From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1751645AbeEBXHG (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 May 2018 19:07:06 -0400 Received: from mail-ot0-f194.google.com ([74.125.82.194]:34841 "EHLO mail-ot0-f194.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1751148AbeEBXHE (ORCPT ); Wed, 2 May 2018 19:07:04 -0400 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AB8JxZoyPRHwr0T0ojud2aPBA6zDsKvSLVX3FW27zzZUQSen2qqlDAAwUE8ZmIgOFA4qKeru3HDlWw== Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack To: Kees Cook Cc: Alexander Popov , Mark Rutland , Ard Biesheuvel , Kernel Hardening , linux-arm-kernel , LKML References: <20180502203326.9491-1-labbott@redhat.com> <20180502203326.9491-3-labbott@redhat.com> From: Laura Abbott Message-ID: <4b7e94c1-79c9-0380-25c6-762762ed595f@redhat.com> Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 16:07:01 -0700 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:52.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/52.7.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8; format=flowed Content-Language: en-US Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott wrote: >> >> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version > > Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can > create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the > arch/ trees... > >> >> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott >> --- >> Now written in C instead of a bunch of assembly. >> --- >> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 6 ++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 ++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 16 ++++++++++ >> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +- >> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +++- >> 8 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> index eb2cf4938f6d..b0221db95dc9 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config ARM64 >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER >> + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK >> select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> index 767598932549..d31ab80ff647 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct { >> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */ >> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */ >> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + unsigned long lowest_stack; >> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS >> + unsigned long prev_lowest_stack; >> +#endif >> +#endif > > I wonder if x86 and arm64 could include a common struct here that was > empty when the plugin is disabled... it would keep the ifdefs in one > place. Maybe include/linux/stackleak.h could be: > > ---start--- > /* Poison value points to the unused hole in the virtual memory map */ > #define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF > #define STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH 128 > > struct stackleak { > #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK > unsigned long lowest; > #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS > unsigned long prev_lowest; > #endif > #endif > }; > Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off? This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs make me a little uneasy. > asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void); > ---eof--- > > and arch/*/include/asm/processor.h could do: > > @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct { > unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */ > unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */ > struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ > + struct stackleak stackleak; > > and arch/x86/entry/erase.c could move to maybe kernel/stackleak.c? > (Oh, I notice this needs an SPDX line too.) > >> static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> index bf825f38d206..0ceea613c65b 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o >> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o >> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o >> >> +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += erase.o >> +KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n >> + >> obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/ >> obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m) >> head-y := head.o >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> index ec2ee720e33e..3144f1ebdc18 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info >> >> .text >> >> + .macro ERASE_KSTACK >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + bl erase_kstack >> +#endif >> + .endm >> /* >> * Exception vectors. >> */ >> @@ -906,6 +911,7 @@ ret_to_user: >> cbnz x2, work_pending >> finish_ret_to_user: >> enable_step_tsk x1, x2 >> + ERASE_KSTACK >> kernel_exit 0 >> ENDPROC(ret_to_user) > > Nice. All of the return paths end up here (I went looking for > ret_from_fork's path). :) > >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..b8b5648d893b >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> + >> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void) >> +{ >> + unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack; >> + unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1); >> + unsigned long poison = 0; >> + const unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / >> + sizeof(unsigned long); >> + >> + /* >> + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack. >> + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom. >> + */ >> + while (p > boundary && poison <= check_depth) { >> + if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON) >> + poison++; >> + else >> + poison = 0; >> + >> + p -= sizeof(unsigned long); >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * One long int at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and >> + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK). >> + */ >> + if (p == boundary) >> + p += sizeof(unsigned long); >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS >> + current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p; >> +#endif >> + >> + /* >> + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. >> + * Start from the address in p and move up till the new boundary. >> + */ >> + boundary = current_stack_pointer; > > This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What > do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86: > > if (on_thread_stack()) > boundary = current_stack_pointer; > else > boundary = current_top_of_stack(); > > then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in