From: "Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>,
Tamas K Lengyel <tamas@tklengyel.com>,
Wei Liu <wei.liu2@citrix.com>,
Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>,
Roger Pau Monne <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/4] x86/altp2m: Rework #VE enable/disable paths
Date: Wed, 20 Feb 2019 07:14:27 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <5C6D60C302000078002187A8@prv1-mh.provo.novell.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <0f1a8d91-082a-fa3a-6c87-5689a6263d52@bitdefender.com>
>>> On 20.02.19 at 00:10, <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com> wrote:
> On 2/20/19 12:18 AM, Andrew Cooper wrote:
>> Split altp2m_vcpu_{enable,disable}_ve() out of the
>> HVMOP_altp2m_vcpu_{enable,disable}_notify marshalling logic. A future
> change
>> is going to need to call altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() from the domain_kill()
> path.
>>
>> While at it, clean up the logic in altp2m_vcpu_{initialise,destroy}().
>> altp2m_vcpu_reset() has no external callers, so fold it into its two
>> callsites. This in turn allows for altp2m_vcpu_destroy() to reuse
>> altp2m_vcpu_disable_ve() rather than opencoding it.
>>
>> No practical change.
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
>
> Reviewed-by: Razvan Cojocaru <rcojocaru@bitdefender.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-02-20 14:14 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-02-19 22:18 [PATCH tentitively for-4.12 0/4] x86/altp2m: Fix multiple security issues Andrew Cooper
2019-02-19 22:18 ` [PATCH 1/4] xen/common: Break domain_unmap_resources() out of domain_kill() Andrew Cooper
2019-02-19 22:39 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2019-02-19 22:46 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-20 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-19 22:18 ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/altp2m: Rework #VE enable/disable paths Andrew Cooper
2019-02-19 23:10 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2019-02-20 14:14 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2019-02-19 22:18 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/vmx: Fix security issue when a guest balloons out the #VE info page Andrew Cooper
2019-02-20 9:45 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2019-02-20 14:37 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-21 17:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-22 8:49 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-21 20:18 ` [PATCH v2 " Andrew Cooper
2019-02-21 21:28 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2019-02-22 12:24 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-22 14:03 ` Andrew Cooper
2019-02-28 5:48 ` Tian, Kevin
2019-02-19 22:18 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/vmx: Properly flush the TLB when an altp2m is modified Andrew Cooper
2019-02-19 23:20 ` Razvan Cojocaru
2019-02-20 14:47 ` Jan Beulich
2019-02-28 5:50 ` Tian, Kevin
2019-02-21 13:13 ` [PATCH tentitively for-4.12 0/4] x86/altp2m: Fix multiple security issues Juergen Gross
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