From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: "Maciej Żenczykowski" <zenczykowski@gmail.com>
Cc: "Maciej Żenczykowski" <maze@google.com>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] net: change capability used by socket options IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT
Date: Fri, 23 Sep 2011 09:36:57 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <4E7CB5A9.2020303@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1316734189-26668-1-git-send-email-zenczykowski@gmail.com>
On 9/22/2011 4:29 PM, Maciej Żenczykowski wrote:
> From: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
>
> Up till now the IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT socket options (which actually set
> the same bit in the socket struct) have required CAP_NET_ADMIN
> privileges to set or clear the option.
>
> - we make clearing the bit not require any privileges.
> - we deprecate using CAP_NET_ADMIN for this purpose.
> - we introduce a new capability CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT,
> which is tailored to allow setting just this bit.
Under what circumstances would a process that requires the
new capability not require CAP_NET_ADMIN? Is there a real
case where a process would be expected to require only this
new capability? Adding new capability values is somewhat
perilous and the granularity you are proposing, that of
controlling a single bit, would explode the list of
capabilities into the hundreds if it were applied throughout
the kernel.
> - we allow either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT or CAP_NET_RAW
> to set this bit, because raw sockets already effectively
> allow you to emulate socket transparency, and make the
> transition easier for apps not desiring to use a brand
> new capability (because of header file or glibc support)
> - we print a warning (but allow it) if you try to set
> the socket option with CAP_NET_ADMIN privs, but without
> either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT or CAP_NET_RAW.
>
> The reason for introducing a new capability is that while
> transparent sockets are potentially dangerous (and can let you
> spoof your source IP on traffic), they don't normally give you
> the full 'freedom' of eavesdropping and/or spoofing that raw sockets
> give you.
>
> Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
> Acked-by: Balazs Scheidler <bazsi@balabit.hu>
> Acked-by: David Miller <davem@redhat.com>
> ---
> include/linux/capability.h | 13 +++++++++----
> net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++----
> net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c | 29 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
> 3 files changed, 55 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/include/linux/capability.h b/include/linux/capability.h
> index c421123..a115ed4 100644
> --- a/include/linux/capability.h
> +++ b/include/linux/capability.h
> @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
> /* Allow modification of routing tables */
> /* Allow setting arbitrary process / process group ownership on
> sockets */
> -/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
> +/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying (deprecated) */
> /* Allow setting TOS (type of service) */
> /* Allow setting promiscuous mode */
> /* Allow clearing driver statistics */
> @@ -210,6 +210,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
>
> /* Allow use of RAW sockets */
> /* Allow use of PACKET sockets */
> +/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
>
> #define CAP_NET_RAW 13
>
> @@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
>
> #define CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL 30
>
> -#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
> +#define CAP_SETFCAP 31
>
> /* Override MAC access.
> The base kernel enforces no MAC policy.
> @@ -357,10 +358,14 @@ struct cpu_vfs_cap_data {
>
> /* Allow triggering something that will wake the system */
>
> -#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
> +#define CAP_WAKE_ALARM 35
> +
> +/* Allow binding to any address for transparent proxying */
> +
> +#define CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT 36
>
>
> -#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_WAKE_ALARM
> +#define CAP_LAST_CAP CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
>
> #define cap_valid(x) ((x) >= 0 && (x) <= CAP_LAST_CAP)
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> index 8905e92..44efa39 100644
> --- a/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c
> @@ -961,12 +961,30 @@ mc_msf_out:
> break;
>
> case IP_TRANSPARENT:
> - if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> - err = -EPERM;
> - break;
> - }
> if (optlen < 1)
> goto e_inval;
> + /* Always allow clearing the transparent proxy socket option.
> + * The pre-3.2 permission for setting this was CAP_NET_ADMIN,
> + * and this is still supported - but deprecated. As of Linux
> + * 3.2 the proper permission is one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
> + * (preferred, a new capability) or CAP_NET_RAW. The latter
> + * is supported to make the transition easier (and because
> + * raw sockets already effectively allow one to emulate
> + * socket transparency).
> + */
> + if (!!val && !capable(CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT)
> + && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> + err = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + }
> + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
> + "deprecated: attempt to set socket option "
> + "IP_TRANSPARENT with CAP_NET_ADMIN but "
> + "without either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT "
> + "or CAP_NET_RAW.\n",
> + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> + }
> inet->transparent = !!val;
> break;
>
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> index 2fbda5f..b8315c8 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/ipv6_sockglue.c
> @@ -343,13 +343,32 @@ static int do_ipv6_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname,
> break;
>
> case IPV6_TRANSPARENT:
> - if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> - retv = -EPERM;
> - break;
> - }
> if (optlen < sizeof(int))
> goto e_inval;
> - /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the one in the IPv4 socket */
> + /* Always allow clearing the transparent proxy socket option.
> + * The pre-3.2 permission for setting this was CAP_NET_ADMIN,
> + * and this is still supported - but deprecated. As of Linux
> + * 3.2 the proper permission is one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT
> + * (preferred, a new capability) or CAP_NET_RAW. The latter
> + * is supported to make the transition easier (and because
> + * raw sockets already effectively allow one to emulate
> + * socket transparency).
> + */
> + if (valbool && !capable(CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT)
> + && !capable(CAP_NET_RAW)) {
> + if (!capable(CAP_NET_ADMIN)) {
> + retv = -EPERM;
> + break;
> + }
> + printk_once(KERN_WARNING "%s (%d): "
> + "deprecated: attempt to set socket option "
> + "IPV6_TRANSPARENT with CAP_NET_ADMIN but "
> + "without either one of CAP_NET_TRANSPARENT "
> + "or CAP_NET_RAW.\n",
> + current->comm, task_pid_nr(current));
> + }
> + /* we don't have a separate transparent bit for IPV6 we use the
> + * one in the IPv4 socket */
> inet_sk(sk)->transparent = valbool;
> retv = 0;
> break;
--
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2011-09-23 16:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 22+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2011-08-30 21:45 IP_TRANSPARENT requires CAP_NET_ADMIN - why? Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-01 21:25 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-02 8:43 ` Balazs Scheidler
2011-09-02 19:10 ` [PATCH] net: change capability used by socket options IP{,V6}_TRANSPARENT Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-13 5:55 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-13 15:27 ` Balazs Scheidler
2011-09-14 6:45 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-20 19:42 ` David Miller
2011-10-17 22:16 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-10-17 22:19 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-10-19 23:34 ` David Miller
2011-10-20 3:32 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-10-20 4:19 ` David Miller
2011-10-20 4:31 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-10-20 4:34 ` David Miller
2011-10-20 22:10 ` [PATCH] net: allow CAP_NET_RAW to set " Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-10-20 22:22 ` David Miller
2011-09-22 23:29 ` [PATCH] net: change capability used by " Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-23 14:45 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2011-09-23 16:36 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2011-09-23 19:33 ` Maciej Żenczykowski
2011-09-26 16:31 ` Casey Schaufler
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