From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-0.8 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_PASS autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 66C4AC3279B for ; Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:11:47 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1D857208E8 for ; Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:11:47 +0000 (UTC) DMARC-Filter: OpenDMARC Filter v1.3.2 mail.kernel.org 1D857208E8 Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dmarc=fail (p=none dis=none) header.from=linux.intel.com Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; spf=none smtp.mailfrom=linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732330AbeGKANR (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:13:17 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:42258 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732262AbeGKANR (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:13:17 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 Jul 2018 17:11:44 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,336,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="73793923" Received: from mgcarrol-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.252.202.182]) ([10.252.202.182]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 10 Jul 2018 17:11:43 -0700 Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support To: Yu-cheng Yu , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue References: <20180710222639.8241-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: <3a7e9ce4-03c6-cc28-017b-d00108459e94@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 17:11:43 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Is this feature *integral* to shadow stacks? Or, should it just be in a different series? > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > index d9ae3d86cdd7..71da2cccba16 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > @@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ struct task_struct; > struct cet_status { > unsigned long shstk_base; > unsigned long shstk_size; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_addr; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_size; > unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; > + unsigned int ibt_enabled:1; > }; Is there a reason we're not using pointers here? This seems like the kind of place that we probably want __user pointers. > +static unsigned long ibt_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) > +{ > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; > + unsigned long populate; > + > + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, > + VM_DONTDUMP, 0, &populate, NULL); > + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + > + if (populate) > + mm_populate(addr, populate); > + > + return addr; > +} We're going to have to start consolidating these at some point. We have at least three of them now, maybe more. > +int cet_setup_ibt_bitmap(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + unsigned long bitmap; > + unsigned long size; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + size = TASK_SIZE_MAX / PAGE_SIZE / BITS_PER_BYTE; Just a note: this table is going to be gigantic on 5-level paging systems, and userspace won't, by default use any of that extra address space. I think it ends up being a 512GB allocation in a 128TB address space. Is that a problem? On 5-level paging systems, maybe we should just stick it up in the high part of the address space. > + bitmap = ibt_mmap(0, size); > + > + if (bitmap >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + bitmap &= PAGE_MASK; We're page-aligning the result of an mmap()? Why? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r |= (MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | bitmap); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); Comments, please. What is this doing, logically? Also, why are we OR'ing the results into this MSR? What are we trying to preserve? > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = bitmap; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size; > + return 0; > +} > + > +void cet_disable_ibt(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return; Does this need a check for being already disabled? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN | MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | > + MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > +} What's the locking for current->thread.cet? > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > index 705467839ce8..c609c9ce5691 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); > > static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > { > - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || > + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); > } > > @@ -434,6 +435,23 @@ static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s) > __setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER > +static __init int setup_disable_ibt(char *s) > +{ > + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */ > + if (strlen(s)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return 1; > + > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT); > + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_ibt' specified, disabling Branch Tracking\n"); > + return 1; > +} > +__setup("no_cet_ibt", setup_disable_ibt); > +#endif > /* > * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always > * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > index 233f6dad9c1f..42e08d3b573e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > /* > * The .note.gnu.property layout: > @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > > struct elf64_hdr *ehdr64 = ehdr_p; > > - if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > return 0; > > if (ehdr64->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) { > @@ -250,6 +252,9 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = 0; > if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { > if (shstk) { > err = cet_setup_shstk(); > @@ -257,6 +262,15 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > goto out; > } > } > + > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { > + if (ibt) { > + err = cet_setup_ibt(); > + if (err < 0) > + goto out; > + } > + } You introduced 'ibt' before it was used. Please wait to introduce it until you actually use it to make it easier to review. Also, what's wrong with: if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) && ibt) { ... } ? From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.1 (2015-04-28) on archive.lwn.net X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-5.8 required=5.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, MAILING_LIST_MULTI,RCVD_IN_DNSWL_HI autolearn=ham autolearn_force=no version=3.4.1 Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [209.132.180.67]) by archive.lwn.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44B7F7D072 for ; Wed, 11 Jul 2018 00:11:46 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1732275AbeGKANR (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:13:17 -0400 Received: from mga04.intel.com ([192.55.52.120]:42258 "EHLO mga04.intel.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1732262AbeGKANR (ORCPT ); Tue, 10 Jul 2018 20:13:17 -0400 X-Amp-Result: SKIPPED(no attachment in message) X-Amp-File-Uploaded: False Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by fmsmga104.fm.intel.com with ESMTP/TLS/DHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384; 10 Jul 2018 17:11:44 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="5.51,336,1526367600"; d="scan'208";a="73793923" Received: from mgcarrol-mobl1.amr.corp.intel.com (HELO [10.252.202.182]) ([10.252.202.182]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 10 Jul 2018 17:11:43 -0700 Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support To: Yu-cheng Yu , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra , "Ravi V. Shankar" , Vedvyas Shanbhogue References: <20180710222639.8241-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> From: Dave Hansen Openpgp: preference=signencrypt Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@linux.intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzShEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gPGRhdmVAc3I3MS5uZXQ+wsF7BBMBAgAlAhsDBgsJCAcDAgYVCAIJ CgsEFgIDAQIeAQIXgAUCTo3k0QIZAQAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsMO2D/421Xg8pimb9mPzM5N7khT0 2MCnaGssU1T59YPE25kYdx2HntwdO0JA27Wn9xx5zYijOe6B21ufrvsyv42auCO85+oFJWfE K2R/IpLle09GDx5tcEmMAHX6KSxpHmGuJmUPibHVbfep2aCh9lKaDqQR07gXXWK5/yU1Dx0r VVFRaHTasp9fZ9AmY4K9/BSA3VkQ8v3OrxNty3OdsrmTTzO91YszpdbjjEFZK53zXy6tUD2d e1i0kBBS6NLAAsqEtneplz88T/v7MpLmpY30N9gQU3QyRC50jJ7LU9RazMjUQY1WohVsR56d ORqFxS8ChhyJs7BI34vQusYHDTp6PnZHUppb9WIzjeWlC7Jc8lSBDlEWodmqQQgp5+6AfhTD kDv1a+W5+ncq+Uo63WHRiCPuyt4di4/0zo28RVcjtzlGBZtmz2EIC3vUfmoZbO/Gn6EKbYAn rzz3iU/JWV8DwQ+sZSGu0HmvYMt6t5SmqWQo/hyHtA7uF5Wxtu1lCgolSQw4t49ZuOyOnQi5 f8R3nE7lpVCSF1TT+h8kMvFPv3VG7KunyjHr3sEptYxQs4VRxqeirSuyBv1TyxT+LdTm6j4a mulOWf+YtFRAgIYyyN5YOepDEBv4LUM8Tz98lZiNMlFyRMNrsLV6Pv6SxhrMxbT6TNVS5D+6 UorTLotDZKp5+M7BTQRUY85qARAAsgMW71BIXRgxjYNCYQ3Xs8k3TfAvQRbHccky50h99TUY sqdULbsb3KhmY29raw1bgmyM0a4DGS1YKN7qazCDsdQlxIJp9t2YYdBKXVRzPCCsfWe1dK/q 66UVhRPP8EGZ4CmFYuPTxqGY+dGRInxCeap/xzbKdvmPm01Iw3YFjAE4PQ4hTMr/H76KoDbD cq62U50oKC83ca/PRRh2QqEqACvIH4BR7jueAZSPEDnzwxvVgzyeuhwqHY05QRK/wsKuhq7s UuYtmN92Fasbxbw2tbVLZfoidklikvZAmotg0dwcFTjSRGEg0Gr3p/xBzJWNavFZZ95Rj7Et db0lCt0HDSY5q4GMR+SrFbH+jzUY/ZqfGdZCBqo0cdPPp58krVgtIGR+ja2Mkva6ah94/oQN lnCOw3udS+Eb/aRcM6detZr7XOngvxsWolBrhwTQFT9D2NH6ryAuvKd6yyAFt3/e7r+HHtkU kOy27D7IpjngqP+b4EumELI/NxPgIqT69PQmo9IZaI/oRaKorYnDaZrMXViqDrFdD37XELwQ gmLoSm2VfbOYY7fap/AhPOgOYOSqg3/Nxcapv71yoBzRRxOc4FxmZ65mn+q3rEM27yRztBW9 AnCKIc66T2i92HqXCw6AgoBJRjBkI3QnEkPgohQkZdAb8o9WGVKpfmZKbYBo4pEAEQEAAcLB XwQYAQIACQUCVGPOagIbDAAKCRBoNZUwcMmSsJeCEACCh7P/aaOLKWQxcnw47p4phIVR6pVL e4IEdR7Jf7ZL00s3vKSNT+nRqdl1ugJx9Ymsp8kXKMk9GSfmZpuMQB9c6io1qZc6nW/3TtvK pNGz7KPPtaDzvKA4S5tfrWPnDr7n15AU5vsIZvgMjU42gkbemkjJwP0B1RkifIK60yQqAAlT YZ14P0dIPdIPIlfEPiAWcg5BtLQU4Wg3cNQdpWrCJ1E3m/RIlXy/2Y3YOVVohfSy+4kvvYU3 lXUdPb04UPw4VWwjcVZPg7cgR7Izion61bGHqVqURgSALt2yvHl7cr68NYoFkzbNsGsye9ft M9ozM23JSgMkRylPSXTeh5JIK9pz2+etco3AfLCKtaRVysjvpysukmWMTrx8QnI5Nn5MOlJj 1Ov4/50JY9pXzgIDVSrgy6LYSMc4vKZ3QfCY7ipLRORyalFDF3j5AGCMRENJjHPD6O7bl3Xo 4DzMID+8eucbXxKiNEbs21IqBZbbKdY1GkcEGTE7AnkA3Y6YB7I/j9mQ3hCgm5muJuhM/2Fr OPsw5tV/LmQ5GXH0JQ/TZXWygyRFyyI2FqNTx4WHqUn3yFj8rwTAU1tluRUYyeLy0ayUlKBH ybj0N71vWO936MqP6haFERzuPAIpxj2ezwu0xb1GjTk4ynna6h5GjnKgdfOWoRtoWndMZxbA z5cecg== Message-ID: <3a7e9ce4-03c6-cc28-017b-d00108459e94@linux.intel.com> Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 17:11:43 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.8.