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From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"oprofile-list@lists.sf.net" <oprofile-list@lists.sf.net>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	seli
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:25:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7EBC6A81-1DA7-4D5C-972F-4D5987B12E2A@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0cb2b8d-e964-bc23-bf80-58d7ac4ed6f1@linux.intel.com>



> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:24 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would
> assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events,
> i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
> attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related
> to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance
> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations
> provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability
> is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
> 
> [1] https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__man7.org_linux_man-2Dpages_man7_capabilities.7.html&d=DwICaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=dR8692q0_uaizy0jkrBJQM5k2hfm4CiFxYT8KaysFrg&m=L5qCuMRrTvYhyjR1rpgE9vEv4HppVlOXDIzKzoGL30c&s=FNJpET4buKFRuqktVHQphaY1qE7IsdFpU4iYwpCn4tY&e= 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"oprofile-list@lists.sf.net" <oprofile-list@lists.sf.net>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:25:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7EBC6A81-1DA7-4D5C-972F-4D5987B12E2A@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0cb2b8d-e964-bc23-bf80-58d7ac4ed6f1@linux.intel.com>



> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:24 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would
> assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events,
> i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
> attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related
> to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance
> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations
> provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability
> is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
> 
> [1] https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__man7.org_linux_man-2Dpages_man7_capabilities.7.html&d=DwICaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=dR8692q0_uaizy0jkrBJQM5k2hfm4CiFxYT8KaysFrg&m=L5qCuMRrTvYhyjR1rpgE9vEv4HppVlOXDIzKzoGL30c&s=FNJpET4buKFRuqktVHQphaY1qE7IsdFpU4iYwpCn4tY&e= 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	"joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com"
	<joonas.lahtinen@linux.intel.com>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"oprofile-list@lists.sf.net" <oprofile-list@lists.sf.net>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	"jani.nikula@linux.intel.com" <jani.nikula@linux.intel.com>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	"rodrigo.vivi@intel.com" <rodrigo.vivi@intel.com>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	Tvrtko Ursulin <tvrtko.ursulin@linux.intel.com>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Lionel Landwerlin <lionel.g.landwerlin@intel.com>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:25:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7EBC6A81-1DA7-4D5C-972F-4D5987B12E2A@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0cb2b8d-e964-bc23-bf80-58d7ac4ed6f1@linux.intel.com>



> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:24 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would
> assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events,
> i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
> attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related
> to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance
> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations
> provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability
> is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
> 
> [1] https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__man7.org_linux_man-2Dpages_man7_capabilities.7.html&d=DwICaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=dR8692q0_uaizy0jkrBJQM5k2hfm4CiFxYT8KaysFrg&m=L5qCuMRrTvYhyjR1rpgE9vEv4HppVlOXDIzKzoGL30c&s=FNJpET4buKFRuqktVHQphaY1qE7IsdFpU4iYwpCn4tY&e= 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
_______________________________________________
linux-arm-kernel mailing list
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
http://lists.infradead.org/mailman/listinfo/linux-arm-kernel

WARNING: multiple messages have this Message-ID (diff)
From: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
To: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Benjamin Herrenschmidt <benh@kernel.crashing.org>,
	Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
	Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>,
	"james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com"
	<james.bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Paul Mackerras <paulus@samba.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>,
	Igor Lubashev <ilubashe@akamai.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	"oprofile-list@lists.sf.net" <oprofile-list@lists.sf.net>,
	Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>, Robert Richter <rric@kernel.org>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	"selinux@vger.kernel.org" <selinux@vger.kernel.org>,
	"intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org"
	<intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org>,
	Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>,
	Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	"linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org"
	<linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org>,
	"linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org" <linux-parisc@vger.kernel.org>,
	linux-kernel <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org"
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	"bpf@vger.kernel.org" <bpf@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org" <linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: Re: [Intel-gfx] [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2020 20:25:37 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <7EBC6A81-1DA7-4D5C-972F-4D5987B12E2A@fb.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e0cb2b8d-e964-bc23-bf80-58d7ac4ed6f1@linux.intel.com>



