From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755970Ab0CXPxe (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Mar 2010 11:53:34 -0400 Received: from mx1.redhat.com ([209.132.183.28]:61120 "EHLO mx1.redhat.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1753271Ab0CXPxa (ORCPT ); Wed, 24 Mar 2010 11:53:30 -0400 Message-ID: <4BAA3556.2040802@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 24 Mar 2010 17:52:54 +0200 From: Avi Kivity User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux x86_64; en-US; rv:1.9.1.8) Gecko/20100301 Fedora/3.0.3-1.fc12 Thunderbird/3.0.3 MIME-Version: 1.0 To: Joerg Roedel CC: "Daniel P. Berrange" , Anthony Liguori , Ingo Molnar , Pekka Enberg , "Zhang, Yanmin" , Peter Zijlstra , Sheng Yang , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, Marcelo Tosatti , Jes Sorensen , Gleb Natapov , ziteng.huang@intel.com, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo , Fr?d?ric Weisbecker , Gregory Haskins Subject: Re: [RFC] Unify KVM kernel-space and user-space code into a single project References: <20100324115900.GB14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA00B1.20407@redhat.com> <20100324125043.GC14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA0DFE.1080700@redhat.com> <20100324134642.GD14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA1A53.20207@redhat.com> <20100324150137.GE14800@8bytes.org> <20100324152653.GA12225@redhat.com> <20100324153746.GF14800@8bytes.org> <4BAA3323.9000405@redhat.com> <20100324155041.GH14800@8bytes.org> In-Reply-To: <20100324155041.GH14800@8bytes.org> Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 03/24/2010 05:50 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote: > On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 05:43:31PM +0200, Avi Kivity wrote: > >> On 03/24/2010 05:37 PM, Joerg Roedel wrote: >> >>> Even better. So a guest which breaks out can't even access its own >>> /sys/kvm/ directory. Perfect, it doesn't need that access anyway. >>> >> But what security label does that directory have? How can we make sure >> that whoever needs access to those files, gets them? >> >> Automatically created objects don't work well with that model. They're >> simply missing information. >> > If we go the /proc//kvm way then the directory should probably > inherit the label from /proc//? > That's a security policy. The security people like their policies outside the kernel. For example, they may want a label that allows a trace context to read the data, and also qemu itself for introspection. > Same could be applied to /sys/kvm/guest/ if we decide for it. The VM is > still bound to a single process with a /proc/ after all. > Ditto. -- error compiling committee.c: too many arguments to function