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Sender: linux-doc-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-doc@vger.kernel.org Is this feature *integral* to shadow stacks? Or, should it just be in a different series? > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > index d9ae3d86cdd7..71da2cccba16 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > @@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ struct task_struct; > struct cet_status { > unsigned long shstk_base; > unsigned long shstk_size; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_addr; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_size; > unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; > + unsigned int ibt_enabled:1; > }; Is there a reason we're not using pointers here? This seems like the kind of place that we probably want __user pointers. > +static unsigned long ibt_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) > +{ > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; > + unsigned long populate; > + > + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, > + VM_DONTDUMP, 0, &populate, NULL); > + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + > + if (populate) > + mm_populate(addr, populate); > + > + return addr; > +} We're going to have to start consolidating these at some point. We have at least three of them now, maybe more. > +int cet_setup_ibt_bitmap(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + unsigned long bitmap; > + unsigned long size; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + size = TASK_SIZE_MAX / PAGE_SIZE / BITS_PER_BYTE; Just a note: this table is going to be gigantic on 5-level paging systems, and userspace won't, by default use any of that extra address space. I think it ends up being a 512GB allocation in a 128TB address space. Is that a problem? On 5-level paging systems, maybe we should just stick it up in the high part of the address space. > + bitmap = ibt_mmap(0, size); > + > + if (bitmap >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + bitmap &= PAGE_MASK; We're page-aligning the result of an mmap()? Why? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r |= (MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | bitmap); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); Comments, please. What is this doing, logically? Also, why are we OR'ing the results into this MSR? What are we trying to preserve? > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = bitmap; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size; > + return 0; > +} > + > +void cet_disable_ibt(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return; Does this need a check for being already disabled? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN | MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | > + MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > +} What's the locking for current->thread.cet? > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > index 705467839ce8..c609c9ce5691 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); > > static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > { > - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || > + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); > } > > @@ -434,6 +435,23 @@ static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s) > __setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER > +static __init int setup_disable_ibt(char *s) > +{ > + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */ > + if (strlen(s)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return 1; > + > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT); > + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_ibt' specified, disabling Branch Tracking\n"); > + return 1; > +} > +__setup("no_cet_ibt", setup_disable_ibt); > +#endif > /* > * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always > * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > index 233f6dad9c1f..42e08d3b573e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > /* > * The .note.gnu.property layout: > @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > > struct elf64_hdr *ehdr64 = ehdr_p; > > - if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > return 0; > > if (ehdr64->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) { > @@ -250,6 +252,9 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = 0; > if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { > if (shstk) { > err = cet_setup_shstk(); > @@ -257,6 +262,15 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > goto out; > } > } > + > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { > + if (ibt) { > + err = cet_setup_ibt(); > + if (err < 0) > + goto out; > + } > + } You introduced 'ibt' before it was used. Please wait to introduce it until you actually use it to make it easier to review. Also, what's wrong with: if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) && ibt) { ... } ? -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-doc" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Dave Hansen Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH v2 22/27] x86/cet/ibt: User-mode indirect branch tracking support Date: Tue, 10 Jul 2018 17:11:43 -0700 Message-ID: <3a7e9ce4-03c6-cc28-017b-d00108459e94@linux.intel.com> References: <20180710222639.8241-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20180710222639.8241-23-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> Content-Language: en-US Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org To: Yu-cheng Yu , x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" , Thomas Gleixner , Ingo Molnar , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org, linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann , Andy Lutomirski , Balbir Singh , Cyrill Gorcunov , Florian Weimer , "H.J. Lu" , Jann Horn , Jonathan Corbet , Kees Cook , Mike Kravetz , Nadav Amit , Oleg Nesterov , Pavel Machek , Peter Zijlstra List-Id: linux-api@vger.kernel.org Is this feature *integral* to shadow stacks? Or, should it just be in a different series? > diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > index d9ae3d86cdd7..71da2cccba16 