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Biederman" , Russell King - ARM Linux admin , Anshuman Khandual , Catalin Marinas , Bhupesh Sharma , kexec@lists.infradead.org, linux-mm@kvack.org, James Morse , Andrew Morton , Will Deacon , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org, linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, piliu@redhat.com References: <20200413023701.GA20265@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <871rorjzmc.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200414064031.GB4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <86e96214-7053-340b-5c1a-ff97fb94d8e0@redhat.com> <20200414092201.GD4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <20200414143912.GE4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <0085f460-b0c7-b25f-36a7-fa3bafaab6fe@redhat.com> <20200415023524.GG4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <18cf6afd-c651-25c7-aca3-3ca3c0e07547@redhat.com> <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABtCREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT6JAlgEEwEIAEICGwMFCQlmAYAGCwkIBwMCBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl3pImkCGQEACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1o+VA//SFvIHUAvul05u6wKv/pIR6aICPdpF9EIgEU448g+7FfDgQwcEny1pbEzAmiw zAXIQ9H0NZh96lcq+yDLtONnXk/bEYWHHUA014A1wqcYNRY8RvY1+eVHb0uu0KYQoXkzvu+s Dncuguk470XPnscL27hs8PgOP6QjG4jt75K2LfZ0eAqTOUCZTJxA8A7E9+XTYuU0hs7QVrWJ jQdFxQbRMrYz7uP8KmTK9/Cnvqehgl4EzyRaZppshruKMeyheBgvgJd5On1wWq4ZUV5PFM4x II3QbD3EJfWbaJMR55jI9dMFa+vK7MFz3rhWOkEx/QR959lfdRSTXdxs8V3zDvChcmRVGN8U Vo93d1YNtWnA9w6oCW1dnDZ4kgQZZSBIjp6iHcA08apzh7DPi08jL7M9UQByeYGr8KuR4i6e RZI6xhlZerUScVzn35ONwOC91VdYiQgjemiVLq1WDDZ3B7DIzUZ4RQTOaIWdtXBWb8zWakt/ ztGhsx0e39Gvt3391O1PgcA7ilhvqrBPemJrlb9xSPPRbaNAW39P8ws/UJnzSJqnHMVxbRZC Am4add/SM+OCP0w3xYss1jy9T+XdZa0lhUvJfLy7tNcjVG/sxkBXOaSC24MFPuwnoC9WvCVQ ZBxouph3kqc4Dt5X1EeXVLeba+466P1fe1rC8MbcwDkoUo65Ag0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAGJAiUEGAECAA8FAlXLn5ECGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1qA6w/+M+ggFv+JdVsz5+ZIc6MSyGUozASX+bmIuPeIecc9UsFRatc91LuJCKMkD9Uv GOcWSeFpLrSGRQ1Z7EMzFVU//qVs6uzhsNk0RYMyS0B6oloW3FpyQ+zOVylFWQCzoyyf227y GW8HnXunJSC+4PtlL2AY4yZjAVAPLK2l6mhgClVXTQ/S7cBoTQKP+jvVJOoYkpnFxWE9pn4t H5QIFk7Ip8TKr5k3fXVWk4lnUi9MTF/5L/mWqdyIO1s7cjharQCstfWCzWrVeVctpVoDfJWp 4LwTuQ5yEM2KcPeElLg5fR7WB2zH97oI6/Ko2DlovmfQqXh9xWozQt0iGy5tWzh6I0JrlcxJ ileZWLccC4XKD1037Hy2FLAjzfoWgwBLA6ULu0exOOdIa58H4PsXtkFPrUF980EEibUp0zFz GotRVekFAceUaRvAj7dh76cToeZkfsjAvBVb4COXuhgX6N4pofgNkW2AtgYu1nUsPAo+NftU CxrhjHtLn4QEBpkbErnXQyMjHpIatlYGutVMS91XTQXYydCh5crMPs7hYVsvnmGHIaB9ZMfB njnuI31KBiLUks+paRkHQlFcgS2N3gkRBzH7xSZ+t7Re3jvXdXEzKBbQ+dC3lpJB0wPnyMcX FOTT3aZT7IgePkt5iC/BKBk3hqKteTnJFeVIT7EC+a6YUFg= Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: <4e1546eb-4416-dc6d-d549-62d1cecccbc8@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 16:09:57 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-Bogosity: Ham, tests=bogofilter, spamicity=0.000000, version=1.2.4 Sender: owner-linux-mm@kvack.org Precedence: bulk X-Loop: owner-majordomo@kvack.org List-ID: >>> Sounds doable to me, and not complicated. >>> >>>> images. It would apply to >>>> >>>> - arm64 and filter out all hotadded memory (IIRC, only boot memory can >>>> be used). >>> >>> Do you mean hot added memory after boot can't be recognized and