> On Dec 18, 2019, at 1:24 AM, Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com> wrote:
> 
> 
> Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability devoted to secure system performance
> monitoring and observability operations so that CAP_SYS_PERFMON would
> assist CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability in its governing role for perf_events,
> i915_perf and other subsystems of the kernel.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to harden system security and integrity during
> system performance monitoring and observability operations by decreasing
> attack surface that is available to CAP_SYS_ADMIN privileged processes.
> 
> CAP_SYS_PERFMON intends to take over CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials related
> to system performance monitoring and observability operations and balance
> amount of CAP_SYS_ADMIN credentials in accordance with the recommendations
> provided in the man page for CAP_SYS_ADMIN [1]: "Note: this capability
> is overloaded; see Notes to kernel developers, below."
> 
> [1] https://urldefense.proofpoint.com/v2/url?u=http-3A__man7.org_linux_man-2Dpages_man7_capabilities.7.html&d=DwICaQ&c=5VD0RTtNlTh3ycd41b3MUw&r=dR8692q0_uaizy0jkrBJQM5k2hfm4CiFxYT8KaysFrg&m=L5qCuMRrTvYhyjR1rpgE9vEv4HppVlOXDIzKzoGL30c&s=FNJpET4buKFRuqktVHQphaY1qE7IsdFpU4iYwpCn4tY&e= 
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>

Acked-by: Song Liu <songliubraving@fb.com>
_______________________________________________
Intel-gfx mailing list
Intel-gfx@lists.freedesktop.org
https://lists.freedesktop.org/mailman/listinfo/intel-gfx

  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-01-13 20:25 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 148+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-12-18  9:16 [PATCH v4 0/7] Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:16 ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:16 ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:24 ` [PATCH v4 1/9] capabilities: introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to kernel and user space Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:24   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:24   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 19:56   ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56     ` [Intel-gfx] " Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-18 19:56     ` Stephen Smalley
2019-12-28  3:53   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28  3:53     ` [Intel-gfx] " Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28  3:53     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-12-28  3:53     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2020-01-13 20:25   ` Song Liu [this message]
2020-01-13 20:25     ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:25     ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:25     ` Song Liu
2019-12-18  9:25 ` [PATCH v4 2/9] perf/core: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:25   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:25   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:25   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:25   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-08 16:07   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07     ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-08 16:07     ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-09 11:36     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-09 11:36       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 14:02       ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02         ` [Intel-gfx] " Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 14:02         ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-01-10 15:52         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52           ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 15:52           ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 16:45           ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45             ` [Intel-gfx] " Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 16:45             ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2020-01-10 23:47             ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47               ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 23:47               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-11  0:23               ` Song Liu
2020-01-11  0:23                 ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-11  0:23                 ` Song Liu
2020-01-11  0:23                 ` Song Liu
2020-01-11  0:35                 ` arnaldo.melo
2020-01-11  0:35                   ` [Intel-gfx] " arnaldo.melo
2020-01-11  9:57                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-13 20:39                     ` Song Liu
2020-01-14  3:25                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-14  5:17                       ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-14  9:47                         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-14 18:06                           ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-14 18:50                             ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-15  1:52                               ` Alexei Starovoitov
2020-01-15  5:15                                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:50                                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:55                                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 13:56                                   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-15  9:45                               ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-15 12:11                                 ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-14 12:04                         ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12  1:44                   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12  1:44                     ` [Intel-gfx] " Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-12  1:44                     ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-01-10 16:41         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 16:41           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34         ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34           ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-10 17:34           ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-01 20:49     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-04-03 14:28       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:26 ` [PATCH v4 3/9] perf tool: extend Perf tool with CAP_SYS_PERFMON capability support Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:26   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:26   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:27 ` [PATCH v4 4/9] drm/i915/perf: open access for CAP_SYS_PERFMON privileged process Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:27   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:27   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-19  9:10   ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19  9:10     ` [Intel-gfx] " Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19  9:10     ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19  9:10     ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-19  9:10     ` Lionel Landwerlin
2019-12-18  9:28 ` [PATCH v4 5/9] trace/bpf_trace: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-13 20:47   ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47     ` [Intel-gfx] " Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47     ` Song Liu
2020-01-13 20:47     ` Song Liu
2019-12-18  9:28 ` [PATCH v4 6/9] powerpc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:28   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:29 ` [PATCH v4 7/9] parisc/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:29   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:29   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-27  8:52   ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27  8:52     ` [Intel-gfx] " Helge Deller
2020-01-27  8:52     ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27  8:52     ` Helge Deller
2020-01-27  8:52     ` Helge Deller
2019-12-18  9:30 ` [PATCH v4 8/9] drivers/perf: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:30   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:30   ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 10:51   ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 10:51     ` [Intel-gfx] " Will Deacon
2020-01-17 10:51     ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 10:51     ` Will Deacon
2020-01-17 21:33     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33       ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-17 21:33       ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-18 18:48     ` Alexey Budankov
2020-01-18 18:48       ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:31 ` [PATCH v4 9/9] drivers/oprofile: " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:31   ` [Intel-gfx] " Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18  9:31   ` Alexey Budankov
2019-12-18 10:11 ` [Intel-gfx] ✗ Fi.CI.BUILD: failure for Introduce CAP_SYS_PERFMON to secure system performance monitoring and observability (rev3) Patchwork

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