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From: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com>
To: David Ahern <dsahern@kernel.org>,
	Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>,
	Philip Paeps <philip@trouble.is>
Cc: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>,
	"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
	Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>,
	Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.co.jp>,
	Hideaki YOSHIFUJI <yoshfuji@linux-ipv6.org>,
	Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>,
	Yuchung Cheng <ycheng@google.com>,
	Francesco Ruggeri <fruggeri@arista.com>,
	Mat Martineau <mathew.j.martineau@linux.intel.com>,
	Christoph Paasch <cpaasch@apple.com>,
	Ivan Delalande <colona@arista.com>,
	Caowangbao <caowangbao@huawei.com>,
	Priyaranjan Jha <priyarjha@google.com>,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH v6 12/26] tcp: authopt: Add support for signing skb-less replies
Date: Tue, 26 Jul 2022 09:15:14 +0300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <56095a3aeb4ce619736cbb25c93e32a99d063488.1658815925.git.cdleonard@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1658815925.git.cdleonard@gmail.com>

This is required because tcp ipv4 sometimes sends replies without
allocating a full skb that can be signed by tcp authopt.

Handle this with additional code in tcp authopt.

Signed-off-by: Leonard Crestez <cdleonard@gmail.com>
---
 include/net/tcp_authopt.h |   7 ++
 net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c    | 144 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 151 insertions(+)

diff --git a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
index 1fa1b968c80c..9bc0f58a78cb 100644
--- a/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
+++ b/include/net/tcp_authopt.h
@@ -114,10 +114,17 @@ static inline struct tcp_authopt_key_info *tcp_authopt_select_key(
 int tcp_authopt_hash(
 		char *hash_location,
 		struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
 		struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
 		struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);
+int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(
+		char *hash_location,
+		struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+		struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+		__be32 saddr,
+		__be32 daddr,
+		struct tcphdr *th);
 int __tcp_authopt_openreq(struct sock *newsk, const struct sock *oldsk, struct request_sock *req);
 static inline int tcp_authopt_openreq(
 		struct sock *newsk,
 		const struct sock *oldsk,
 		struct request_sock *req)
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
index 2a216356d280..2af6265041b4 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_authopt.c
@@ -944,10 +944,72 @@ static int tcp_authopt_get_traffic_key(struct sock *sk,
 out:
 	tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool);
 	return err;
 }
 
+struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data {
+	__be32 saddr;
+	__be32 daddr;
+	__be16 sport;
+	__be16 dport;
+	__be32 sisn;
+	__be32 disn;
+	__be16 digestbits;
+} __packed;
+
+static int tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+						__be32 saddr,
+						__be32 daddr,
+						__be16 sport,
+						__be16 dport,
+						__be32 sisn,
+						__be32 disn,
+						u8 *traffic_key)
+{
+	int err;
+	struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool;
+	struct tcp_v4_authopt_context_data data;
+
+	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(data) != 22);
+
+	pool = tcp_authopt_get_kdf_pool(key);
+	if (IS_ERR(pool))
+		return PTR_ERR(pool);
+
+	err = tcp_authopt_setkey(pool, key);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+	// RFC5926 section 3.1.1.1
+	// Separate to keep alignment semi-sane
+	err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, "\x01TCP-AO", 7);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+	data.saddr = saddr;
+	data.daddr = daddr;
+	data.sport = sport;
+	data.dport = dport;
+	data.sisn = sisn;
+	data.disn = disn;
+	data.digestbits = htons(crypto_ahash_digestsize(pool->tfm) * 8);
+
+	err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&data, sizeof(data));
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, traffic_key, 0);
+	err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out;
+
+out:
+	tcp_authopt_put_kdf_pool(key, pool);
+	return err;
+}
+
 static int crypto_ahash_buf_zero(struct ahash_request *req, int len)
 {
 	u8 zeros[TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN] = {0};
 	int buflen, err;
 
@@ -1214,10 +1276,92 @@ int tcp_authopt_hash(char *hash_location,
 	return err;
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL(tcp_authopt_hash);
 