added >>> into system RAM on arm64? >> >> See patch #3 of this patch set, which wants to avoid placing kexec >> binaries on hotplugged memory. But I have no idea what the current plan >> regarding arm64 is (this thread exploded :) ). >> >> I would assume that we don't want to place kexec images on any >> hotplugged (or rather: hot(un)pluggable) memory - on any architecture. > > Yes, noticed that and James replied to DaveY. > > Later, when I was considering to make a draft patch to do the picking of > memory from normal zone, and add a notifier, as we discussed at above, I > suddenly realized that kexec_file_load doesn't have this issue. It > traverse system RAM bottom up to get an available region to put > kernel/initrd/boot_param, etc. I can't think of a system where its > low memory could be unavailable. kexec_walk_memblock() has the option for "kbuf->top_down". Only kexec_walk_resources() seems to ignore it. So I think in case of memblocks (e.g., arm64), this still applies? >> >>> >>> >>>> - powerpc to filter out all LMBs that can be removed (assuming not all >>>> memory corresponds to LMBs that can be removed, otherwise we're in >>>> trouble ... :) ) >>>> - virtio-mem to filter out all memory it added. >>>> - hyper-v to filter out partially backed memory blocks (esp. the last >>>> memory block it added and only partially backed it by memory). >>>> >>>> This would make it work for kexec_file_load(), however, I do wonder how >>>> we would want to approach that from userspace kexec-tools when handling >>>> it from kexec_load(). >>> >>> Let's make kexec_file_load work firstly. Since this work is only first >>> step to make kexec-ed kernel not break memory hotplug. After kexec >>> rebooting, the KASLR may locate kernel into hotpluggable area too. >> >> Can you elaborate how that would work? > > Well, boot memory can be hotplugged or not after boot, they are marked > in uefi tables, the current kexec doesn't save and pass them into 2nd > kenrel, when kexec kernel bootup, it need read them and avoid them to > randomize kernel into. What about e.g., memory hotplugged by ACPI? I would assume, that the kexec kernel will not make use of that (IOW detected that) until the ACPI driver comes up and re-detects + adds that memory. Or how would that machinery work in case we have a DIMM hotplugged via ACPI? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.0 required=3.0 tests=DKIM_INVALID,DKIM_SIGNED, HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1DFDAC2BB55 for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:17:52 +0000 (UTC) Received: from lists.ozlabs.org (lists.ozlabs.org [203.11.71.2]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id C68E5206B9 for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:17:51 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; dkim=fail reason="signature verification failed" (1024-bit key) header.d=redhat.com header.i=@redhat.com header.b="EDdWb9lm"; 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Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:10:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.114.9] (ovpn-114-9.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.114.9]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0082099DEE; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:09:57 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] kexec: Prevent removal of memory in use by a loaded kexec image To: Baoquan He References: <20200413023701.GA20265@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <871rorjzmc.