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* OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
@ 2019-11-06 19:31 Bruce Mitchell
  2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: OpenBMC Maillist

From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be corrected with OpenBMC's https:
  1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS threat
  2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS 
     and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.

Is this your understanding as well?

Thank you!

-- 
Bruce Mitchell

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
  2019-11-06 19:31 OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue Bruce Mitchell
@ 2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
  2019-11-06 22:18   ` Bruce Mitchell
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: James Feist @ 2019-11-06 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist

On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
>  From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be corrected with OpenBMC's https:
>    1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS threat

This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due 
to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS 
(which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said 
the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I 
need to see if there are any consequences.

https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992



>    2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
>       and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128      TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256

Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, 
we are using the recommended ciphers, 
https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b82261060310b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. 
And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can 
determine this externally, and it's just a warning: 
https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-372953654. 
Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one?

Thanks

-James


> 
> Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
> 
> Is this your understanding as well?
> 
> Thank you!
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
  2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
@ 2019-11-06 22:18   ` Bruce Mitchell
  2019-11-06 22:38     ` Bruce Mitchell
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Feist, OpenBMC Maillist



> -----Original Message-----
> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of
> James Feist
> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52
> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist
> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
> 
> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
> >  From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be
> corrected with OpenBMC's https:
> >    1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS
> threat
> 
> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due
> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS
> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said
> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I
> need to see if there are any consequences.
> 
> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992
> 
> 
> 
> >    2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE,
> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
> >       and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128
> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
> 
> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13,
> we are using the recommended ciphers,
> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031
> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330.
> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can
> determine this externally, and it's just a warning:
> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-
> 372953654.
> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one?
> 
> Thanks
> 
> -James
> 

Thanks James, I accept your assessment.

-Bruce

> 
> >
> > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-
> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
> >
> > Is this your understanding as well?
> >
> > Thank you!
> >


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
  2019-11-06 22:18   ` Bruce Mitchell
@ 2019-11-06 22:38     ` Bruce Mitchell
  2019-11-06 22:43       ` James Feist
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:38 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bruce Mitchell, James Feist, OpenBMC Maillist



> -----Original Message-----
> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce
> Mitchell
> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19
> To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist
> Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
> 
> 
> 
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
> > bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of
> > James Feist
> > Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52
> > To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist
> > Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
> >
> > On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
> > >  From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be
> > corrected with OpenBMC's https:
> > >    1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS
> > threat
> >
> > This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due
> > to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS
> > (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said
> > the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I
> > need to see if there are any consequences.
> >
> > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992
> >
> >
> >
> > >    2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE,
> > uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
> > >       and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128
> > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
> >
> > Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13,
> > we are using the recommended ciphers,
> >
> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031
> > 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330.
> > And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can
> > determine this externally, and it's just a warning:
> > https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-
> > 372953654.
> > Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one?
> >
> > Thanks
> >
> > -James
> >
> 
> Thanks James, I accept your assessment.
> 
> -Bruce
> 

There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well.
https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations

- Bruce

> >
> > >
> > > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-
> > Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
> > >
> > > Is this your understanding as well?
> > >
> > > Thank you!
> > >


^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
  2019-11-06 22:38     ` Bruce Mitchell
@ 2019-11-06 22:43       ` James Feist
  2019-11-15 22:45         ` Joseph Reynolds
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: James Feist @ 2019-11-06 22:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist

On 11/6/19 2:38 PM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
> 
> 
>> -----Original Message-----
>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce
>> Mitchell
>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19
>> To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist
>> Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
>>
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
>>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of
>>> James Feist
>>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52
>>> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist
>>> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
>>>
>>> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
>>>>   From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be
>>> corrected with OpenBMC's https:
>>>>     1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS
>>> threat
>>>
>>> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due
>>> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS
>>> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said
>>> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I
>>> need to see if there are any consequences.
>>>
>>> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>>     2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE,
>>> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
>>>>        and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128
>>> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
>>>
>>> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13,
>>> we are using the recommended ciphers,
>>>
>> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031
>>> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330.
>>> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can
>>> determine this externally, and it's just a warning:
>>> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-
>>> 372953654.
>>> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one?
>>>
>>> Thanks
>>>
>>> -James
>>>
>>
>> Thanks James, I accept your assessment.
>>
>> -Bruce
>>
> 
> There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well.
> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations
> 

I believe that's what was originally copied based on the variable name 
in ssl_key_handler.hpp.

> - Bruce
> 
>>>
>>>>
>>>> Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-
>>> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
>>>>
>>>> Is this your understanding as well?
>>>>
>>>> Thank you!
>>>>
> 

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
  2019-11-06 22:43       ` James Feist
@ 2019-11-15 22:45         ` Joseph Reynolds
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread
From: Joseph Reynolds @ 2019-11-15 22:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: James Feist, Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist

On 11/6/19 4:43 PM, James Feist wrote:
> On 11/6/19 2:38 PM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
>>
>>
>>> -----Original Message-----
>>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
>>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce
>>> Mitchell
>>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19
>>> To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist
>>> Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>> -----Original Message-----
>>>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
>>>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of
>>>> James Feist
>>>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52
>>>> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist
>>>> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
>>>>
>>>> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
>>>>>   From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that 
>>>>> could be
>>>> corrected with OpenBMC's https:
>>>>>     1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT 
>>>>> ok), DoS
>>>> threat
>>>>
>>>> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due
>>>> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS
>>>> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being 
>>>> said
>>>> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I
>>>> need to see if there are any consequences.
>>>>
>>>> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992

Thanks for looking at this.  Sorry about my delayed response.  The fix 
looks good to me, and it has merged already anyway.
I don't see any negative consequences.

FWIW, to address the ongoing issue of what ciphers to support, an 
OpenBMC network security considerations document was created to discuss 
relevant standards and the OpenBMC implementation.  Feel free to improve 
it with additional information.  It is here:
https://github.com/openbmc/docs/blob/master/security/network-security-considerations.md

- Joseph

>>>>
>>>>
>>>>
>>>>>     2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially 
>>>>> VULNERABLE,
>>>> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
>>>>>        and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES 128
>>>> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
>>>>
>>>> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13,
>>>> we are using the recommended ciphers,
>>>>
>>> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031
>>>> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330.
>>>> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can
>>>> determine this externally, and it's just a warning:
>>>> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-
>>>> 372953654.
>>>> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for 
>>>> this one?
>>>>
>>>> Thanks
>>>>
>>>> -James
>>>>
>>>
>>> Thanks James, I accept your assessment.
>>>
>>> -Bruce
>>>
>>
>> There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well.
>> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations 
>>
>>
>
> I believe that's what was originally copied based on the variable name 
> in ssl_key_handler.hpp.
>
>> - Bruce
>>
>>>>
>>>>>
>>>>> Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-
>>>> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
>>>>>
>>>>> Is this your understanding as well?
>>>>>
>>>>> Thank you!
>>>>>
>>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2019-11-15 22:45 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed)
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2019-11-06 19:31 OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
2019-11-06 22:18   ` Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 22:38     ` Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 22:43       ` James Feist
2019-11-15 22:45         ` Joseph Reynolds

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