All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: George Dunlap <dunlapg@umich.edu>
Cc: xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: backporting considerations (Re: [PATCH v9 0/9] xen/x86: various XPTI speedups)
Date: Wed, 16 May 2018 10:01:42 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5AFC55E602000078001C35C5@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAFLBxZYyspzYvD=hDq8aK5G2OFT+7nGFGE0dTy3hYpirS8uwMg@mail.gmail.com>

>>> On 16.05.18 at 16:53, <dunlapg@umich.edu> wrote:
> On Wed, May 16, 2018 at 3:01 PM, Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com> wrote:
>>>>> On 16.05.18 at 15:18, <dunlapg@umich.edu> wrote:
>>> If the latter, I think the same argument applies: turning on XPTI is a
>>> requirement for many people, and thus represents a pretty hefty
>>> performance regression.  While we don't need to backport normal fixes
>>> to security-only releases, we should certainly try to avoid
>>> regressions.
>>
>> I don't think we would have addressed non-security fallout (or other
>> than really severe regressions) from other security patches in the
>> past on security only branches. People caring about performance
>> should upgrade.
> 
> If a security patch, when backported to 4.6, broke some fairly
> critical bit of functionality (say,  openvswitch support), you would
> oppose a subsequent patch which would fix that regression?
> 
> That doesn't seem very reasonable to me.  Users shouldn't have to
> choose between being vulnerable to a security issue and losing
> functionality which was working at the last release.  Otherwise,
> what's the point of having "security supported" releases?

Note how I did say "or other than really severe regressions". I think
your "fairly critical bit of functionality" falls into exactly that area.

Jan



_______________________________________________
Xen-devel mailing list
Xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
https://lists.xenproject.org/mailman/listinfo/xen-devel

  reply	other threads:[~2018-05-16 16:01 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-26 11:33 [PATCH v9 0/9] xen/x86: various XPTI speedups Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 1/9] x86/xpti: avoid copying L4 page table contents when possible Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 14:01   ` Tim Deegan
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 2/9] xen/x86: add a function for modifying cr3 Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 3/9] xen/x86: support per-domain flag for xpti Juergen Gross
2018-04-27  7:55   ` Sergey Dyasli
2018-04-27  7:59     ` Juergen Gross
2018-04-27  8:15       ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-04 15:06         ` Wei Liu
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 4/9] xen/x86: use invpcid for flushing the TLB Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 5/9] xen/x86: disable global pages for domains with XPTI active Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 6/9] xen/x86: use flag byte for decision whether xen_cr3 is valid Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 7/9] xen/x86: convert pv_guest_cr4_to_real_cr4() to a function Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 8/9] xen/x86: add some cr3 helpers Juergen Gross
2018-04-26 11:33 ` [PATCH v9 9/9] xen/x86: use PCID feature Juergen Gross
2018-05-01  9:28 ` [PATCH v9 0/9] xen/x86: various XPTI speedups Andrew Cooper
2018-05-02 10:38   ` Juergen Gross
2018-05-03 17:41     ` Andrew Cooper
2018-05-03 18:41       ` Juergen Gross
2018-05-04 14:59 ` Wei Liu
2018-05-16  9:06 ` backporting considerations (Re: [PATCH v9 0/9] xen/x86: various XPTI speedups) Jan Beulich
2018-05-16 13:18   ` George Dunlap
2018-05-16 14:01     ` Jan Beulich
2018-05-16 14:53       ` George Dunlap
2018-05-16 16:01         ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2018-05-16 16:42           ` George Dunlap

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5AFC55E602000078001C35C5@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com \
    --to=jbeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=dunlapg@umich.edu \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.