 /**
+ * tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply - Hash tcp+ipv4 header without SKB
+ *
+ * @hash_location: output buffer
+ * @info: sending socket's tcp_authopt_info
+ * @key: signing key, from tcp_authopt_select_key.
+ * @saddr: source address
+ * @daddr: destination address
+ * @th: Pointer to TCP header and options
+ */
+int tcp_v4_authopt_hash_reply(char *hash_location,
+			      struct tcp_authopt_info *info,
+			      struct tcp_authopt_key_info *key,
+			      __be32 saddr,
+			      __be32 daddr,
+			      struct tcphdr *th)
+{
+	struct tcp_authopt_alg_pool *pool;
+	u8 macbuf[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAXMACBUF];
+	u8 traffic_key[TCP_AUTHOPT_MAX_TRAFFIC_KEY_LEN];
+	__be32 sne = 0;
+	int err;
+
+	/* Call special code path for computing traffic key without skb
+	 * This can be called from tcp_v4_reqsk_send_ack so caching would be
+	 * difficult here.
+	 */
+	err = tcp_v4_authopt_get_traffic_key_noskb(key, saddr, daddr,
+						   th->source, th->dest,
+						   htonl(info->src_isn), htonl(info->dst_isn),
+						   traffic_key);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err_traffic_key;
+
+	/* Init mac shash */
+	pool = tcp_authopt_get_mac_pool(key);
+	if (IS_ERR(pool))
+		return PTR_ERR(pool);
+	err = crypto_ahash_setkey(pool->tfm, traffic_key, key->alg->traffic_key_len);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+	err = crypto_ahash_init(pool->req);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)&sne, 4);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	err = tcp_authopt_hash_tcp4_pseudoheader(pool, saddr, daddr, th->doff * 4);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
+
+	// TCP header with checksum set to zero. Caller ensures this.
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(th->check != 0))
+		goto out_err;
+	err = crypto_ahash_buf(pool->req, (u8 *)th, sizeof(*th));
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	// TCP options
+	err = tcp_authopt_hash_opts(pool, th, (struct tcphdr_authopt *)(hash_location - 4),
+				    !(key->flags & TCP_AUTHOPT_KEY_EXCLUDE_OPTS));
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(pool->req, NULL, macbuf, 0);
+	err = crypto_ahash_final(pool->req);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_err;
+	memcpy(hash_location, macbuf, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN);
+
+	tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool);
+	return 0;
+
+out_err:
+	tcp_authopt_put_mac_pool(key, pool);
+out_err_traffic_key:
+	memset(hash_location, 0, TCP_AUTHOPT_MACLEN);
+	return err;
+}
+
+/*
  * tcp_authopt_lookup_recv - lookup key for receive
  *
  * @sk: Receive socket
  * @skb: Packet, used to compare addr and iface
  * @net: Per-namespace information containing keys
-- 
2.25.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-07-26  6:18 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-07-26  6:15 [PATCH v6 00/26] tcp: Initial support for RFC5925 auth option Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 01/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support and key management Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 02/26] tcp: authopt: Remove more unused noops Leonard Crestez
2022-07-27  1:17   ` David Ahern
2022-07-27  8:49     ` Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 03/26] docs: Add user documentation for tcp_authopt Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 04/26] tcp: authopt: Add crypto initialization Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 05/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_sig_hash_skb_data for AO Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 06/26] tcp: authopt: Compute packet signatures Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 07/26] tcp: Refactor tcp_inbound_md5_hash into tcp_inbound_sig_hash Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 08/26] tcp: authopt: Hook into tcp core Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 09/26] tcp: authopt: Disable via sysctl by default Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 10/26] tcp: authopt: Implement Sequence Number Extension Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 11/26] tcp: ipv6: Add AO signing for tcp_v6_send_response Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` Leonard Crestez [this message]
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 13/26] tcp: ipv4: Add AO signing for skb-less replies Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 14/26] tcp: authopt: Add key selection controls Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 15/26] tcp: authopt: Add initial l3index support Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 16/26] tcp: authopt: Add NOSEND/NORECV flags Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 17/26] tcp: authopt: Add prefixlen support Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 18/26] tcp: authopt: Add /proc/net/tcp_authopt listing all keys Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 19/26] selftests: nettest: Rename md5_prefix to key_addr_prefix Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 20/26] selftests: nettest: Initial tcp_authopt support Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 21/26] selftests: net/fcnal: " Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  7:06   ` Eric Dumazet
2022-07-26  7:27     ` Eric Dumazet
2022-07-27  8:29       ` Leonard Crestez
2022-07-27  9:27         ` Eric Dumazet
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 22/26] tcp: authopt: Try to respect rnextkeyid from SYN on SYNACK Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 23/26] tcp: authopt: tcp_authopt_lookup_send: Add anykey output param Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 24/26] tcp: authopt: Initial support for TCP_AUTHOPT_FLAG_ACTIVE Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 25/26] tcp: authopt: If no keys are valid for send report an error Leonard Crestez
2022-07-26  6:15 ` [PATCH v6 26/26] tcp: authopt: Initial implementation of TCP_REPAIR_AUTHOPT Leonard Crestez

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