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200414064031.GB4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <86e96214-7053-340b-5c1a-ff97fb94d8e0@redhat.com> <20200414092201.GD4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <20200414143912.GE4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <0085f460-b0c7-b25f-36a7-fa3bafaab6fe@redhat.com> <20200415023524.GG4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <18cf6afd-c651-25c7-aca3-3ca3c0e07547@redhat.com> <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABtCREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT6JAlgEEwEIAEICGwMFCQlmAYAGCwkIBwMCBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl3pImkCGQEACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1o+VA//SFvIHUAvul05u6wKv/pIR6aICPdpF9EIgEU448g+7FfDgQwcEny1pbEzAmiw zAXIQ9H0NZh96lcq+yDLtONnXk/bEYWHHUA014A1wqcYNRY8RvY1+eVHb0uu0KYQoXkzvu+s Dncuguk470XPnscL27hs8PgOP6QjG4jt75K2LfZ0eAqTOUCZTJxA8A7E9+XTYuU0hs7QVrWJ jQdFxQbRMrYz7uP8KmTK9/Cnvqehgl4EzyRaZppshruKMeyheBgvgJd5On1wWq4ZUV5PFM4x II3QbD3EJfWbaJMR55jI9dMFa+vK7MFz3rhWOkEx/QR959lfdRSTXdxs8V3zDvChcmRVGN8U Vo93d1YNtWnA9w6oCW1dnDZ4kgQZZSBIjp6iHcA08apzh7DPi08jL7M9UQByeYGr8KuR4i6e RZI6xhlZerUScVzn35ONwOC91VdYiQgjemiVLq1WDDZ3B7DIzUZ4RQTOaIWdtXBWb8zWakt/ ztGhsx0e39Gvt3391O1PgcA7ilhvqrBPemJrlb9xSPPRbaNAW39P8ws/UJnzSJqnHMVxbRZC Am4add/SM+OCP0w3xYss1jy9T+XdZa0lhUvJfLy7tNcjVG/sxkBXOaSC24MFPuwnoC9WvCVQ ZBxouph3kqc4Dt5X1EeXVLeba+466P1fe1rC8MbcwDkoUo65Ag0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAGJAiUEGAECAA8FAlXLn5ECGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1qA6w/+M+ggFv+JdVsz5+ZIc6MSyGUozASX+bmIuPeIecc9UsFRatc91LuJCKMkD9Uv GOcWSeFpLrSGRQ1Z7EMzFVU//qVs6uzhsNk0RYMyS0B6oloW3FpyQ+zOVylFWQCzoyyf227y GW8HnXunJSC+4PtlL2AY4yZjAVAPLK2l6mhgClVXTQ/S7cBoTQKP+jvVJOoYkpnFxWE9pn4t H5QIFk7Ip8TKr5k3fXVWk4lnUi9MTF/5L/mWqdyIO1s7cjharQCstfWCzWrVeVctpVoDfJWp 4LwTuQ5yEM2KcPeElLg5fR7WB2zH97oI6/Ko2DlovmfQqXh9xWozQt0iGy5tWzh6I0JrlcxJ ileZWLccC4XKD1037Hy2FLAjzfoWgwBLA6ULu0exOOdIa58H4PsXtkFPrUF980EEibUp0zFz GotRVekFAceUaRvAj7dh76cToeZkfsjAvBVb4COXuhgX6N4pofgNkW2AtgYu1nUsPAo+NftU CxrhjHtLn4QEBpkbErnXQyMjHpIatlYGutVMS91XTQXYydCh5crMPs7hYVsvnmGHIaB9ZMfB njnuI31KBiLUks+paRkHQlFcgS2N3gkRBzH7xSZ+t7Re3jvXdXEzKBbQ+dC3lpJB0wPnyMcX FOTT3aZT7IgePkt5iC/BKBk3hqKteTnJFeVIT7EC+a6YUFg= Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: <4e1546eb-4416-dc6d-d549-62d1cecccbc8@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 16:09:57 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=utf-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit X-BeenThere: linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: Linux on PowerPC Developers Mail List List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: piliu@redhat.com, Anshuman Khandual , Catalin Marinas , Bhupesh Sharma , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Russell King - ARM Linux admin , linux-mm@kvack.org, James Morse , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andrew Morton , Will Deacon , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Errors-To: linuxppc-dev-bounces+linuxppc-dev=archiver.kernel.org@lists.ozlabs.org Sender: "Linuxppc-dev" >>> Sounds doable to me, and not complicated. >>> >>>> images. It