All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: andy753421@gmail.com
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC] Privilege dropping security module
Date: Wed, 23 Sep 2009 13:46:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <4ABA892A.9090804@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090923005644.GA28244@c.hsd1.tn.comcast.net>

Andy Spencer wrote:
> I started work on a Linux Security Module called dpriv a few days ago
> and would like to get some feedback. It's by no means ready to be
> included in the kernel, but I'm sure there are many things that I could
> have done better so suggestions are welcome.
>   

Hi Andy. Git is a wonderful tool, but if you want people to review
your work you need to post patches.

> The code is available from gitweb and the dpriv branch of my tree:
>
>   git://lug.rose-hulman.edu/~spenceal/linux-dev dpriv
>
>   http://lug.rose-hulman.edu/git/?p=~spenceal/linux-dev;f=security/dpriv;hb=refs/heads/dpriv
>
>
> I'll start off with a quick FAQ
> -------------------------------
> Q: Why another LSM, don't we have enough already?
> A: As far as I know there are several rather unique things about dpriv
>    when compared to other LSMs. (it's also been a good way for me to
>    familiarize myself with the kernel)
>
> Q: So what's unique about dpriv?
> A: - Dpriv can be used by any user, not just by root
>    - The "policy" is created at runtime instead of fixed beforehand
>    - It does *not* implement Mandatory Access Control
>   

A good thing, or at least, a partial answer to #1.

>
> Now for how it works
> --------------------
> - Everything is controlled though a securityfs interface which consists
>   of three files: "stage", "policy", and "control".
>
> - Policies are created by writing lines to the stage file and then
>   writing the "commit" command to the control file. "Committing" the
>   policy merges the staged policy into the actual policy (the "policy"
>   file). Note that privileges can only be dropped during a commit, and
>   afterwards there is no way to get them back.
>
> - Policies are effective for the process which created them and are also
>   copied to all it's child processes.
>
> - For example, the following commands will set the root filesystem
>   read-only with the exception of allowing execute permission in /bin/
>   and write permission in /tmp/. (note that directory permission are
>   uppercase and file permissions are lowercase, both are recursive)
>
>   $ echo r--R-X /    > /sys/kernel/security/dpriv/stage
>   $ echo r-xR-X /bin > /sys/kernel/security/dpriv/stage
>   $ echo rw-RWX /tmp > /sys/kernel/security/dpriv/stage
>   $ echo commit      > /sys/kernel/security/dpriv/control
>
>   

And what do you propose as an interesting use case for dpriv?

> And some technical details
> --------------------------
> (subject to change)
>
> - Dpriv stores a list of active and staged permissions for each process
>   in current->cred->security. Each permissions line consists of a mode
>   mask and the inode that it is effective for.
>
> - When determining access rights for an inode: if the inode is in the
>   list of active permissions, use that mask, else recursively fetch (and
>   merge) the permissions from the inodes parents
>
>   (to do this, all the parents for hard links/mounts will need to be
>   known and stored in the inode somehow, possibly using extended
>   attributes, I haven't completely worked this out yet)
>
> - Permissions for things other than files could be implemented as well,
>   but I haven't started working on those either.
>
>
> Let me know what you think
>   


  reply	other threads:[~2009-09-23 20:47 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2009-09-23  0:56 [RFC] Privilege dropping security module Andy Spencer
2009-09-23 20:46 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2009-09-23 22:31   ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-23 23:03     ` Tetsuo Handa
2009-09-24 16:37     ` David Wagner
2009-09-25  7:22       ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-25 20:48         ` David Wagner
2009-09-26 21:09           ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-27  0:28             ` David Wagner
2009-10-01  7:38     ` Pavel Machek
2009-10-01  9:15       ` Andy Spencer
2009-10-01 10:42         ` Pavel Machek
2009-09-23 21:31 ` [RFC][PATCH] " Andy Spencer
2009-09-24 16:25   ` Casey Schaufler
2009-09-25 10:06     ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-25 16:23       ` Casey Schaufler
2009-09-26 21:35         ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-28  5:38           ` Rob Meijer
2009-09-25 21:00       ` David Wagner
2009-09-29  7:36         ` Andy Spencer
2009-09-29  7:10 ` [RFC][PATCH] Permission masking security module (was dpriv) Andy Spencer
2009-09-29 17:44   ` Greg KH
2009-09-30  0:18     ` Andy Spencer
2009-10-01  2:33   ` Casey Schaufler

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=4ABA892A.9090804@schaufler-ca.com \
    --to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
    --cc=andy753421@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.