All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Cc: "xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org" <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, mheyne@amazon.de
Subject: Re: Interrupt for port 19, but apparently not enabled; per-user 000000004af23acc
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 17:14:49 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5d88a82e-d237-7803-7b50-897e857f2fbd@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <9a08bbf2-ba6a-6e49-3bcb-bfe2beb32b99@xen.org>


[-- Attachment #1.1.1: Type: text/plain, Size: 6185 bytes --]

On 22.06.21 14:21, Julien Grall wrote:
> Hi Juergen,
> 
> On 22/06/2021 13:04, Juergen Gross wrote:
>> On 22.06.21 12:24, Julien Grall wrote:
>>> Hi Juergen,
>>>
>>> As discussed on IRC yesterday, we noticed a couple of splat in 5.13-rc6 
>>
>>> (and stable 5.4) in the evtchn driver:
>>>
>>> [    7.581000] ------------[ cut here ]------------
>>> [    7.581899] Interrupt for port 19, but apparently not 
>> enabled;
>>> per-user 000000004af23acc
>>> [    7.583401] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 467 at 
>>> /home/ANT.AMAZON.COM/jgrall/works/oss/linux/drivers/xen/evtchn.c:169 
>>> evtchn_interrupt+0xd5/0x100
>>> [    7.585583] Modules linked in:
>>> [    7.586188] CPU: 0 PID: 467 Comm: xenstore-read Not 
tainted 
>>> 5.13.0-rc6 #240
>>> [    7.587462] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), 
>>> BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
>>> [    7.589462] RIP: e030:evtchn_interrupt+0xd5/0x100
>>> [    7.590361] Code: 48 8d bb d8 01 00 00 ba 01 00 00 00 
>> be 1d 00 00 00
>>> e8 5f 72 c4 ff eb b2 8b 75 20 48 89 da 48 c7 c7 a8 03 5f 82 e8 6b 2d 96 
>>
>>> ff <0f> 0b e9 4d ff ff ff 41 0f b6 f4 48 c7 c7 80 da a2 82 e8 f0
>>> [    7.593662] RSP: e02b:ffffc90040003e60 EFLAGS: 00010082
>>> [    7.594636] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888102328c00 RCX: 
>>> 0000000000000027
>>> [    7.595924] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffff88817fe18ad0 RDI: 
>>> ffff88817fe18ad8
>>> [    7.597216] RBP: ffff888108ef8140 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 
>>> 0000000000000001
>>> [    7.598522] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 7075727265746e49 R12: 
>>> 0000000000000000
>>> [    7.599810] R13: ffffc90040003ec4 R14: ffff8881001b8000 R15: 
>>> ffff888109b36f80
>>> [    7.601113] FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88817fe00000(0000) 
>>> knlGS:0000000000000000
>>> [    7.602570] CS:  10000e030 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0:0000000080050033
>>> [    7.603700] CR2: 00007f15b390e368 CR3: 000000010bb04000 CR4: 
>>> 0000000000050660
>>> [    7.604993] Call Trace:
>>> [    7.605501]  <IRQ>
>>> [    7.605929]  __handle_irq_event_percpu+0x4c/0x330
>>> [    7.606817]  handle_irq_event_percpu+0x32/0xa0
>>> [    7.607670]  handle_irq_event+0x3a/0x60
>>> [    7.608416]  handle_edge_irq+0x9b/0x1f0
>>> [    7.609154]  generic_handle_irq+0x4f/0x60
>>> [    7.609918]  __evtchn_fifo_handle_events+0x195/0x3a0
>>> [    7.610864]  __xen_evtchn_do_upcall+0x66/0xb0
>>> [    7.611693]  __xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x1d/0x30
>>> [    7.612582]  xen_pv_evtchn_do_upcall+0x9d/0xc0
>>> [    7.613439]  </IRQ>
>>> [    7.613882]  exc_xen_hypervisor_callback+0x8/0x10
>>>
>>> This is quite similar to the problem I reported a few months ago (see 

