> -----Original Message----- > From: Roberts, William C [mailto:william.c.roberts(a)intel.com] > Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 10:33 AM > To: Florian.Schreiner(a)infineon.com; andreas.fuchs(a)sit.fraunhofer.de; > lester.corderio(a)ufomoviez.com; tpm2(a)lists.01.org > Subject: [tpm2] Re: tpm2_clear > > Most enterprise situations that I have seen, set the owner password or as > Andreas mentioned Disable it via clearcontrol. Their also usually exists a key, Let me make this more clear, admin sets/does these things, the regular user just makes Keys under the SRK. > known as the SRK, which is at the persistent address of 0x81000001, that has no > auth value. Then folks can create keys under that as they see fit. So the > disgruntled employee could nuke his keys, but no one else's. > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Florian.Schreiner(a)infineon.com > > [mailto:Florian.Schreiner(a)infineon.com] > > Sent: Thursday, May 7, 2020 6:01 AM > > To: andreas.fuchs(a)sit.fraunhofer.de; lester.corderio(a)ufomoviez.com; > > tpm2(a)lists.01.org > > Subject: [tpm2] Re: tpm2_clear > > > > Hi, > > > > maybe it helps to mention that the tpm2_clear command only affects the > > keys stored in the storage hierarchy, which should by normally anyway > > in the ownership of the user. Then it according to the design, that a > > user/employee would only be able to delete his own keys. > > Keys from another party like the platform owner should for example be > > stored in the TPM platform hierarchy, which is more protected as there > > is no clear command (e.g. TPM2_ChangePPS command is not available or > blocked in BIOS). > > > > Best, > > Florian > > > > -----Original Message----- > > From: Fuchs, Andreas > > Sent: Donnerstag, 7. Mai 2020 12:11 > > To: lester.corderio(a)ufomoviez.com; tpm2(a)lists.01.org > > Subject: [tpm2] Re: tpm2_clear > > > > Caution: This e-mail originated outside Infineon Technologies. Do not > > click on links or open attachments unless you validate it is safe > > US/Support/security/CDC/pse/Pages/pce.aspx>. > > > > > > The purpose of tpm2_clear is for decommissioning so there is no way to > recover. > > > > You can call tpm2_clearcontrol to disable "owner-authorized" clearing, > > so that you cannot clear from OS anymore. > > Then, the only way to clear the TPM is via BIOS which you can secure > > with a password. > > > > That's as secure as it gets. > > ________________________________________ > > From: lester.corderio(a)ufomoviez.com [lester.corderio(a)ufomoviez.com] > > Sent: Thursday, May 07, 2020 11:51 > > To: tpm2(a)lists.01.org > > Subject: [tpm2] tpm2_clear > > > > hi, i am complete newbie to TPM so please excuse me if my question is > > silly, i wanted to know if anyone uses tpm2_clear command is all the > > data and keys lost?? so what if a disgrunted employee takes access and > > clears the TPM how can we recover from this? > > _______________________________________________ > > tpm2 mailing list -- tpm2(a)lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to > > tpm2-leave(a)lists.01.org > > %(web_page_url)slistinfo%(cgiext)s/%(_internal_name)s > > _______________________________________________ > > tpm2 mailing list -- tpm2(a)lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to > > tpm2-leave(a)lists.01.org > > %(web_page_url)slistinfo%(cgiext)s/%(_internal_name)s > > _______________________________________________ > > tpm2 mailing list -- tpm2(a)lists.01.org To unsubscribe send an email to > > tpm2-leave(a)lists.01.org > > %(web_page_url)slistinfo%(cgiext)s/%(_internal_name)s > _______________________________________________ > tpm2 mailing list -- tpm2(a)lists.01.org > To unsubscribe send an email to tpm2-leave(a)lists.01.org > %(web_page_url)slistinfo%(cgiext)s/%(_internal_name)s