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From: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
To: linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, jarkko@kernel.org, luto@kernel.org,
	dave.hansen@intel.com, rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com,
	haitao.huang@intel.com, pbonzini@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	jmattson@google.com, joro@8bytes.org, vkuznets@redhat.com,
	wanpengli@tencent.com, corbet@lwn.net,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Subject: [RFC PATCH v5 26/26] KVM: x86: Add capability to grant VM access to privileged SGX attribute
Date: Sun, 14 Feb 2021 02:30:45 +1300	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5cb830912bb6a641a3947a10743ff40d71b4e953.1613221549.git.kai.huang@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1613221549.git.kai.huang@intel.com>

From: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>

Add a capability, KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE, that can be used by userspace
to grant a VM access to a priveleged attribute, with args[0] holding a
file handle to a valid SGX attribute file.

The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to
provide additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. to prevent
malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to ensure its nodes are running
inside a geniune SGX enclave and/or to obtain a stable fingerprint.

To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions by running an
enclave in a VM, KVM restricts guest access to privileged attributes by
default.

Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
---
 Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c           |  2 +-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c             | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h       |  1 +
 4 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
index c136e254b496..47c7c7c33025 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/api.rst
@@ -6037,6 +6037,29 @@ KVM_EXIT_X86_RDMSR and KVM_EXIT_X86_WRMSR exit notifications which user space
 can then handle to implement model specific MSR handling and/or user notifications
 to inform a user that an MSR was not handled.
 
+7.22 KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE
+----------------------
+
+:Architectures: x86
+:Target: VM
+:Parameters: args[0] is a file handle of a SGX attribute file in securityfs
+:Returns: 0 on success, -EINVAL if the file handle is invalid or if a requested
+          attribute is not supported by KVM.
+
+KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE enables a userspace VMM to grant a VM access to one or
+more priveleged enclave attributes.  args[0] must hold a file handle to a valid
+SGX attribute file corresponding to an attribute that is supported/restricted
+by KVM (currently only PROVISIONKEY).
+
+The SGX subsystem restricts access to a subset of enclave attributes to provide
+additional security for an uncompromised kernel, e.g. use of the PROVISIONKEY
+is restricted to deter malware from using the PROVISIONKEY to obtain a stable
+system fingerprint.  To prevent userspace from circumventing such restrictions
+by running an enclave in a VM, KVM prevents access to privileged attributes by
+default.
+
+See Documentation/x86/sgx/2.Kernel-internals.rst for more details.
+
 8. Other capabilities.
 ======================
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
index 04b2f5de2d7b..ad00a1af1545 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/cpuid.c
@@ -833,7 +833,7 @@ static inline int __do_cpuid_func(struct kvm_cpuid_array *array, u32 function)
 		 * expected to derive it from supported XCR0.
 		 */
 		entry->eax &= SGX_ATTR_DEBUG | SGX_ATTR_MODE64BIT |
-			      /* PROVISIONKEY | */ SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
+			      SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY | SGX_ATTR_EINITTOKENKEY |
 			      SGX_ATTR_KSS;
 		entry->ebx &= 0;
 		break;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 5ca7b181a3ae..3d1b4113a57b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -74,6 +74,8 @@
 #include <asm/tlbflush.h>
 #include <asm/intel_pt.h>
 #include <asm/emulate_prefix.h>
+#include <asm/sgx.h>
+#include <asm/sgx_arch.h>
 #include <clocksource/hyperv_timer.h>
 
