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Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/cpu, x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on AMD processors
To: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>, x86@kernel.org
References: <20171227054354.20369.94587.stgit@tlendack-t1.amdoffice.net>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
        Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
        Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>, Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
From: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Message-ID: <4ecfab84-ae81-2e00-9004-8d0ccf863f76@linux.intel.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Dec 2017 00:48:09 -0800
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On 12/26/2017 09:43 PM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c
> @@ -923,8 +923,8 @@ static void __init early_identify_cpu(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
>  
>  	setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ALWAYS);
>  
> -	/* Assume for now that ALL x86 CPUs are insecure */
> -	setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);
> +	if (c->x86_vendor != X86_VENDOR_AMD)
> +		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_CPU_INSECURE);

Does this disable it in a way that it can be turned back on via the
kernel command-line?

This is a rather wide class of issues and I would rather not just
hard-code it in a way that we say one vendor has never and will never be
affected.