive
>> the prctrl/other solutions for vulnerable processes they'd like to see.
> 
> I believe (and Linus, please correct me here) that the question of
> toggling on/off SPEC_CTRL MSR on user-space entrance is a no-go.

To clarify, it's not a userspace toggling of an MSR. It would be a prctl
(e.g. a new "SPECULATION_VULNERABILITY" major with some minor variants)
that would allow processes to say "I'm vulnerable to X" or somesuch.

On x86, that might then allow us to have the mechanics of globally
enabling MDD, disabling it on entry to the kernel (due to stack attack,
to be debated), and selectively disabling it for known vulnerable
processes. Yea, it's a lot more complicated.

Anyway, I'm personally ok with a global knob. It's just that we're
getting a lot of pressure from Intel and AMD to not do that. I've asked
Intel to talk with Thomas and Linus and represent their opinions here
because I don't want it to seem like this is my asking for knobs! ;)

Jon.

-- 
Computer Architect | Sent from my Fedora powered laptop


  reply	other threads:[~2018-04-23 18:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-20  2:25 [MODERATED] [patch 07/11] [PATCH v2 07/10] Linux Patch #7 konrad.wilk
2018-04-20 17:42 ` [MODERATED] " Borislav Petkov
2018-04-21  3:27   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-21  9:03     ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-21 12:21       ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-21 19:25         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-21 21:41           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-21 22:09             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-21 22:13               ` Jon Masters
2018-04-21 22:35                 ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-21 22:54                   ` Jon Masters
2018-04-22  1:26                     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-22  3:18                       ` Jon Masters
2018-04-22  9:35                         ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-22  9:53                           ` Jon Masters
2018-04-22 10:34                             ` Borislav Petkov
2018-04-22 15:16                               ` Jon Masters
2018-04-23 14:30                               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-23 14:34                                 ` [MODERATED] " Jon Masters
2018-04-23 17:06                                   ` Jon Masters
2018-04-23 17:51                                     ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-23 18:01                                       ` Jon Masters [this message]
2018-04-23 18:02                                         ` Jon Masters
2018-04-23 18:05                                       ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-23 18:09                                         ` Jon Masters
2018-04-23 22:23                                           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-04-23 22:30                                             ` [MODERATED] " Jiri Kosina
2018-04-23 23:03                                               ` Andi Kleen
2018-04-24  5:32                                                 ` Jiri Kosina
2018-04-23 22:31                                             ` Andi Kleen
2018-04-24  0:44                                               ` Jon Masters
2018-04-23 23:36                                             ` Tim Chen
2018-04-23 21:13                                         ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-04-23 21:23                                           ` Linus Torvalds
2018-04-23 21:33                                             ` Jiri Kosina
2018-04-23 22:18                                             ` Andi Kleen
2018-04-24  0:34                                             ` Jon Masters
2018-04-21 22:09             ` Jon Masters

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