* [PATCH v8 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support
@ 2021-05-14 0:53 Masahisa Kojima
2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Masahisa Kojima
` (2 more replies)
0 siblings, 3 replies; 10+ messages in thread
From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: u-boot
This patch series add the PE/COFF measurement support.
Extending PCR and Event Log is tested with fTPM
running as a OP-TEE TA.
Unit test will be added in the separate series.
Masahisa Kojima (3):
lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option
efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is
disabled
efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement
common/Kconfig.boot | 1 +
include/efi_loader.h | 6 +
include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++
include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++
lib/Kconfig | 3 +
lib/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 8 ++
lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +-
lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 123 +++++++++++++++---
lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +---------
lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 +
12 files changed, 356 insertions(+), 93 deletions(-)
--
2.17.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread* [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option 2021-05-14 0:53 [PATCH v8 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-24 13:25 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is enabled, because hash-checksum.c is not compiled. Since hash_calculate() implemented in hash-checksum.c can be commonly used aside from FIT image signature verification, this commit itroduces HASH_CALCULATE option to decide if hash-checksum.c shall be compiled. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- (no changes since v7) Changes in v7: - newly introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Changes in v6: - update lib/Makefile to compile hash-checksum.c, instead of selecting FIT_SIGNATURE in secure boot and capsule authentication. Changes in v5: - Missing option for EFI_TCG2_PROTOROL already added in different commit. This commit adds FIT_SIGNATURE only. Changes in v4: - newly added in this patch series, due to rebasing the base code. common/Kconfig.boot | 1 + lib/Kconfig | 3 +++ lib/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 2 ++ 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/common/Kconfig.boot b/common/Kconfig.boot index 5a18d62d78..56608226cc 100644 --- a/common/Kconfig.boot +++ b/common/Kconfig.boot @@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ config FIT_SIGNATURE select RSA_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO select FIT_FULL_CHECK + select HASH_CALCULATE help This option enables signature verification of FIT uImages, using a hash signed and verified using RSA. If diff --git a/lib/Kconfig b/lib/Kconfig index 6d2d41de30..df67eb0503 100644 --- a/lib/Kconfig +++ b/lib/Kconfig @@ -428,6 +428,9 @@ config CRC32C config XXHASH bool +config HASH_CALCULATE + bool + endmenu menu "Compression Support" diff --git a/lib/Makefile b/lib/Makefile index 6825671955..0835ea292c 100644 --- a/lib/Makefile +++ b/lib/Makefile @@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ endif obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)ACPIGEN) += acpi/ obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)MD5) += md5.o obj-$(CONFIG_$(SPL_)RSA) += rsa/ -obj-$(CONFIG_FIT_SIGNATURE) += hash-checksum.o +obj-$(CONFIG_HASH_CALCULATE) += hash-checksum.o obj-$(CONFIG_SHA1) += sha1.o obj-$(CONFIG_SHA256) += sha256.o obj-$(CONFIG_SHA512_ALGO) += sha512.o diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index c259abe033..eb5c4d6f29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO + select HASH_CALCULATE default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -342,6 +343,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select X509_CERTIFICATE_PARSER select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY + select HASH_CALCULATE default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-24 13:25 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-24 13:25 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Masahisa Kojima Cc: Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Ilias Apalodimas, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot On 5/14/21 2:53 AM, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > Build error occurs when CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT or > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is enabled, > because hash-checksum.c is not compiled. > > Since hash_calculate() implemented in hash-checksum.c can be > commonly used aside from FIT image signature verification, > this commit itroduces HASH_CALCULATE option to decide > if hash-checksum.c shall be compiled. > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> This patch is already merged. Best regards Heinrich ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v8 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled 2021-05-14 0:53 [PATCH v8 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot This is preparation for PE/COFF measurement support. PE/COFF image hash calculation is same in both UEFI Secure Boot image verification and measurement in measured boot. PE/COFF image parsing functions are gathered into efi_image_loader.c, and exposed even if UEFI Secure Boot is not enabled. This commit also adds the EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option to decide if efi_signature.c shall be compiled. Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- Changes in v8: - remove superfluous "depends on" in Kconfig (no changes since v4) Changes in v4: - revert #ifdef instead of using "if (!IS_ENABLED())" statement, not to rely on the compiler optimization. Changes in v3: - hide EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option Changes in v2: - Remove all #ifdef from efi_image_loader.c and efi_signature.c - Add EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT option - Explicitly include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> - Gather PE/COFF parsing functions into efi_image_loader.c - Move efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database in efi_var_common.c lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 5 +++ lib/efi_loader/Makefile | 2 +- lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++- lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c | 67 +------------------------------ lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c | 3 ++ 5 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 68 deletions(-) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index eb5c4d6f29..98845b8ba3 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -175,6 +175,7 @@ config EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE select PKCS7_VERIFY select IMAGE_SIGN_INFO select HASH_CALCULATE + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option if you want to enable capsule @@ -344,6 +345,7 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT select PKCS7_MESSAGE_PARSER select PKCS7_VERIFY select HASH_CALCULATE + select EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT default n help Select this option to enable EFI secure boot support. @@ -351,6 +353,9 @@ config EFI_SECURE_BOOT it is signed with a trusted key. To do that, you need to install, at least, PK, KEK and db. +config EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT + bool + config EFI_ESRT bool "Enable the UEFI ESRT generation" depends on EFI_CAPSULE_FIRMWARE_MANAGEMENT diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile index 8bd343e258..fd344cea29 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Makefile +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Makefile @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_GENERATE_SMBIOS_TABLE) += efi_smbios.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL) += efi_rng.