From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Cedric Le Goater Subject: Re: How much of a mess does OpenVZ make? ;) Was: What can OpenVZ do? Date: Tue, 03 Mar 2009 17:17:35 +0100 Message-ID: <49AD581F.2090903__32812.558548949$1236097584$gmane$org@free.fr> References: <1234467035.3243.538.camel@calx> <20090212114207.e1c2de82.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <1234475483.30155.194.camel@nimitz> <20090212141014.2cd3d54d.akpm@linux-foundation.org> <1234479845.30155.220.camel@nimitz> <20090226162755.GB1456@x200.localdomain> <20090226173302.GB29439@elte.hu> <20090226223112.GA2939@x200.localdomain> <20090301013304.GA2428@x200.localdomain> <20090301200231.GA25276@us.ibm.com> <20090301205659.GA7276@x200.localdomain> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20090301205659.GA7276-2ev+ksY9ol182hYKe6nXyg@public.gmane.org> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org Errors-To: containers-bounces-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org To: Alexey Dobriyan Cc: Andrew Morton , linux-api-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, containers-cunTk1MwBs9QetFLy7KEm3xJsTq8ys+cHZ5vskTnxNA@public.gmane.org, hpa-YMNOUZJC4hwAvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org, linux-kernel-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org, Dave Hansen , linux-mm-Bw31MaZKKs3YtjvyW6yDsg@public.gmane.org, viro-RmSDqhL/yNMiFSDQTTA3OLVCufUGDwFn@public.gmane.org, mpm-VDJrAJ4Gl5ZBDgjK7y7TUQ@public.gmane.org, tglx-hfZtesqFncYOwBW4kG4KsQ@public.gmane.org, torvalds-de/tnXTf+JLsfHDXvbKv3WD2FQJk+8+b@public.gmane.org, Ingo Molnar , xemul-GEFAQzZX7r8dnm+yROfE0A@public.gmane.org List-Id: containers.vger.kernel.org >> 1. cap_sys_admin check is unfortunate. In discussions about Oren's >> patchset we've agreed that not having that check from the outset forces >> us to consider security with each new patch and feature, which is a good >> thing. > > Removing CAP_SYS_ADMIN on restore? we've kept the capabilities in our patchset but the user tools doing checkpoint and restart are setcap'ed appropriately to be able to do different things like : clone() the namespaces mount /dev/mqueue interact with net_ns etc. at restart, the task are restarted through execve() so they loose their capabilities automatically. but I think we could drop the CAP_SYS_ADMIN tests for some namespaces, uts and ipc are good candidates. I guess network should require some privilege. C.