* OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
@ 2019-11-06 19:31 Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread
From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 19:31 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: OpenBMC Maillist
From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be corrected with OpenBMC's https:
1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS threat
2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
Is this your understanding as well?
Thank you!
--
Bruce Mitchell
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. 2019-11-06 19:31 OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist 2019-11-06 22:18 ` Bruce Mitchell 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: James Feist @ 2019-11-06 21:52 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: > From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be corrected with OpenBMC's https: > 1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS threat This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I need to see if there are any consequences. https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992 > 2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS > and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, we are using the recommended ciphers, https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b82261060310b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can determine this externally, and it's just a warning: https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-372953654. Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one? Thanks -James > > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers. > > Is this your understanding as well? > > Thank you! > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. 2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist @ 2019-11-06 22:18 ` Bruce Mitchell 2019-11-06 22:38 ` Bruce Mitchell 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:18 UTC (permalink / raw) To: James Feist, OpenBMC Maillist > -----Original Message----- > From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- > bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of > James Feist > Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52 > To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist > Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. > > On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: > > From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be > corrected with OpenBMC's https: > > 1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS > threat > > This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due > to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS > (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said > the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I > need to see if there are any consequences. > > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992 > > > > > 2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, > uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS > > and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 > > Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, > we are using the recommended ciphers, > https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031 > 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. > And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can > determine this externally, and it's just a warning: > https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment- > 372953654. > Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one? > > Thanks > > -James > Thanks James, I accept your assessment. -Bruce > > > > > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client- > Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers. > > > > Is this your understanding as well? > > > > Thank you! > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. 2019-11-06 22:18 ` Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:38 ` Bruce Mitchell 2019-11-06 22:43 ` James Feist 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:38 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bruce Mitchell, James Feist, OpenBMC Maillist > -----Original Message----- > From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- > bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce > Mitchell > Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19 > To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist > Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. > > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- > > bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of > > James Feist > > Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52 > > To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist > > Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. > > > > On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: > > > From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be > > corrected with OpenBMC's https: > > > 1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS > > threat > > > > This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due > > to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS > > (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said > > the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I > > need to see if there are any consequences. > > > > https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992 > > > > > > > > > 2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, > > uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS > > > and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 > > TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 > > > > Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, > > we are using the recommended ciphers, > > > https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031 > > 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. > > And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can > > determine this externally, and it's just a warning: > > https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment- > > 372953654. > > Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one? > > > > Thanks > > > > -James > > > > Thanks James, I accept your assessment. > > -Bruce > There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well. https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations - Bruce > > > > > > > > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client- > > Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers. > > > > > > Is this your understanding as well? > > > > > > Thank you! > > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. 2019-11-06 22:38 ` Bruce Mitchell @ 2019-11-06 22:43 ` James Feist 2019-11-15 22:45 ` Joseph Reynolds 0 siblings, 1 reply; 6+ messages in thread From: James Feist @ 2019-11-06 22:43 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist On 11/6/19 2:38 PM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: > > >> -----Original Message----- >> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- >> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce >> Mitchell >> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19 >> To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist >> Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. >> >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- >>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of >>> James Feist >>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52 >>> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist >>> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. >>> >>> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: >>>> From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be >>> corrected with OpenBMC's https: >>>> 1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS >>> threat >>> >>> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due >>> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS >>> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said >>> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I >>> need to see if there are any consequences. >>> >>> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992 >>> >>> >>> >>>> 2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially VULNERABLE, >>> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS >>>> and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 >>> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 >>> >>> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, >>> we are using the recommended ciphers, >>> >> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031 >>> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. >>> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can >>> determine this externally, and it's just a warning: >>> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment- >>> 372953654. >>> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one? >>> >>> Thanks >>> >>> -James >>> >> >> Thanks James, I accept your assessment. >> >> -Bruce >> > > There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well. > https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations > I believe that's what was originally copied based on the variable name in ssl_key_handler.hpp. > - Bruce > >>> >>>> >>>> Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client- >>> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers. >>>> >>>> Is this your understanding as well? >>>> >>>> Thank you! >>>> > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
* Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. 2019-11-06 22:43 ` James Feist @ 2019-11-15 22:45 ` Joseph Reynolds 0 siblings, 0 replies; 6+ messages in thread From: Joseph Reynolds @ 2019-11-15 22:45 UTC (permalink / raw) To: James Feist, Bruce Mitchell, OpenBMC Maillist On 11/6/19 4:43 PM, James Feist wrote: > On 11/6/19 2:38 PM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: >> >> >>> -----Original Message----- >>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- >>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of Bruce >>> Mitchell >>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 14:19 >>> To: James Feist; OpenBMC Maillist >>> Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. >>> >>> >>> >>>> -----Original Message----- >>>> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc- >>>> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of >>>> James Feist >>>> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52 >>>> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist >>>> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue. >>>> >>>> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote: >>>>> From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that >>>>> could be >>>> corrected with OpenBMC's https: >>>>> 1 Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation VULNERABLE (NOT >>>>> ok), DoS >>>> threat >>>> >>>> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due >>>> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS >>>> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being >>>> said >>>> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I >>>> need to see if there are any consequences. >>>> >>>> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992 Thanks for looking at this. Sorry about my delayed response. The fix looks good to me, and it has merged already anyway. I don't see any negative consequences. FWIW, to address the ongoing issue of what ciphers to support, an OpenBMC network security considerations document was created to discuss relevant standards and the OpenBMC implementation. Feel free to improve it with additional information. It is here: https://github.com/openbmc/docs/blob/master/security/network-security-considerations.md - Joseph >>>> >>>> >>>> >>>>> 2 LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental potentially >>>>> VULNERABLE, >>>> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS >>>>> and xc023 ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256 ECDH 521 AES 128 >>>> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 >>>> >>>> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13, >>>> we are using the recommended ciphers, >>>> >>> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031 >>>> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330. >>>> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can >>>> determine this externally, and it's just a warning: >>>> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment- >>>> 372953654. >>>> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for >>>> this one? >>>> >>>> Thanks >>>> >>>> -James >>>> >>> >>> Thanks James, I accept your assessment. >>> >>> -Bruce >>> >> >> There are Mozilla Recommended configurations as well. >> https://wiki.mozilla.org/Security/Server_Side_TLS#Recommended_configurations >> >> > > I believe that's what was originally copied based on the variable name > in ssl_key_handler.hpp. > >> - Bruce >> >>>> >>>>> >>>>> Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client- >>>> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers. >>>>> >>>>> Is this your understanding as well? >>>>> >>>>> Thank you! >>>>> >> ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 6+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2019-11-15 22:45 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 6+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2019-11-06 19:31 OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue Bruce Mitchell 2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist 2019-11-06 22:18 ` Bruce Mitchell 2019-11-06 22:38 ` Bruce Mitchell 2019-11-06 22:43 ` James Feist 2019-11-15 22:45 ` Joseph Reynolds
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