On 22.06.21 12:24, Julien Grall wrote: > Hi Juergen, > > As discussed on IRC yesterday, we noticed a couple of splat in 5.13-rc6 > (and stable 5.4) in the evtchn driver: > > [    7.581000] ------------[ cut here ]------------ > [    7.581899] Interrupt for port 19, but apparently not enabled; > per-user 000000004af23acc > [    7.583401] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 467 at > /home/ANT.AMAZON.COM/jgrall/works/oss/linux/drivers/xen/evtchn.c:169 > evtchn_interrupt+0xd5/0x100 > [    7.585583] Modules linked in: > [    7.586188] CPU: 0 PID: 467 Comm: xenstore-read Not tainted > 5.13.0-rc6 #240 > [    7.587462] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS > rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014 > [    7.589462] RIP: e030:evtchn_interrupt+0xd5/0x100 > [    7.590361] Code: 48 8d bb d8 01 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 be 1d 00 00 00 > e8 5f 72 c4 ff eb b2 8b 75 20 48 89 da 48 c7 c7 a8 03 5f 82 e8 6b 2d 96 > ff <0f> 0b e9 4d ff ff ff 41 0f b6 f4 48 c7 c7 80 da a2 82 e8 f0 > [    7.593662] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040003e60 EFLAGS: 00010082 > [    7.594636] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102328c00 RCX: > 0000000000000027 > [    7.595924] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88817fe18ad0 RDI: > ffff88817fe18ad8 > [    7.597216] RBP: ffff888108ef8140 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: > 0000000000000001 > [    7.598522] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 7075727265746e49 R12: > 0000000000000000 > [    7.599810] R13: ffffc90040003ec4 R14: ffff8881001b8000 R15: > ffff888109b36f80 > [    7.601113] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817fe00000(0000) > knlGS:0000000000000000 > [    7.602570] CS:  10000e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 > [    7.603700] CR2: 00007f15b390e368 CR3: 000000010bb04000 CR4: > 0000000000050660 > [    7.604993] Call Trace: > [    7.605501]  > [    7.605929]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x330 > [    7.606817]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x32/0xa0 > [    7.607670]  handle_irq_event+0x3a/0x60 > [    7.608416]  handle_edge_irq+0x9b/0x1f0 > [    7.609154]  generic_handle_irq+0x4f/0x60 > [    7.609918]  __evtchn_fifo_handle_events+0x195/0x3a0 > [    7.610864]  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x66/0xb0 > [    7.611693]  __xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1d/0x30 > [    7.612582]  xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x9d/0xc0 > [    7.613439]  > [    7.613882]  exc_xen_hypervisor_callback+0x8/0x10 > > This is quite similar to the problem I reported a few months ago (see > [1]) but this time this is happening with fifo rather than 2L. > > I haven't been able to reproduced it reliably so far. But looking at the > code, I think I have found another potential race after commit > > commit b6622798bc50b625a1e62f82c7190df40c1f5b21 > Author: Juergen Gross > Date:   Sat Mar 6 17:18:33 2021 +0100 >    xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpus at the same time >    When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that >    (with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled on the old >    and the new cpu at the same time. >    Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the per-event data and >    call the handler only if this flag isn't set. >    Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >    Reported-by: Julien Grall >    Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross >    Reviewed-by: Julien Grall >    Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210306161833.4552-4-jgross@suse.com >    Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky > > The evtchn driver will use the lateeoi handlers. So the code to ack > looks like: > > do_mask(..., EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING) > smp_store_release(&info->is_active, 0); > clear_evtchn(info->evtchn); > > The code to handle an interrupts look like: > > clear_link(...) > if ( evtchn_fifo_is_pending(port) && !evtchn_fifo_is_mask()) { >   if (xchg_acquire(&info->is_active, 1) >     return; >   generic_handle_irq(); > } > > After changing the affinity, an interrupt may be received once on the > previous vCPU. So, I think the following can happen: > > vCPU0                             | vCPU1 >                   | >  Receive event              | >                   | change affinity to vCPU1 >  clear_link()              | >                       | >                /* The interrupt is re-raised */ >                   | receive event >                     | >                   | /* The interrupt is not masked */ >  info->is_active = 1          | >  do_mask(...)              | >  info->is_active = 0          | >                   | info->is_active = 1 >  clear_evtchn(...)               | >                                  | do_mask(...) >                                  | info->is_active = 0 >                   | clear_evtchn(...) > > Does this look plausible to you? Yes, it does. Thanks for the analysis. So I guess for lateeoi events we need to clear is_active only in xen_irq_lateeoi()? At a first glance this should fix the issue. What do you think? Juergen