arch/? > The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs. >> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE); >> + >> + while (p < boundary) { >> + *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON; >> + p += sizeof(unsigned long); >> + } >> + >> + /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */ >> + current->thread.lowest_stack = current_stack_pointer; >> +} >> + >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> index f08a2ed9db0d..156fa0a0da19 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start, >> p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork; >> p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs; >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p); >> +#endif >> ptrace_hw_copy_thread(p); >> >> return 0; >> @@ -493,3 +496,16 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) >> { >> current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; >> } >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size) >> +{ >> + unsigned long sp, stack_left; >> + >> + sp = current_stack_pointer; >> + >> + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1); >> + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256); >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca); > > This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or > something else? > This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best practice. >> +#endif >> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644 >> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt >> KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ >> -D__NO_FORTIFY \ >> $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \ >> - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) >> + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \ >> + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) >> >> GCOV_PROFILE := n >> KASAN_SANITIZE := n >> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> index 8d6070fc538f..6cc0e35d3324 100644 >> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS >> >> gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so >> gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE) >> + ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable >> + endif >> >> GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y)) >> >> export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR >> - export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN >> + export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN >> >> ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),) >> # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication. >> -- >> 2.14.3 >> > > -Kees > Thanks, Laura From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: labbott@redhat.com (Laura Abbott) Date: Wed, 2 May 2018 16:07:01 -0700 Subject: [PATCH 2/2] arm64: Clear the stack In-Reply-To: References: <20180502203326.9491-1-labbott@redhat.com> <20180502203326.9491-3-labbott@redhat.com> Message-ID: <4b7e94c1-79c9-0380-25c6-762762ed595f@redhat.com> To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org List-Id: linux-arm-kernel.lists.infradead.org On 05/02/2018 02:31 PM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Wed, May 2, 2018 at 1:33 PM, Laura Abbott wrote: >> >> Implementation of stackleak based heavily on the x86 version > > Awesome! Notes below for both you and Alexander, since I think we can > create a common code base instead of having near-duplicates in the > arch/ trees... > >> >> Signed-off-by: Laura Abbott >> --- >> Now written in C instead of a bunch of assembly. >> --- >> arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 + >> arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 6 ++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile | 3 ++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 6 ++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c | 55 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ >> arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 16 ++++++++++ >> drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile | 3 +- >> scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins | 5 +++- >> 8 files changed, 93 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) >> create mode 100644 arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> index eb2cf4938f6d..b0221db95dc9 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig >> @@ -92,6 +92,7 @@ config ARM64 >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS >> select HAVE_ARCH_MMAP_RND_COMPAT_BITS if COMPAT >> select HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER >> + select HAVE_ARCH_STACKLEAK >> select HAVE_ARCH_THREAD_STRUCT_WHITELIST >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRACEHOOK >> select HAVE_ARCH_TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> index 767598932549..d31ab80ff647 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h >> @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct { >> unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */ >> unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */ >> struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + unsigned long lowest_stack; >> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS >> + unsigned long prev_lowest_stack; >> +#endif >> +#endif > > I wonder if x86 and arm64 could include a common struct here that was > empty when the plugin is disabled... it would keep the ifdefs in one > place. Maybe include/linux/stackleak.h could be: > > ---start--- > /* Poison value points to the unused hole in the virtual memory map */ > #define STACKLEAK_POISON -0xBEEF > #define STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH 128 > > struct stackleak { > #ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK > unsigned long lowest; > #ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS > unsigned long prev_lowest; > #endif > #endif > }; > Is this well defined across all compilers if the plugin is off? This seems to compile with gcc at least but 0 sized structs make me a little uneasy. > asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void); > ---eof--- > > and arch/*/include/asm/processor.h could do: > > @@ -124,6 +124,12 @@ struct thread_struct { > unsigned long fault_address; /* fault info */ > unsigned long fault_code; /* ESR_EL1 value */ > struct debug_info debug; /* debugging */ > + struct stackleak stackleak; > > and arch/x86/entry/erase.c could move to maybe kernel/stackleak.c? > (Oh, I notice this needs an SPDX line too.) > >> static inline void arch_thread_struct_whitelist(unsigned long *offset, >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> index bf825f38d206..0ceea613c65b 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/Makefile >> @@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ arm64-reloc-test-y := reloc_test_core.o reloc_test_syms.o >> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP) += crash_dump.o >> arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_SDE_INTERFACE) += sdei.o >> >> +arm64-obj-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += erase.o >> +KASAN_SANITIZE_erase.o := n >> + >> obj-y += $(arm64-obj-y) vdso/ probes/ >> obj-m += $(arm64-obj-m) >> head-y := head.o >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> index ec2ee720e33e..3144f1ebdc18 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S >> @@ -401,6 +401,11 @@ tsk .req x28 // current thread_info >> >> .text >> >> + .macro ERASE_KSTACK >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + bl erase_kstack >> +#endif >> + .endm >> /* >> * Exception vectors. >> */ >> @@ -906,6 +911,7 @@ ret_to_user: >> cbnz x2, work_pending >> finish_ret_to_user: >> enable_step_tsk x1, x2 >> + ERASE_KSTACK >> kernel_exit 0 >> ENDPROC(ret_to_user) > > Nice. All of the return paths end up here (I went looking for > ret_from_fork's path). :) > >> >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> new file mode 100644 >> index 000000000000..b8b5648d893b >> --- /dev/null >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/erase.c >> @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> +#include >> + >> +asmlinkage void erase_kstack(void) >> +{ >> + unsigned long p = current->thread.lowest_stack; >> + unsigned long boundary = p & ~(THREAD_SIZE - 1); >> + unsigned long poison = 0; >> + const unsigned long check_depth = STACKLEAK_POISON_CHECK_DEPTH / >> + sizeof(unsigned long); >> + >> + /* >> + * Let's search for the poison value in the stack. >> + * Start from the lowest_stack and go to the bottom. >> + */ >> + while (p > boundary && poison <= check_depth) { >> + if (*(unsigned long *)p == STACKLEAK_POISON) >> + poison++; >> + else >> + poison = 0; >> + >> + p -= sizeof(unsigned long); >> + } >> + >> + /* >> + * One long int at the bottom of the thread stack is reserved and >> + * should not be poisoned (see CONFIG_SCHED_STACK_END_CHECK). >> + */ >> + if (p == boundary) >> + p += sizeof(unsigned long); >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_STACKLEAK_METRICS >> + current->thread.prev_lowest_stack = p; >> +#endif >> + >> + /* >> + * So let's write the poison value to the kernel stack. >> + * Start from the address in p and move up till the new boundary. >> + */ >> + boundary = current_stack_pointer; > > This is the only difference between x86 and arm64 in this code. What > do you think about implementing on_thread_stack() to match x86: > > if (on_thread_stack()) > boundary = current_stack_pointer; > else > boundary = current_top_of_stack(); > > then we could make this common code too instead of having two copies in arch/? > The issue isn't on_thread_stack, it's current_top_of_stack which isn't defined on arm64. I agree it would be good if the code would be common but I'm not sure how much we want to start trying to force APIs. >> + BUG_ON(boundary - p >= THREAD_SIZE); >> + >> + while (p < boundary) { >> + *(unsigned long *)p = STACKLEAK_POISON; >> + p += sizeof(unsigned long); >> + } >> + >> + /* Reset the lowest_stack value for the next syscall */ >> + current->thread.lowest_stack = current_stack_pointer; >> +} >> + >> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> index f08a2ed9db0d..156fa0a0da19 100644 >> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/process.c >> @@ -364,6 +364,9 @@ int copy_thread(unsigned long clone_flags, unsigned long stack_start, >> p->thread.cpu_context.pc = (unsigned long)ret_from_fork; >> p->thread.cpu_context.sp = (unsigned long)childregs; >> >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + p->thread.lowest_stack = (unsigned long)task_stack_page(p); >> +#endif >> ptrace_hw_copy_thread(p); >> >> return 0; >> @@ -493,3 +496,16 @@ void arch_setup_new_exec(void) >> { >> current->mm->context.flags = is_compat_task() ? MMCF_AARCH32 : 0; >> } >> + >> +#ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> +void __used check_alloca(unsigned long size) >> +{ >> + unsigned long sp, stack_left; >> + >> + sp = current_stack_pointer; >> + >> + stack_left = sp & (THREAD_SIZE - 1); >> + BUG_ON(stack_left < 256 || size >= stack_left - 256); >> +} >> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(check_alloca); > > This is pretty different from x86. Is this just an artifact of ORC, or > something else? > This was based on the earlier version of x86. I'll confess to not seeing how the current x86 version ended up with get_stack_info but I suspect it's either related to ORC unwinding or it's best practice. >> +#endif >> diff --git a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> index a34e9290a699..25dd2a14560d 100644 >> --- a/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> +++ b/drivers/firmware/efi/libstub/Makefile >> @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ cflags-$(CONFIG_EFI_ARMSTUB) += -I$(srctree)/scripts/dtc/libfdt >> KBUILD_CFLAGS := $(cflags-y) -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING \ >> -D__NO_FORTIFY \ >> $(call cc-option,-ffreestanding) \ >> - $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) >> + $(call cc-option,-fno-stack-protector) \ >> + $(DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN) >> >> GCOV_PROFILE := n >> KASAN_SANITIZE := n >> diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> index 8d6070fc538f..6cc0e35d3324 100644 >> --- a/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> +++ b/scripts/Makefile.gcc-plugins >> @@ -37,11 +37,14 @@ ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGINS >> >> gcc-plugin-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += stackleak_plugin.so >> gcc-plugin-cflags-$(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK) += -DSTACKLEAK_PLUGIN -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-track-min-size=$(CONFIG_STACKLEAK_TRACK_MIN_SIZE) >> + ifdef CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_STACKLEAK >> + DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN += -fplugin-arg-stackleak_plugin-disable >> + endif >> >> GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS := $(strip $(addprefix -fplugin=$(objtree)/scripts/gcc-plugins/, $(gcc-plugin-y)) $(gcc-plugin-cflags-y)) >> >> export PLUGINCC GCC_PLUGINS_CFLAGS GCC_PLUGIN GCC_PLUGIN_SUBDIR >> - export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN >> + export SANCOV_PLUGIN DISABLE_LATENT_ENTROPY_PLUGIN DISABLE_STACKLEAK_PLUGIN >> >> ifneq ($(PLUGINCC),) >> # SANCOV_PLUGIN can be only in CFLAGS_KCOV because avoid duplication. >> -- >> 2.14.3 >> > > -Kees > Thanks, Laura