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From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	"Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 09/16] x86/cpu: Adjust enable_nmis() to be shadow stack compatible
Date: Tue, 5 May 2020 16:48:37 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <478340f1-4238-1419-eeb7-c8c2ed7103a6@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200501225838.9866-10-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

On 02.05.2020 00:58, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> When executing an IRET-to-self, the shadow stack must agree with the regular
> stack.  We can't manipulate SSP directly, so have to fake a shadow IRET frame
> by executing 3 CALLs, then editing the result to look correct.
> 
> This is not a fastpath, is called on the BSP long before CET can be set up,
> and may be called on the crash path after CET is disabled.  Use the fact that
> INCSSP is allocated from the hint nop space to construct a test for CET being
> active which is safe on all processors.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Reviewed-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
albeit with a question which may make a further change necessary:

> --- a/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
> +++ b/xen/include/asm-x86/processor.h
> @@ -544,17 +544,40 @@ static inline void enable_nmis(void)
>  {
>      unsigned long tmp;
>  
> -    asm volatile ( "mov %%rsp, %[tmp]     \n\t"
> -                   "push %[ss]            \n\t"
> -                   "push %[tmp]           \n\t"
> -                   "pushf                 \n\t"
> -                   "push %[cs]            \n\t"
> -                   "lea 1f(%%rip), %[tmp] \n\t"
> -                   "push %[tmp]           \n\t"
> -                   "iretq; 1:             \n\t"
> -                   : [tmp] "=&r" (tmp)
> +    asm volatile ( "mov     %%rsp, %[rsp]        \n\t"
> +                   "lea    .Ldone(%%rip), %[rip] \n\t"
> +#ifdef CONFIG_XEN_SHSTK
> +                   /* Check for CET-SS being active. */
> +                   "mov    $1, %k[ssp]           \n\t"
> +                   "rdsspq %[ssp]                \n\t"
> +                   "cmp    $1, %k[ssp]           \n\t"
> +                   "je     .Lshstk_done          \n\t"
> +
> +                   /* Push 3 words on the shadow stack */
> +                   ".rept 3                      \n\t"
> +                   "call 1f; nop; 1:             \n\t"
> +                   ".endr                        \n\t"
> +
> +                   /* Fixup to be an IRET shadow stack frame */
> +                   "wrssq  %q[cs], -1*8(%[ssp])  \n\t"
> +                   "wrssq  %[rip], -2*8(%[ssp])  \n\t"
> +                   "wrssq  %[ssp], -3*8(%[ssp])  \n\t"
> +
> +                   ".Lshstk_done:"
> +#endif
> +                   /* Write an IRET regular frame */
> +                   "push   %[ss]                 \n\t"
> +                   "push   %[rsp]                \n\t"
> +                   "pushf                        \n\t"
> +                   "push   %q[cs]                \n\t"
> +                   "push   %[rip]                \n\t"
> +                   "iretq                        \n\t"
> +                   ".Ldone:                      \n\t"
> +                   : [rip] "=&r" (tmp),
> +                     [rsp] "=&r" (tmp),
> +                     [ssp] "=&r" (tmp)

Even after an hour of reading and searching through the gcc docs
I can't convince myself that this utilizes defined behavior. We
do tie multiple outputs to the same C variable elsewhere, yes,
but only in cases where we don't really care about the register,
or where the register is a fixed one anyway. What I can't find
is a clear statement that gcc wouldn't ever, now or in the
future, use the same register for all three outputs. I think one
can deduce this in certain ways, and experimentation also seems
to confirm it, but still.

Jan


  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-05 14:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-01 22:58 [PATCH 00/16] x86: Support for CET Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 01/16] x86/traps: Drop last_extable_addr Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 12:44   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 14:53     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:00       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 02/16] x86/traps: Clean up printing in do_reserved_trap()/fatal_trap() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:08   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-11 15:09       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-18 16:54         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-19  8:50           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 15:38             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27  6:54               ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 03/16] x86/traps: Factor out exception_fixup() and make printing consistent Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:20   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:14     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:05       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-26 18:06         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-27  7:01           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 04/16] x86/smpboot: Write the top-of-stack block in cpu_smpboot_alloc() Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:22   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 05/16] x86/shstk: Introduce Supervisor Shadow Stack support Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 13:52   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 15:46     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:54       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-15 16:21     ` Anthony PERARD
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 06/16] x86/traps: Implement #CP handler and extend #PF for shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:10   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:20     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 13:58       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 07/16] x86/shstk: Re-layout the stack block " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:24   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 17:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:07       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 08/16] x86/shstk: Create " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-04 14:55   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-04 15:08     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 09/16] x86/cpu: Adjust enable_nmis() to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-05 14:48   ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2020-05-11 18:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 10/16] x86/cpu: Adjust reset_stack_and_jump() " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:17   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 20:07     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 11/16] x86/spec-ctrl: Adjust DO_OVERWRITE_RSB " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:22   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 13:25     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:38       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 12/16] x86/extable: Adjust extable handling " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:35   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:09     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:31       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-12 16:14         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-13  9:22           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 13/16] x86/ioemul: Rewrite stub generation " Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:46   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 14/16] x86/alt: Adjust _alternative_instructions() to not create shadow stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 13:49   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 15/16] x86/entry: Adjust guest paths to be shadow stack compatible Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:12   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-07 15:50     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 16:15       ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 21:45         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-05-12 14:56           ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-01 22:58 ` [PATCH 16/16] x86/shstk: Activate Supervisor Shadow Stacks Andrew Cooper
2020-05-07 14:54   ` Jan Beulich
2020-05-11 23:46     ` Andrew Cooper

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