 #define CREATE_TRACE_POINTS
@@ -3767,6 +3769,9 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm *kvm, long ext)
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_USER_SPACE_MSR:
 	case KVM_CAP_X86_MSR_FILTER:
 	case KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID:
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE:
+#endif
 		r = 1;
 		break;
 	case KVM_CAP_SYNC_REGS:
@@ -5295,6 +5300,23 @@ int kvm_vm_ioctl_enable_cap(struct kvm *kvm,
 		kvm->arch.user_space_msr_mask = cap->args[0];
 		r = 0;
 		break;
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SGX_KVM
+	case KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE: {
+		unsigned long allowed_attributes = 0;
+
+		r = sgx_set_attribute(&allowed_attributes, cap->args[0]);
+		if (r)
+			break;
+
+		/* KVM only supports the PROVISIONKEY privileged attribute. */
+		if ((allowed_attributes & SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY) &&
+		    !(allowed_attributes & ~SGX_ATTR_PROVISIONKEY))
+			kvm->arch.sgx_provisioning_allowed = true;
+		else
+			r = -EINVAL;
+		break;
+	}
+#endif
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		break;
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index 374c67875cdb..e17bda18a9b4 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1058,6 +1058,7 @@ struct kvm_ppc_resize_hpt {
 #define KVM_CAP_ENFORCE_PV_FEATURE_CPUID 190
 #define KVM_CAP_SYS_HYPERV_CPUID 191
 #define KVM_CAP_DIRTY_LOG_RING 192
+#define KVM_CAP_SGX_ATTRIBUTE 200
 
 #ifdef KVM_CAP_IRQ_ROUTING
 
-- 
2.29.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-02-13 13:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-02-13 13:28 [RFC PATCH v5 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 01/26] x86/cpufeatures: Make SGX_LC feature bit depend on SGX bit Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add SGX1 and SGX2 sub-features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 03/26] x86/sgx: Wipe out EREMOVE from sgx_free_epc_page() Kai Huang
2021-02-16 17:04   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 20:42     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 04/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX_CHILD_PRESENT hardware error code Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:28 ` [RFC PATCH v5 05/26] x86/sgx: Introduce virtual EPC for use by KVM guests Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:12   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16 18:38   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:25     ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-16 21:33       ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 21:34     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-17 22:22     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 06/26] x86/cpu/intel: Allow SGX virtualization without Launch Control support Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  5:03     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16  8:36       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16 10:24         ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 18:40   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 20:42     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 07/26] x86/sgx: Initialize virtual EPC driver even when SGX driver is disabled Kai Huang
2021-02-16 18:41   ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 08/26] x86/sgx: Expose SGX architectural definitions to the kernel Kai Huang
2021-02-16  2:17   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16 10:30     ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 10:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 11:15         ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 11:48           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 11:56             ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 15:18             ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 18:47               ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-16 18:53                 ` Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:18                   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-02-17 22:20               ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-18  9:09                 ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16 16:28         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 09/26] x86/sgx: Move ENCLS leaf definitions to sgx_arch.h Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 10/26] x86/sgx: Add SGX2 ENCLS leaf definitions (EAUG, EMODPR and EMODT) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 11/26] x86/sgx: Add encls_faulted() helper Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 12/26] x86/sgx: Add helper to update SGX_LEPUBKEYHASHn MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 13/26] x86/sgx: Add helpers to expose ECREATE and EINIT to KVM Kai Huang
2021-02-16  3:08   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  3:09     ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  4:55       ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-16  8:33         ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  8:35           ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-02-16  9:33             ` Huang, Kai
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 14/26] x86/sgx: Move provisioning device creation out of SGX driver Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 15/26] KVM: VMX: Convert vcpu_vmx.exit_reason to a union Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 16/26] KVM: x86: Export kvm_mmu_gva_to_gpa_{read,write}() for SGX (VMX) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 17/26] KVM: x86: Define new #PF SGX error code bit Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 18/26] KVM: x86: Add support for reverse CPUID lookup of scattered features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 19/26] KVM: x86: Add reverse-CPUID lookup support for scattered SGX features Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 20/26] KVM: VMX: Add basic handling of VM-Exit from SGX enclave Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 21/26] KVM: VMX: Frame in ENCLS handler for SGX virtualization Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 22/26] KVM: VMX: Add SGX ENCLS[ECREATE] handler to enforce CPUID restrictions Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 23/26] KVM: VMX: Add emulation of SGX Launch Control LE hash MSRs Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 24/26] KVM: VMX: Add ENCLS[EINIT] handler to support SGX Launch Control (LC) Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:29 ` [RFC PATCH v5 25/26] KVM: VMX: Enable SGX virtualization for SGX1, SGX2 and LC Kai Huang
2021-02-13 13:30 ` Kai Huang [this message]
2021-02-16 18:48 ` [RFC PATCH v5 00/26] KVM SGX virtualization support Dave Hansen
2021-02-16 19:15   ` Sean Christopherson
2021-02-16 20:58   ` Huang, Kai

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