From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: David Vrabel Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/hvm: Allow the guest to permit the use of userspace hypercalls Date: Mon, 11 Jan 2016 18:26:01 +0000 Message-ID: <5693F3B9.5060407@citrix.com> References: <1452520774-16794-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> <5693CDE302000078000C5788@prv-mh.provo.novell.com> <5693E3BD.6070009@citrix.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <5693E3BD.6070009@citrix.com> List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Andrew Cooper , Jan Beulich Cc: StefanoStabellini , Ian Campbell , Xen-devel List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org On 11/01/16 17:17, Andrew Cooper wrote: > So from one point of view, sufficient justification for this change is > "because the Linux way isn't the only valid way to do this". "Because we can" isn't a good justification for adding something new. Particularly something that is trivially easy to (accidentally) misuse and open a big security hole between userspace and kernel. The vague idea for a userspace netfront that's floating around internally is also not a good reason for pushing this feature at this time. David