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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d0e5b1-ffee-d694-4865-8718619c1be0@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518102424.GD82842@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>

On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
> 
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
> 
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?

It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the 
admin to even work.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d0e5b1-ffee-d694-4865-8718619c1be0@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518102424.GD82842@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>

On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
> 
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
> 
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?

It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the 
admin to even work.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-riscv mailing list
linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-riscv

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@i ntel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d0e5b1-ffee-d694-4865-8718619c1be0@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518102424.GD82842@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>

On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
> 
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
> 
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?

It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the 
admin to even work.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb
_______________________________________________
Linux-nvdimm mailing list -- linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org
To unsubscribe send an email to linux-nvdimm-leave@lists.01.org

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>, Mike Rapoport <rppt@kernel.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
	Christopher Lameter <cl@linux.com>,
	Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Elena Reshetova <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Hagen Paul Pfeifer <hagen@jauu.net>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	James Bottomley <jejb@linux.ibm.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	"Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>,
	Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org>,
	Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>,
	Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>,
	Michael Kerrisk <mtk.manpages@gmail.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmer@dabbelt.com>,
	Palmer Dabbelt <palmerdabbelt@google.com>,
	Paul Walmsley <paul.walmsley@sifive.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Rafael J. Wysocki" <rjw@rjwysocki.net>,
	Rick Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>,
	Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>, Shakeel Butt <shakeelb@google.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Tycho Andersen <tycho@tycho.ws>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	Yury Norov <yury.norov@gmail.com>,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-nvdimm@lists.01.org, linux-riscv@lists.infradead.org,
	x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users
Date: Tue, 18 May 2021 12:27:13 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <47d0e5b1-ffee-d694-4865-8718619c1be0@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210518102424.GD82842@C02TD0UTHF1T.local>

On 18.05.21 12:24, Mark Rutland wrote:
> On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 09:47:32PM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
>> From: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
>>
>> It is unsafe to allow saving of secretmem areas to the hibernation
>> snapshot as they would be visible after the resume and this essentially
>> will defeat the purpose of secret memory mappings.
>>
>> Prevent hibernation whenever there are active secret memory users.
> 
> Have we thought about how this is going to work in practice, e.g. on
> mobile systems? It seems to me that there are a variety of common
> applications which might want to use this which people don't expect to
> inhibit hibernate (e.g. authentication agents, web browsers).
> 
> Are we happy to say that any userspace application can incidentally
> inhibit hibernate?

It's worth noting that secretmem has to be explicitly enabled by the 
admin to even work.

-- 
Thanks,

David / dhildenb


_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

  reply	other threads:[~2021-05-18 10:27 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 129+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-05-13 18:47 [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 1/8] mmap: make mlock_future_check() global Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  8:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 2/8] riscv/Kconfig: make direct map manipulation options depend on MMU Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  8:28   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:28     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:28     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:28     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 3/8] set_memory: allow set_direct_map_*_noflush() for multiple pages Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  8:43   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:43     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:43     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:43     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-16  7:13     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:13       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:13       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:13       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 4/8] set_memory: allow querying whether set_direct_map_*() is actually enabled Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 5/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  8:50   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:50     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:50     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  8:50     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-17  7:23     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-17  7:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-17  7:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-17  7:23       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  9:25   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:25     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:25     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:25     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-16  7:29     ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:29       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:29       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-16  7:29       ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-18  9:59       ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18  9:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18  9:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18  9:59         ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:06         ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:06           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:06           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:06           ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:31           ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:31             ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:31             ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:31             ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 10:35             ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:35               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:35               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:35               ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 11:08               ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 11:08                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 11:08                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-18 11:08                 ` Michal Hocko
2021-05-19  7:13                 ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-19  7:13                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-19  7:13                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-19  7:13                   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 6/8] PM: hibernate: disable when there are active secretmem users Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:24   ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-18 10:24     ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-18 10:24     ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-18 10:24     ` Mark Rutland
2021-05-18 10:27     ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2021-05-18 10:27       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:27       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-18 10:27       ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-19  1:32     ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  1:32       ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  1:32       ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  1:32       ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  1:49       ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19  1:49         ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19  1:49         ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19  1:49         ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19  1:49         ` Dan Williams
2021-05-19  3:50         ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  3:50           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  3:50           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-19  3:50           ` James Bottomley
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 7/8] arch, mm: wire up memfd_secret system call where relevant Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  9:27   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:27     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 18:47 ` [PATCH v19 8/8] secretmem: test: add basic selftest for memfd_secret(2) Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-13 18:47   ` Mike Rapoport
2021-05-14  9:40   ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:40     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:40     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-14  9:40     ` David Hildenbrand
2021-05-13 19:08 ` [PATCH v19 0/8] mm: introduce memfd_secret system call to create "secret" memory areas James Bottomley
2021-05-13 19:08   ` James Bottomley
2021-05-13 19:08   ` James Bottomley
2021-05-13 19:08   ` James Bottomley

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