would apply to >>>> >>>> - arm64 and filter out all hotadded memory (IIRC, only boot memory can >>>> be used). >>> >>> Do you mean hot added memory after boot can't be recognized and added >>> into system RAM on arm64? >> >> See patch #3 of this patch set, which wants to avoid placing kexec >> binaries on hotplugged memory. But I have no idea what the current plan >> regarding arm64 is (this thread exploded :) ). >> >> I would assume that we don't want to place kexec images on any >> hotplugged (or rather: hot(un)pluggable) memory - on any architecture. > > Yes, noticed that and James replied to DaveY. > > Later, when I was considering to make a draft patch to do the picking of > memory from normal zone, and add a notifier, as we discussed at above, I > suddenly realized that kexec_file_load doesn't have this issue. It > traverse system RAM bottom up to get an available region to put > kernel/initrd/boot_param, etc. I can't think of a system where its > low memory could be unavailable. kexec_walk_memblock() has the option for "kbuf->top_down". Only kexec_walk_resources() seems to ignore it. So I think in case of memblocks (e.g., arm64), this still applies? >> >>> >>> >>>> - powerpc to filter out all LMBs that can be removed (assuming not all >>>> memory corresponds to LMBs that can be removed, otherwise we're in >>>> trouble ... :) ) >>>> - virtio-mem to filter out all memory it added. >>>> - hyper-v to filter out partially backed memory blocks (esp. the last >>>> memory block it added and only partially backed it by memory). >>>> >>>> This would make it work for kexec_file_load(), however, I do wonder how >>>> we would want to approach that from userspace kexec-tools when handling >>>> it from kexec_load(). >>> >>> Let's make kexec_file_load work firstly. Since this work is only first >>> step to make kexec-ed kernel not break memory hotplug. After kexec >>> rebooting, the KASLR may locate kernel into hotpluggable area too. >> >> Can you elaborate how that would work? > > Well, boot memory can be hotplugged or not after boot, they are marked > in uefi tables, the current kexec doesn't save and pass them into 2nd > kenrel, when kexec kernel bootup, it need read them and avoid them to > randomize kernel into. What about e.g., memory hotplugged by ACPI? I would assume, that the kexec kernel will not make use of that (IOW detected that) until the ACPI driver comes up and re-detects + adds that memory. Or how would that machinery work in case we have a DIMM hotplugged via ACPI? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-2.2 required=3.0 tests=DKIMWL_WL_HIGH,DKIM_SIGNED, DKIM_VALID,HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SPF_HELO_NONE, SPF_PASS,URIBL_BLOCKED,USER_AGENT_SANE_1 autolearn=no autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1AF28C2BB55 for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:10:17 +0000 (UTC) Received: from bombadil.infradead.org (bombadil.infradead.org [198.137.202.133]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher ECDHE-RSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384 (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTPS id D1AAF206D6 for ; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:10:16 +0000 (UTC) Authentication-Results: mail.kernel.org; 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bh=8/b5xlVSBppD8oG+Tq5LVp3w4DRFsRGgPJ0h1ZUoG5I=; b=EDdWb9lmNzBq902ds/okFaOpCLMwnxPtS0PQtSWAWmqCkAwRH29OC+uHxll0K5c1x9d3Al