From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: "Jan Beulich" Subject: Re: [RFC Design Doc] Add vNVDIMM support for Xen Date: Wed, 17 Feb 2016 02:08:28 -0700 Message-ID: <56C4469C02000078000D2F64@prv-mh.provo.novell.com> References: <20160201054414.GA25211@hz-desktop.sh.intel.com> <20160202191519.GB21656@char.us.oracle.com> <20160215084352.GB8938@hz-desktop.sh.intel.com> <56C1BF9302000078000D202D@prv-mh.provo.novell.com> <20160217090105.GD5459@hz-desktop.sh.intel.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset="us-ascii" Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Return-path: In-Reply-To: <20160217090105.GD5459@hz-desktop.sh.intel.com> Content-Disposition: inline List-Unsubscribe: , List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Sender: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org Errors-To: xen-devel-bounces@lists.xen.org To: Haozhong Zhang Cc: Juergen Gross , Kevin Tian , Wei Liu , Ian Campbell , Stefano Stabellini , George Dunlap , Andrew Cooper , Ian Jackson , "xen-devel@lists.xen.org" , Jun Nakajima , Xiao Guangrong , Keir Fraser List-Id: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org >>> On 17.02.16 at 10:01, wrote: > On 02/15/16 04:07, Jan Beulich wrote: >> >>> On 15.02.16 at 09:43, wrote: >> > On 02/03/16 03:15, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote: >> >> > Similarly to that in KVM/QEMU, enabling vNVDIMM in Xen is composed of >> >> > three parts: >> >> > (1) Guest clwb/clflushopt/pcommit enabling, >> >> > (2) Memory mapping, and >> >> > (3) Guest ACPI emulation. >> >> >> >> >> >> .. MCE? and vMCE? >> >> >> > >> > NVDIMM can generate UCR errors like normal ram. Xen may handle them in a >> > way similar to what mc_memerr_dhandler() does, with some differences in >> > the data structure and the broken page offline parts: >> > >> > Broken NVDIMM pages should be marked as "offlined" so that Xen >> > hypervisor can refuse further requests that map them to DomU. >> > >> > The real problem here is what data structure will be used to record >> > information of NVDIMM pages. Because the size of NVDIMM is usually much >> > larger than normal ram, using struct page_info for NVDIMM pages would >> > occupy too much memory. >> >> I don't see how your alternative below would be less memory >> hungry: Since guests have at least partial control of their GFN >> space, a malicious guest could punch holes into the contiguous >> GFN range that you appear to be thinking about, thus causing >> arbitrary splitting of the control structure. >> > > QEMU would always use MFN above guest normal ram and I/O holes for > vNVDIMM. It would attempt to search in that space for a contiguous range > that is large enough for that that vNVDIMM devices. Is guest able to > punch holes in such GFN space? See XENMAPSPACE_* and their uses. Jan