>>> [1]) but this time this is happening with fifo rather than 2L.
>>>
>>> I haven't been able to reproduced it reliably so far. But looking at 
>>> the code, I think I have found another potential race after commit
>>>
>>> commit b6622798bc50b625a1e62f82c7190df40c1f5b21
>>> Author: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>>> Date:   Sat Mar 6 17:18:33 2021 +0100
>>>     xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two cpusat the same 
>>> time
>>>     When changing the cpu affinity of an event it can happen today that
>>>     (with some unlucky timing) the same event will be handled 
>> on the old
>>>     and the new cpu at the same time.
>>>     Avoid that by adding an "event active" flag to the 
per-event data 
>>> and
>>>     call the handler only if this flag isn't set.
>>>     Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>>>     Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
>>>     Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
>>>     Reviewed-by: Julien Grall <jgrall@amazon.com>
>>>     Link: 
>>> https://lore.kernel.org/r/20210306161833.4552-4-jgross@suse.com
>>>     Signed-off-by: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
>>>
>>> The evtchn driver will use the lateeoi handlers. So the code to ack 
>>> looks like:
>>>
>>> do_mask(..., EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING)
>>> smp_store_release(&info->is_active, 0);
>>> clear_evtchn(info->evtchn);
>>>
>>> The code to handle an interrupts look like:
>>>
>>> clear_link(...)
>>> if ( evtchn_fifo_is_pending(port) && !evtchn_fifo_is_mask()) {
>>>    if (xchg_acquire(&info->is_active, 1)
>>>      return;
>>>    generic_handle_irq();
>>> }
>>>
>>> After changing the affinity, an interrupt may be received once on the 

>>> previous vCPU. So, I think the following can happen:
>>>
>>> vCPU0                             | vCPU1
>>>                    |
>>>   Receive event              |
>>>                    | change affinity to vCPU1
>>>   clear_link()              |
>>>                        |
>>>                 /* The interrupt is re-raised */
>>>                    | receive event
>>>                      |
>>>                    | /* The interrupt is not masked */
>>>   info->is_active = 1          |
>>>   do_mask(...)              |
>>>   info->is_active = 0          |
>>>                    | info->is_active = 1
>>>   clear_evtchn(...)               |
>>>                                   | do_mask(...)
>>>                                   | info->is_active = 0
>>>                    | clear_evtchn(...)
>>>
>>> Does this look plausible to you?
>>
>> Yes, it does.
>>
>> Thanks for the analysis.
>>
>> So I guess for lateeoi events we need to clear is_active only in
>> xen_irq_lateeoi()? At a first glance this should fix the issue.
> 
> It should work and would be quite neat. But, I believe clear_evtchn() 
> would have to stick in the ack helper to avoid losing interrupts.
> 

Could you try the attached patch, please? Only compile tested.


Juergen

[-- Attachment #1.1.2: 0001-xen-events-reset-active-flag-for-lateeoi-events-late.patch --]
[-- Type: text/x-patch, Size: 1588 bytes --]

From 593e81cfb5d4a15e5e420111565e7f6019da9b72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Date: Tue, 22 Jun 2021 17:05:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xen/events: reset active flag for lateeoi events later

In order to avoid a race condition for user events when changing
cpu affinity reset the active flag only when EOI-ing the event.

This is working fine as all user events are lateeoi events.

Reported-by: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
Fixes: b6622798bc50b62 ("xen/events: avoid handling the same event on two 
cpus at the same time")
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
 drivers/xen/events/events_base.c | 3 ++-
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
index 7bbfd58958bc..26836546e1cd 100644
--- a/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
+++ b/drivers/xen/events/events_base.c
@@ -642,6 +642,7 @@ static void xen_irq_lateeoi_locked(struct irq_info *info, bool spurious)
 	}
 
 	info->eoi_time = 0;
+	smp_store_release(&info->is_active, 0);
 	do_unmask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
 }
 
@@ -1883,7 +1884,7 @@ static void lateeoi_ack_dynirq(struct irq_data *data)
 
 	if (VALID_EVTCHN(evtchn)) {
 		do_mask(info, EVT_MASK_REASON_EOI_PENDING);
-		event_handler_exit(info);
+		clear_evtchn(evtchn);
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.26.2


[-- Attachment #1.1.3: OpenPGP public key --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-keys, Size: 3135 bytes --]

[-- Attachment #2: OpenPGP digital signature --]
[-- Type: application/pgp-signature, Size: 495 bytes --]

  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-06-22 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-06-22 10:24 Interrupt for port 19, but apparently not enabled; per-user 000000004af23acc Julien Grall
2021-06-22 11:04 ` Juergen Gross
2021-06-22 12:21   ` Julien Grall
2021-06-22 12:23     ` Juergen Gross
2021-06-22 15:14     ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2021-06-23 12:25       ` Julien Grall

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=5d88a82e-d237-7803-7b50-897e857f2fbd@suse.com \
    --to=jgross@suse.com \
    --cc=julien@xen.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mheyne@amazon.de \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.