tA0QRkHB2POOTuMgOkEilImN706cW48qN3b/OfxRbJbnr3J5WuuWLh+/fwYEUUViogsHR0 o32LzmAk+w7R45nLwIRAHG32Byra0mE= Received: from mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (mimecast-mx01.redhat.com [209.132.183.4]) (Using TLS) by relay.mimecast.com with ESMTP id us-mta-182-IDpcV1-mPbGXZUJ2chAMbw-1; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 10:10:02 -0400 X-MC-Unique: IDpcV1-mPbGXZUJ2chAMbw-1 Received: from smtp.corp.redhat.com (int-mx03.intmail.prod.int.phx2.redhat.com [10.5.11.13]) (using TLSv1.2 with cipher AECDH-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits)) (No client certificate requested) by mimecast-mx01.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTPS id EB9C0924C0; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:10:00 +0000 (UTC) Received: from [10.36.114.9] (ovpn-114-9.ams2.redhat.com [10.36.114.9]) by smtp.corp.redhat.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 0082099DEE; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:09:57 +0000 (UTC) Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] kexec: Prevent removal of memory in use by a loaded kexec image To: Baoquan He References: <20200413023701.GA20265@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <871rorjzmc.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200414064031.GB4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <86e96214-7053-340b-5c1a-ff97fb94d8e0@redhat.com> <20200414092201.GD4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <20200414143912.GE4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <0085f460-b0c7-b25f-36a7-fa3bafaab6fe@redhat.com> <20200415023524.GG4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <18cf6afd-c651-25c7-aca3-3ca3c0e07547@redhat.com> <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> From: David Hildenbrand Autocrypt: addr=david@redhat.com; prefer-encrypt=mutual; keydata= mQINBFXLn5EBEAC+zYvAFJxCBY9Tr1xZgcESmxVNI/0ffzE/ZQOiHJl6mGkmA1R7/uUpiCjJ dBrn+lhhOYjjNefFQou6478faXE6o2AhmebqT4KiQoUQFV4R7y1KMEKoSyy8hQaK1umALTdL QZLQMzNE74ap+GDK0wnacPQFpcG1AE9RMq3aeErY5tujekBS32jfC/7AnH7I0v1v1TbbK3Gp XNeiN4QroO+5qaSr0ID2sz5jtBLRb15RMre27E1ImpaIv2Jw8NJgW0k/D1RyKCwaTsgRdwuK Kx/Y91XuSBdz0uOyU/S8kM1+ag0wvsGlpBVxRR/xw/E8M7TEwuCZQArqqTCmkG6HGcXFT0V9 PXFNNgV5jXMQRwU0O/ztJIQqsE5LsUomE//bLwzj9IVsaQpKDqW6TAPjcdBDPLHvriq7kGjt WhVhdl0qEYB8lkBEU7V2Yb+SYhmhpDrti9Fq1EsmhiHSkxJcGREoMK/63r9WLZYI3+4W2rAc UucZa4OT27U5ZISjNg3Ev0rxU5UH2/pT4wJCfxwocmqaRr6UYmrtZmND89X0KigoFD/XSeVv jwBRNjPAubK9/k5NoRrYqztM9W6sJqrH8+UWZ1Idd/DdmogJh0gNC0+N42Za9yBRURfIdKSb B3JfpUqcWwE7vUaYrHG1nw54pLUoPG6sAA7Mehl3nd4pZUALHwARAQABtCREYXZpZCBIaWxk ZW5icmFuZCA8ZGF2aWRAcmVkaGF0LmNvbT6JAlgEEwEIAEICGwMFCQlmAYAGCwkIBwMCBhUI AgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAFiEEG9nKrXNcTDpGDfzKTd4Q9wD/g1oFAl3pImkCGQEACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1o+VA//SFvIHUAvul05u6wKv/pIR6aICPdpF9EIgEU448g+7FfDgQwcEny1pbEzAmiw zAXIQ9H0NZh96lcq+yDLtONnXk/bEYWHHUA014A1wqcYNRY8RvY1+eVHb0uu0KYQoXkzvu+s Dncuguk470XPnscL27hs8PgOP6QjG4jt75K2LfZ0eAqTOUCZTJxA8A7E9+XTYuU0hs7QVrWJ jQdFxQbRMrYz7uP8KmTK9/Cnvqehgl4EzyRaZppshruKMeyheBgvgJd5On1wWq4ZUV5PFM4x II3QbD3EJfWbaJMR55jI9dMFa+vK7MFz3rhWOkEx/QR959lfdRSTXdxs8V3zDvChcmRVGN8U Vo93d1YNtWnA9w6oCW1dnDZ4kgQZZSBIjp6iHcA08apzh7DPi08jL7M9UQByeYGr8KuR4i6e