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From: Stephan Mueller <smueller@chronox.de>
To: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>
Cc: herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	nhorman@tuxdriver.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2014 07:14:43 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4224700.3m7VJgkz0U@tachyon.chronox.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20141214203738.20811.qmail@ns.horizon.com>

Am Sonntag, 14. Dezember 2014, 15:37:38 schrieb George Spelvin:

Hi George,

> In an earlier conversation with Neil, I had an idea that I'd like
> your opinion on.
> 
> I still think whether true-random mode is wanted is up in the air,
> but if it is, a better way to proide it would be to create a separate
> crypto_alg for it, with a smaller seed size (no DT seed) and its own name.
> 
In my personal view, there is no need for such rather non-deterministic 
behavior. The reasons are several-fold:

- one who wants non-deterministic operation goes straight to get_random_bytes 
or uses stdrng in a normal system. This RNG is built for that purpose. Though, 
get_random_bytes is logically /dev/urandom. If somebody wants to have an in-
kernel /dev/random implementation, I have one available. When I come around, I 
want to make that in-kernel /dev/random as a seed source for my DRBG. That in-
kernel /dev/random would be a good seed source for the X9.31 too -- and here 
you should put your effort into, IMHO. 

- the non-determinism you get from get_random_int is very weak. If you start 
thinking about the information theoretical entropy behind that function that 
is used once in a while, you may not get much entropy. Please, please, please, 
I do not want to start a discussion around entropy -- I will not participate 
in such discussion :-)

- the deterministic RNGs are cryptographically strong. Thus, when you seed 
them with a good noise source like get_random_bytes, you will get good random 
numbers. Ensure proper reseeding and you will be on the safe side.

Thus, I am questioning whether such slightly non-deterministic RNG would be 
used.

> But I have no idea what name to use.  Any suggestions?  And a FIPS
> version, too?

There is no FIPS version of a non-deterministic RNG. Either deterministic or 
die (the SP800-90B death).

-- 
Ciao
Stephan

  reply	other threads:[~2014-12-15  6:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 53+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-12-07 12:26 [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 01/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - unroll _get_more_prng_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 02/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Additional _get_more_prng_bytes cleanup George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 03/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Use %phN rather than print_hex_dump for debug George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 04/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make debug output more like NIST test vectors George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 05/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Eliminate ctx->I and ctx->last_rand_data George Spelvin
2014-12-14 11:50   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 19:22     ` George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 06/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make cont_test a bool George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 07/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Shrink context some more George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 08/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Don't call reset_prng_context from cprng_init George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 09/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Make length types consistent George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 10/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Use u8 data types consistently internally George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 11/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Eliminate unused PRNG_FIXED_SIZE flag George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 12/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Get rid of rdata buffer in fips_cprng_reset George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 13/25] crypto: Add appropriate consts to RNG API George Spelvin
2014-12-14 11:39   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 14/25] crypto: tcrypt - Add const qualifiers all over the test code George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 15/25] crypto: testmgr - Merge seed arrays in struct cprng_testvec George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 16/25] crypto: testmgr - Report failure on zero-length crypto_rng_get_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 17/25] crypto: testmgr - Don't crash if CPRNG test result is large George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 18/25] crypto: testmgr - Add CPRNG stutter test George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 19/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - simplify get_prng_bytes George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 20/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - simplify xor_vectors() to xor_block() George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 21/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Rename rand_data_valid more sensibly George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 22/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Tweak comments George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 23/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Introduce a "union cipherblock" George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 24/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - Introduce non-deterministic mode George Spelvin
2014-12-07 12:26 ` [PATCH v2 25/25] crypto: ansi_cprng - If non-deterministic, don't buffer old output George Spelvin
2014-12-07 22:49   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-08 14:22     ` Neil Horman
2014-12-08 16:43       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-08 18:07         ` Neil Horman
2014-12-08 20:34           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-14 12:06 ` [PATCH v2 00/25] Multiple changes to crypto/ansi_cprng.c Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 19:47   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:18     ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-14 20:37   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:14     ` Stephan Mueller [this message]
2014-12-15  8:42       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  8:50         ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15 10:45           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15 11:08             ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15  5:53   ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  6:27     ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15  8:28       ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15  8:56         ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15 10:21           ` George Spelvin
2014-12-15 10:46             ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-15 11:32               ` Neil Horman
2014-12-15 22:01                 ` George Spelvin
2014-12-16  7:22                   ` Stephan Mueller
2014-12-16 11:32                   ` Neil Horman

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