From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Jan Beulich" Subject: Re: Xen Advisory 5 (CVE-2011-3131) IOMMU fault livelock Date: Fri, 12 Aug 2011 14:53:44 +0100 Message-ID: <4E454C880200007800051000@nat28.tlf.novell.com> References: <20037.10841.995717.397090@mariner.uk.xensource.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20037.10841.995717.397090@mariner.uk.xensource.com> Content-Disposition: inline List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xensource.com To: Tim Deegan Cc: xen-devel@lists.xensource.com, "Xen.org security team" List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org >>> On 12.08.11 at 15:27, Xen.org security team wrote: > IMPACT > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >=20 > A malicious guest administrator of a VM that has direct control of a > PCI[E] device can cause a performance degradation, and possibly hang the > host. >=20 > RESOLUTION > =3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D=3D >=20 > This issue is resolved in changeset 23762:537ed3b74b3f of > xen-unstable.hg, and 23112:84e3706df07a of xen-4.1-testing.hg. Do you really think this helps much? Direct control of the device means it could also (perhaps on a second vCPU) constantly re-enable the bus mastering bit. Preventing that would need cooperation with pciback or filtering of subsequent config space writes directly in the hypervisor (the latter could become difficult when mmcfg is being used by Dom0 even for base accesses). Jan