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Violators will be prosecuted; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 17:31:47 -0500 Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com [9.57.199.110]) by b01cxnp22034.gho.pok.ibm.com (8.14.9/8.14.9/NCO v10.0) with ESMTP id w1DMVkQY47054864; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 22:31:46 GMT Received: from b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (unknown [127.0.0.1]) by IMSVA (Postfix) with ESMTP id 60148AE034; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 17:33:07 -0500 (EST) Received: from ltc.linux.ibm.com (unknown [9.16.170.189]) by b01ledav005.gho.pok.ibm.com (Postfix) with ESMTP id 1A339AE03C; Tue, 13 Feb 2018 17:33:07 -0500 (EST) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=US-ASCII; format=flowed Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 16:33:25 -0600 From: Adriana Kobylak To: Yugi Mani Cc: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org Subject: RE: BMC Image Signing Proposal In-Reply-To: References: <70e1d00f2f9abaea58ff3710d4fbcbff@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <7857d6b0-5c9b-63c1-4216-a737513a3f5a@yadro.com> <1517207425.21006.27.camel@aj.id.au> <87shaoymux.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <87lggezywe.fsf@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <3d38bc878a5b36f9091588d1fb842c1e@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <8172868d02b4f54ceaa101ba1c99fa5b@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Sender: anoo@linux.vnet.ibm.com User-Agent: Roundcube Webmail/1.0.1 X-TM-AS-GCONF: 00 x-cbid: 18021322-0040-0000-0000-000003F2F09D X-IBM-SpamModules-Scores: X-IBM-SpamModules-Versions: BY=3.00008529; HX=3.00000241; KW=3.00000007; PH=3.00000004; SC=3.00000253; SDB=6.00989309; UDB=6.00502332; IPR=6.00768664; BA=6.00005827; NDR=6.00000001; ZLA=6.00000005; ZF=6.00000009; ZB=6.00000000; ZP=6.00000000; ZH=6.00000000; ZU=6.00000002; MB=3.00019539; XFM=3.00000015; UTC=2018-02-13 22:31:47 X-IBM-AV-DETECTION: SAVI=unused REMOTE=unused XFE=unused x-cbparentid: 18021322-0041-0000-0000-000007E8696F Message-Id: <634e8e59f56c0f62e78ece56048c8059@linux.vnet.ibm.com> X-Proofpoint-Virus-Version: vendor=fsecure engine=2.50.10432:, , definitions=2018-02-13_11:, , signatures=0 X-Proofpoint-Spam-Details: rule=outbound_notspam policy=outbound score=0 priorityscore=1501 malwarescore=0 suspectscore=0 phishscore=0 bulkscore=0 spamscore=0 clxscore=1011 lowpriorityscore=0 impostorscore=0 adultscore=0 classifier=spam adjust=0 reason=mlx scancount=1 engine=8.0.1-1709140000 definitions=main-1802130264 X-BeenThere: openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.26 Precedence: list List-Id: Development list for OpenBMC List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , X-List-Received-Date: Tue, 13 Feb 2018 22:31:55 -0000 On 2018-02-09 19:36, Yugi Mani wrote: > We should consider both of these requirements for image signing: > 1. Update verification > 2. Boot Verification > Yes, the boot verification via FIT is being tracked via issue https://github.com/openbmc/openbmc/issues/2829, it's planned to be implemented after the update verification. > Appending signature to image meets verification during firmware > update. To do verification on every boot, we need something like FIT. > https://chromium.googlesource.com/chromiumos/third_party/u-boot-next/+/chromeos-v2013.06/doc/uImage.FIT > Thanks, I've added the link to the issue 2829 for reference. > As far as actual signing is concerned, we don't have access to private > key for security reasons. We should support two models: > Model 1: > Source code has private key and signing is part of build process > ("bitbake obmc-phosphor-image") > > Model 2: > Source code does not have private key, Signing is done externally and > some post-processing is done to add hash to image. (maybe a new task, > "bitbake obmc-phosphor-image -c add_hash") Yeah, these are good points, we were thinking also through a build environment variable this could be specified. Eddie is implementing this piece so he could expand on this.