RZI6xhlZerUScVzn35ONwOC91VdYiQgjemiVLq1WDDZ3B7DIzUZ4RQTOaIWdtXBWb8zWakt/ ztGhsx0e39Gvt3391O1PgcA7ilhvqrBPemJrlb9xSPPRbaNAW39P8ws/UJnzSJqnHMVxbRZC Am4add/SM+OCP0w3xYss1jy9T+XdZa0lhUvJfLy7tNcjVG/sxkBXOaSC24MFPuwnoC9WvCVQ ZBxouph3kqc4Dt5X1EeXVLeba+466P1fe1rC8MbcwDkoUo65Ag0EVcufkQEQAOfX3n0g0fZz Bgm/S2zF/kxQKCEKP8ID+Vz8sy2GpDvveBq4H2Y34XWsT1zLJdvqPI4af4ZSMxuerWjXbVWb T6d4odQIG0fKx4F8NccDqbgHeZRNajXeeJ3R7gAzvWvQNLz4piHrO/B4tf8svmRBL0ZB5P5A 2uhdwLU3NZuK22zpNn4is87BPWF8HhY0L5fafgDMOqnf4guJVJPYNPhUFzXUbPqOKOkL8ojk CXxkOFHAbjstSK5Ca3fKquY3rdX3DNo+EL7FvAiw1mUtS+5GeYE+RMnDCsVFm/C7kY8c2d0G NWkB9pJM5+mnIoFNxy7YBcldYATVeOHoY4LyaUWNnAvFYWp08dHWfZo9WCiJMuTfgtH9tc75 7QanMVdPt6fDK8UUXIBLQ2TWr/sQKE9xtFuEmoQGlE1l6bGaDnnMLcYu+Asp3kDT0w4zYGsx 5r6XQVRH4+5N6eHZiaeYtFOujp5n+pjBaQK7wUUjDilPQ5QMzIuCL4YjVoylWiBNknvQWBXS lQCWmavOT9sttGQXdPCC5ynI+1ymZC1ORZKANLnRAb0NH/UCzcsstw2TAkFnMEbo9Zu9w7Kv AxBQXWeXhJI9XQssfrf4Gusdqx8nPEpfOqCtbbwJMATbHyqLt7/oz/5deGuwxgb65pWIzufa N7eop7uh+6bezi+rugUI+w6DABEBAAGJAiUEGAECAA8FAlXLn5ECGwwFCQlmAYAACgkQTd4Q 9wD/g1qA6w/+M+ggFv+JdVsz5+ZIc6MSyGUozASX+bmIuPeIecc9UsFRatc91LuJCKMkD9Uv GOcWSeFpLrSGRQ1Z7EMzFVU//qVs6uzhsNk0RYMyS0B6oloW3FpyQ+zOVylFWQCzoyyf227y GW8HnXunJSC+4PtlL2AY4yZjAVAPLK2l6mhgClVXTQ/S7cBoTQKP+jvVJOoYkpnFxWE9pn4t H5QIFk7Ip8TKr5k3fXVWk4lnUi9MTF/5L/mWqdyIO1s7cjharQCstfWCzWrVeVctpVoDfJWp 4LwTuQ5yEM2KcPeElLg5fR7WB2zH97oI6/Ko2DlovmfQqXh9xWozQt0iGy5tWzh6I0JrlcxJ ileZWLccC4XKD1037Hy2FLAjzfoWgwBLA6ULu0exOOdIa58H4PsXtkFPrUF980EEibUp0zFz GotRVekFAceUaRvAj7dh76cToeZkfsjAvBVb4COXuhgX6N4pofgNkW2AtgYu1nUsPAo+NftU CxrhjHtLn4QEBpkbErnXQyMjHpIatlYGutVMS91XTQXYydCh5crMPs7hYVsvnmGHIaB9ZMfB njnuI31KBiLUks+paRkHQlFcgS2N3gkRBzH7xSZ+t7Re3jvXdXEzKBbQ+dC3lpJB0wPnyMcX FOTT3aZT7IgePkt5iC/BKBk3hqKteTnJFeVIT7EC+a6YUFg= Organization: Red Hat GmbH Message-ID: <4e1546eb-4416-dc6d-d549-62d1cecccbc8@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 16:09:57 +0200 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Linux x86_64; rv:68.0) Gecko/20100101 Thunderbird/68.6.0 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> Content-Language: en-US X-Scanned-By: MIMEDefang 2.79 on 10.5.11.13 X-Mimecast-Spam-Score: 0 X-Mimecast-Originator: redhat.com X-CRM114-Version: 20100106-BlameMichelson ( TRE 0.8.0 (BSD) ) MR-646709E3 X-CRM114-CacheID: sfid-20200416_071006_264376_DE4FE6AF X-CRM114-Status: GOOD ( 18.54 ) X-BeenThere: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.29 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Cc: piliu@redhat.com, Anshuman Khandual , Catalin Marinas , Bhupesh Sharma , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Russell King - ARM Linux admin , linux-mm@kvack.org, James Morse , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andrew Morton , Will Deacon , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "linux-arm-kernel" Errors-To: linux-arm-kernel-bounces+infradead-linux-arm-kernel=archiver.kernel.org@lists.infradead.org >>> Sounds doable to me, and not complicated. >>> >>>> images. It would apply to >>>> >>>> - arm64 and filter out all hotadded memory (IIRC, only boot memory can >>>> be used). >>> >>> Do you mean hot added memory after boot can't be recognized and added >>> into system RAM on arm64? >> >> See patch #3 of this patch set, which wants to avoid placing kexec >> binaries on hotplugged memory. But I have no idea what the current plan >> regarding arm64 is (this thread exploded :) ). >> >> I would assume that