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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	"xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
	"George Dunlap" <george.dunlap@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/6] x86/p2m: tidy p2m_add_foreign() a little
Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2020 19:03:54 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <55de56b3-0e83-c558-6432-9853db82f57a@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <8b70c26e-7ae6-8438-67a3-99cef338ba52@suse.com>

On 15/12/2020 16:25, Jan Beulich wrote:
> Drop a bogus ASSERT() - we don't typically assert incoming domain
> pointers to be non-NULL, and there's no particular reason to do so here.
>
> Replace the open-coded DOMID_SELF check by use of
> rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(), at the same time covering the request
> being made with the current domain's actual ID.
>
> Move the "both domains same" check into just the path where it really
> is meaningful.
>
> Swap the order of the two puts, such that
> - the p2m lock isn't needlessly held across put_page(),
> - a separate put_page() on an error path can be avoided,
> - they're inverse to the order of the respective gets.
>
> Signed-off-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>

Acked-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

> ---
> The DOMID_SELF check being converted also suggests to me that there's an
> implication of tdom == current->domain, which would in turn appear to
> mean the "both domains same" check could as well be dropped altogether.

I don't see anything conceptually wrong with the toolstack creating a
foreign mapping on behalf of a guest at construction time.  I'd go as
far as to argue that it is an interface shortcoming if this didn't
function correctly.

>
> --- a/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> +++ b/xen/arch/x86/mm/p2m.c
> @@ -2560,9 +2560,6 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom,
>      int rc;
>      struct domain *fdom;
>  
> -    ASSERT(tdom);
> -    if ( foreigndom == DOMID_SELF )
> -        return -EINVAL;
>      /*
>       * hvm fixme: until support is added to p2m teardown code to cleanup any
>       * foreign entries, limit this to hardware domain only.
> @@ -2573,13 +2570,15 @@ int p2m_add_foreign(struct domain *tdom,
>      if ( foreigndom == DOMID_XEN )
>          fdom = rcu_lock_domain(dom_xen);
>      else
> -        fdom = rcu_lock_domain_by_id(foreigndom);
> -    if ( fdom == NULL )
> -        return -ESRCH;
> +    {
> +        rc = rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id(foreigndom, &fdom);

It occurs to me that rcu_lock_remote_domain_by_id()'s self error path
ought to be -EINVAL rather than -EPERM.  It's never for permissions
reasons that we restrict to remote domains like this - always for
technical ones.

But that is definitely content for a different patch.

~Andrew


  reply	other threads:[~2020-12-17 19:04 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-12-15 16:24 [PATCH 0/6] x86/p2m: restrict more code to build just for HVM Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:25 ` [PATCH 1/6] x86/p2m: tidy p2m_add_foreign() a little Jan Beulich
2020-12-17 19:03   ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-12-18  8:39     ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:26 ` [PATCH 2/6] x86/mm: p2m_add_foreign() is HVM-only Jan Beulich
2020-12-17 19:18   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-12-18  8:48     ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-21  8:10     ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-22 10:40       ` Andrew Cooper
2021-01-04 16:57         ` Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2021-01-05  8:48           ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-08 16:38             ` Oleksandr
2021-01-08 17:01               ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-08 17:37                 ` Oleksandr
2021-01-11  7:41                   ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-11  8:23                     ` Oleksandr
2021-01-12 11:58                       ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-13 15:06                         ` Oleksandr
2021-01-23 13:22                           ` Julien Grall
2021-01-25  9:10                             ` Jan Beulich
2021-01-25 10:33                             ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:26 ` [PATCH 3/6] x86/p2m: set_{foreign,mmio}_p2m_entry() are HVM-only Jan Beulich
2020-12-17 19:54   ` Andrew Cooper
2020-12-18  8:58     ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:26 ` [PATCH 4/6] x86/p2m: {,un}map_mmio_regions() " Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:27 ` [PATCH 5/6] x86/mm: the gva_to_gfn() hook is HVM-only Jan Beulich
2020-12-22 17:02   ` Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 16:28 ` [PATCH 6/6] x86/p2m: set_shared_p2m_entry() is MEM_SHARING-only Jan Beulich
2020-12-15 17:05   ` Tamas K Lengyel

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