From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: from mga09.intel.com (mga09.intel.com [134.134.136.24]) by mail.openembedded.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 26D4B6FA47 for ; Mon, 9 Jun 2014 15:53:57 +0000 (UTC) Received: from orsmga002.jf.intel.com ([10.7.209.21]) by orsmga102.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Jun 2014 08:48:38 -0700 X-ExtLoop1: 1 X-IronPort-AV: E=Sophos;i="4.98,1003,1392192000"; d="scan'208,223";a="554544800" Received: from mmckenna-mobl2.ger.corp.intel.com (HELO peggleto-mobl5.ger.corp.intel.com) ([10.252.121.49]) by orsmga002.jf.intel.com with ESMTP; 09 Jun 2014 08:53:53 -0700 From: Paul Eggleton To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org Date: Mon, 9 Jun 2014 16:53:45 +0100 Message-Id: <499ed141558ca50a9e97fc9a979c131fca27ba21.1402329159.git.paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 1.9.3 In-Reply-To: References: In-Reply-To: References: Subject: [dora][PATCH 3/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221 X-BeenThere: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.12 Precedence: list List-Id: Patches and discussions about the oe-core layer List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Mon, 09 Jun 2014 15:53:57 -0000 >From the OpenSSL Security Advisory [05 Jun 2014] http://www.openssl.org/news/secadv_20140605.txt DTLS recursion flaw (CVE-2014-0221) By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Only applications using OpenSSL as a DTLS client are affected. (Patch borrowed from Fedora.) Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton --- .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++ .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb | 1 + 2 files changed, 39 insertions(+) create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf730a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +commit d30e582446b027868cdabd0994681643682045a4 +Author: Dr. Stephen Henson +Date: Fri May 16 13:00:45 2014 +0100 + + Fix CVE-2014-0221 + + Unnecessary recursion when receiving a DTLS hello request can be used to + crash a DTLS client. Fixed by handling DTLS hello request without recursion. + + Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. + +Patch borrowed from Fedora +Upstream-Status: Backport +Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton + +diff --git a/ssl/d1_both.c b/ssl/d1_both.c +index 07f67f8..4c2fd03 100644 +--- a/ssl/d1_both.c ++++ b/ssl/d1_both.c +@@ -793,6 +793,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) + int i,al; + struct hm_header_st msg_hdr; + ++ redo: + /* see if we have the required fragment already */ + if ((frag_len = dtls1_retrieve_buffered_fragment(s,max,ok)) || *ok) + { +@@ -851,8 +852,7 @@ dtls1_get_message_fragment(SSL *s, int st1, int stn, long max, int *ok) + s->msg_callback_arg); + + s->init_num = 0; +- return dtls1_get_message_fragment(s, st1, stn, +- max, ok); ++ goto redo; + } + else /* Incorrectly formated Hello request */ + { + diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb index 38cdb3f..dc77330 100644 --- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb +++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \ file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \ file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \ + file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0221.patch \ " SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c" -- 1.9.3