we don't want to place kexec images on any >> hotplugged (or rather: hot(un)pluggable) memory - on any architecture. > > Yes, noticed that and James replied to DaveY. > > Later, when I was considering to make a draft patch to do the picking of > memory from normal zone, and add a notifier, as we discussed at above, I > suddenly realized that kexec_file_load doesn't have this issue. It > traverse system RAM bottom up to get an available region to put > kernel/initrd/boot_param, etc. I can't think of a system where its > low memory could be unavailable. kexec_walk_memblock() has the option for "kbuf->top_down". Only kexec_walk_resources() seems to ignore it. So I think in case of memblocks (e.g., arm64), this still applies? >> >>> >>> >>>> - powerpc to filter out all LMBs that can be removed (assuming not all >>>> memory corresponds to LMBs that can be removed, otherwise we're in >>>> trouble ... :) ) >>>> - virtio-mem to filter out all memory it added. >>>> - hyper-v to filter out partially backed memory blocks (esp. the last >>>> memory block it added and only partially backed it by memory). >>>> >>>> This would make it work for kexec_file_load(), however, I do wonder how >>>> we would want to approach that from userspace kexec-tools when handling >>>> it from kexec_load(). >>> >>> Let's make kexec_file_load work firstly. Since this work is only first >>> step to make kexec-ed kernel not break memory hotplug. After kexec >>> rebooting, the KASLR may locate kernel into hotpluggable area too. >> >> Can you elaborate how that would work? > > Well, boot memory can be hotplugged or not after boot, they are marked > in uefi tables, the current kexec doesn't save and pass them into 2nd > kenrel, when kexec kernel bootup, it need read them and avoid them to > randomize kernel into. What about e.g., memory hotplugged by ACPI? I would assume, that the kexec kernel will not make use of that (IOW detected that) until the ACPI driver comes up and re-detects + adds that memory. Or how would that machinery work in case we have a DIMM hotplugged via ACPI? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb _______________________________________________ linux-arm-kernel mailing list linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-path: Received: from us-smtp-delivery-1.mimecast.com ([205.139.110.120] helo=us-smtp-1.mimecast.com) by bombadil.infradead.org with esmtps (Exim 4.92.3 #3 (Red Hat Linux)) id 1jP5DS-0005gK-3n for kexec@lists.infradead.org; Thu, 16 Apr 2020 14:10:08 +0000 Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/3] kexec: Prevent removal of memory in use by a loaded kexec image References: <20200413023701.GA20265@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <871rorjzmc.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <20200414064031.GB4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <86e96214-7053-340b-5c1a-ff97fb94d8e0@redhat.com> <20200414092201.GD4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <20200414143912.GE4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <0085f460-b0c7-b25f-36a7-fa3bafaab6fe@redhat.com> <20200415023524.GG4247@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> <18cf6afd-c651-25c7-aca3-3ca3c0e07547@redhat.com> <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> From: David Hildenbrand Message-ID: <4e1546eb-4416-dc6d-d549-62d1cecccbc8@redhat.com> Date: Thu, 16 Apr 2020 16:09:57 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: <20200416140247.GA12723@MiWiFi-R3L-srv> Content-Language: en-US List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Sender: "kexec" Errors-To: kexec-bounces+dwmw2=infradead.org@lists.infradead.org To: Baoquan He Cc: piliu@redhat.com, Anshuman Khandual , Catalin Marinas , Bhupesh Sharma , linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org, Russell King - ARM Linux admin , linux-mm@kvack.org, James Morse , "Eric W. Biederman" , Andrew Morton , Will Deacon , linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org >>> Sounds doable to me, and not complicated. >>> >>>> images. It would apply to >>>> >>>> - arm64 and filter out all hotadded memory (IIRC, only boot memory can >>>> be used). >>> >>> Do you mean hot added memory after boot can't be recognized and added >>> into system RAM on arm64? >> >> See patch #3 of this patch set, which wants to avoid placing kexec >> binaries on hotplugged memory. But I have no idea what the current plan >> regarding arm64 is (this thread exploded :) ). >> >> I would assume that we don't want to place kexec images on any >> hotplugged (or rather: hot(un)pluggable) memory - on any architecture. > > Yes, noticed that and James replied to DaveY. > > Later, when I was considering to make a draft patch to do the picking of > memory from normal zone, and add a notifier, as we discussed at above, I > suddenly realized that kexec_file_load doesn't have this issue. It > traverse system RAM bottom up to get an available region to put > kernel/initrd/boot_param, etc. I can't think of a system where its > low memory could be unavailable. kexec_walk_memblock() has the option for "kbuf->top_down". Only kexec_walk_resources() seems to ignore it. So I think in case of memblocks (e.g., arm64), this still applies? >> >>> >>> >>>> - powerpc to filter out all LMBs that can be removed (assuming not all >>>> memory corresponds to LMBs that can be removed, otherwise we're in >>>> trouble ... :) ) >>>> - virtio-mem to filter out all memory it added. >>>> - hyper-v to filter out partially backed memory blocks (esp. the last >>>> memory block it added and only partially backed it by memory). >>>> >>>> This would make it work for kexec_file_load(), however, I do wonder how >>>> we would want to approach that from userspace kexec-tools when handling >>>> it from kexec_load(). >>> >>> Let's make kexec_file_load work firstly. Since this work is only first >>> step to make kexec-ed kernel not break memory hotplug. After kexec >>> rebooting, the KASLR may locate kernel into hotpluggable area too. >> >> Can you elaborate how that would work? > > Well, boot memory can be hotplugged or not after boot, they are marked > in uefi tables, the current kexec doesn't save and pass them into 2nd > kenrel, when kexec kernel bootup, it need read them and avoid them to > randomize kernel into. What about e.g., memory hotplugged by ACPI? I would assume, that the kexec kernel will not make use of that (IOW detected that) until the ACPI driver comes up and re-detects + adds that memory. Or how would that machinery work in case we have a DIMM hotplugged via ACPI? -- Thanks, David / dhildenb _______________________________________________ kexec mailing list kexec@lists.infradead.org http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/kexec