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cet.h > @@ -12,7 +12,10 @@ struct task_struct; > struct cet_status { > unsigned long shstk_base; > unsigned long shstk_size; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_addr; > + unsigned long ibt_bitmap_size; > unsigned int shstk_enabled:1; > + unsigned int ibt_enabled:1; > }; Is there a reason we're not using pointers here? This seems like the kind of place that we probably want __user pointers. > +static unsigned long ibt_mmap(unsigned long addr, unsigned long len) > +{ > + struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm; > + unsigned long populate; > + > + down_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + addr = do_mmap(NULL, addr, len, PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, > + MAP_ANONYMOUS | MAP_PRIVATE, > + VM_DONTDUMP, 0, &populate, NULL); > + up_write(&mm->mmap_sem); > + > + if (populate) > + mm_populate(addr, populate); > + > + return addr; > +} We're going to have to start consolidating these at some point. We have at least three of them now, maybe more. > +int cet_setup_ibt_bitmap(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + unsigned long bitmap; > + unsigned long size; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return -EOPNOTSUPP; > + > + size = TASK_SIZE_MAX / PAGE_SIZE / BITS_PER_BYTE; Just a note: this table is going to be gigantic on 5-level paging systems, and userspace won't, by default use any of that extra address space. I think it ends up being a 512GB allocation in a 128TB address space. Is that a problem? On 5-level paging systems, maybe we should just stick it up in the high part of the address space. > + bitmap = ibt_mmap(0, size); > + > + if (bitmap >= TASK_SIZE_MAX) > + return -ENOMEM; > + > + bitmap &= PAGE_MASK; We're page-aligning the result of an mmap()? Why? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r |= (MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | bitmap); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); Comments, please. What is this doing, logically? Also, why are we OR'ing the results into this MSR? What are we trying to preserve? > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = bitmap; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = size; > + return 0; > +} > + > +void cet_disable_ibt(void) > +{ > + u64 r; > + > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return; Does this need a check for being already disabled? > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + r &= ~(MSR_IA32_CET_ENDBR_EN | MSR_IA32_CET_LEG_IW_EN | > + MSR_IA32_CET_NO_TRACK_EN); > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_U_CET, r); > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > +} What's the locking for current->thread.cet? > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > index 705467839ce8..c609c9ce5691 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c > @@ -413,7 +413,8 @@ __setup("nopku", setup_disable_pku); > > static __always_inline void setup_cet(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) > { > - if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) || > + cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > cr4_set_bits(X86_CR4_CET); > } > > @@ -434,6 +435,23 @@ static __init int setup_disable_shstk(char *s) > __setup("no_cet_shstk", setup_disable_shstk); > #endif > > +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_BRANCH_TRACKING_USER > +static __init int setup_disable_ibt(char *s) > +{ > + /* require an exact match without trailing characters */ > + if (strlen(s)) > + return 0; > + > + if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > + return 1; > + > + setup_clear_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBT); > + pr_info("x86: 'no_cet_ibt' specified, disabling Branch Tracking\n"); > + return 1; > +} > +__setup("no_cet_ibt", setup_disable_ibt); > +#endif > /* > * Some CPU features depend on higher CPUID levels, which may not always > * be available due to CPUID level capping or broken virtualization > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > index 233f6dad9c1f..42e08d3b573e 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/elf.c > @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ > #include > #include > #include > +#include > > /* > * The .note.gnu.property layout: > @@ -222,7 +223,8 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > > struct elf64_hdr *ehdr64 = ehdr_p; > > - if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) > + if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK) && > + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) > return 0; > > if (ehdr64->e_ident[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64) { > @@ -250,6 +252,9 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > current->thread.cet.shstk_enabled = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_base = 0; > current->thread.cet.shstk_size = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_enabled = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_addr = 0; > + current->thread.cet.ibt_bitmap_size = 0; > if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SHSTK)) { > if (shstk) { > err = cet_setup_shstk(); > @@ -257,6 +262,15 @@ int arch_setup_features(void *ehdr_p, void *phdr_p, > goto out; > } > } > + > + if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) { > + if (ibt) { > + err = cet_setup_ibt(); > + if (err < 0) > + goto out; > + } > + } You introduced 'ibt' before it was used. Please wait to introduce it until you actually use it to make it easier to review. Also, what's wrong with: if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT) && ibt) { ... } ?