All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
To: Sandy Harris <sandyinchina@gmail.com>
Cc: Jeffrey Walton <noloader@gmail.com>,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: Entropy sources
Date: Thu, 25 Aug 2016 17:20:57 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5d672be5-6234-6bb7-fc2d-ee680742628c@zytor.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CACXcFmk8DWOxu+=J3i06bSvEW3tp_O2cxHLGdCuXTJROZ=hysA@mail.gmail.com>

On 08/25/16 16:35, Sandy Harris wrote:
> On Thu, Aug 25, 2016 at 5:30 PM, H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com> wrote:
> 
>> The network stack is a good source of entropy, *once it is online*.
>> However, the most serious case is while the machine is still booting,
>> when the network will not have enabled yet.
>>
>>         -hpa
> 
> One possible solution is at:
> https://github.com/sandy-harris/maxwell
> 
> A small (< 700 lines) daemon that gets entropy from timer imprecision
> and variations in time for arithmetic (cache misses, interrupts, etc.)
> and pumps it into /dev/random. Make it the first userspace program
> started and all should be covered. Directory above includes a PDF doc
> with detailed rationale and some discussion of alternate solutions.
> 
> Of course if you are dealing with a system-on-a-chip or low-end
> embedded CPU & the timer is really inadequate, this will not work
> well. Conceivably well enough, but we could not know that without
> detailed analysis for each chip in question.
> 

A lot of this is exactly the same thing /dev/random already does in
kernel space.  I have already in the past expressed skepticism toward
this approach, because a lot of the analysis done has simply been bogus.

	-hpa

      reply	other threads:[~2016-08-26  0:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-08-21  5:37 Entropy sources (was: /dev/random - a new approach) Jeffrey Walton
2016-08-25 21:30 ` H. Peter Anvin
2016-08-25 23:35   ` Sandy Harris
2016-08-26  0:20     ` H. Peter Anvin [this message]

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5d672be5-6234-6bb7-fc2d-ee680742628c@zytor.com \
    --to=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=noloader@gmail.com \
    --cc=sandyinchina@gmail.com \
    --cc=tytso@mit.edu \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.