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) += efi_tcg2.o obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_LOAD_FILE2_INITRD) += efi_load_initrd.o -obj-y += efi_signature.o +obj-$(CONFIG_EFI_SIGNATURE_SUPPORT) += efi_signature.o EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE := $(subst $\",,$(CONFIG_EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE)) $(obj)/efi_var_seed.o: $(srctree)/$(EFI_VAR_SEED_FILE) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index f53ef367ec..fe1ee198e2 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -213,7 +213,68 @@ static void efi_set_code_and_data_type( } } -#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT +/** + * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region + * @regs: Pointer to array of regions + * @start: Start address of region (included) + * @end: End address of region (excluded) + * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions + * + * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. + * + * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. + * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. + * + * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence + * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, + const void *start, const void *end, + int nocheck) +{ + struct image_region *reg; + int i, j; + + if (regs->num >= regs->max) { + EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + } + + if (end < start) + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + + for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + if (nocheck) + continue; + + /* new data after registered region */ + if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) + continue; + + /* new data preceding registered region */ + if (end <= reg->data) { + for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) + memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], + sizeof(*reg)); + break; + } + + /* new data overlapping registered region */ + EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + + reg = ®s->reg[i]; + reg->data = start; + reg->size = end - start; + regs->num++; + + return EFI_SUCCESS; +} + /** * cmp_pe_section() - compare virtual addresses of two PE image sections * @arg1: pointer to pointer to first section header @@ -422,6 +483,7 @@ err: return false; } +#ifdef CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT /** * efi_image_unsigned_authenticate() - authenticate unsigned image with * SHA256 hash diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c index c7ec275414..bdd09881fc 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_signature.c @@ -15,18 +15,16 @@ #include <crypto/public_key.h> #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/oid_registry.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/rsa.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> -const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = - EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_sha256 = EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_rsa2048 = EFI_CERT_RSA2048_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509 = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_x509_sha256 = EFI_CERT_X509_SHA256_GUID; const efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 = EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID; -#if defined(CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT) || defined(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE) static u8 pkcs7_hdr[] = { /* SEQUENCE */ 0x30, 0x82, 0x05, 0xc7, @@ -539,68 +537,6 @@ out: return !revoked; } -/** - * efi_image_region_add() - add an entry of region - * @regs: Pointer to array of regions - * @start: Start address of region (included) - * @end: End address of region (excluded) - * @nocheck: flag against overlapped regions - * - * Take one entry of region [@start, @end[ and insert it into the list. - * - * * If @nocheck is false, the list will be sorted ascending by address. - * Overlapping entries will not be allowed. - * - * * If @nocheck is true, the list will be sorted ascending by sequence - * of adding the entries. Overlapping is allowed. - * - * Return: status code - */ -efi_status_t efi_image_region_add(struct efi_image_regions *regs, - const void *start, const void *end, - int nocheck) -{ - struct image_region *reg; - int i, j; - - if (regs->num >= regs->max) { - EFI_PRINT("%s: no more room for regions\n", __func__); - return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; - } - - if (end < start) - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - - for (i = 0; i < regs->num; i++) { - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - if (nocheck) - continue; - - /* new data after registered region */ - if (start >= reg->data + reg->size) - continue; - - /* new data preceding registered region */ - if (end <= reg->data) { - for (j = regs->num - 1; j >= i; j--) - memcpy(®s->reg[j + 1], ®s->reg[j], - sizeof(*reg)); - break; - } - - /* new data overlapping registered region */ - EFI_PRINT("%s: new region already part of another\n", __func__); - return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; - } - - reg = ®s->reg[i]; - reg->data = start; - reg->size = end - start; - regs->num++; - - return EFI_SUCCESS; -} - /** * efi_sigstore_free - free signature store * @sigstore: Pointer to signature store structure @@ -846,4 +782,3 @@ struct efi_signature_store *efi_sigstore_parse_sigdb(u16 *name) return efi_build_signature_store(db, db_size); } -#endif /* CONFIG_EFI_SECURE_BOOT || CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE */ diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c index b11ed91a74..83479dd142 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_var_common.c @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ struct efi_auth_var_name_type { const enum efi_auth_var_type type; }; +const efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_security_database = + EFI_IMAGE_SECURITY_DATABASE_GUID; + static const struct efi_auth_var_name_type name_type[] = { {u"PK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_PK}, {u"KEK", &efi_global_variable_guid, EFI_AUTH_VAR_KEK}, -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-14 0:53 [PATCH v8 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-24 12:53 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-25 12:57 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2 siblings, 2 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-14 0:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: u-boot "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" requires to measure every attempt to load and execute a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, and appends measurement into Event Log. Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> --- (no changes since v7) Changes in v7: - include hash-checksum.h instead of rsa.h - select HASH_CALCULATE in Kconfig, not to update lib/Makefile - rebased the base code Changes in v6: - update lib/Makefile to add hash-checksum.c as a compilation target (no changes since v2) Changes in v2: - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path - Add function comment include/efi_loader.h | 6 + include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 1 + lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- 6 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 --- a/include/efi_loader.h +++ b/include/efi_loader.h @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, const char *if_typename, int diskid, @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); + bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ +#include <efi_api.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { u8 event[]; } __packed; +struct uefi_image_load_event { + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; + u64 image_length_in_memory; + u64 image_link_time_address; + u64 length_of_device_path; + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; +}; + struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { u8 size; struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 --- a/include/tpm-v2.h +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) +/* + * event types, cf. + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 + */ +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) + /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ struct tpms_tagged_property { u32 property; diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL select SHA512_ALGO select SHA384 select SHA512 + select HASH_CALCULATE help Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware of the platform. diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) return 1; } +/** + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image + * + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. + * + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. + */ +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) +{ + size_t new_efi_size; + void *p; + + /* + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. + */ + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); + if (!p) + return NULL; + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); + *efi_size = new_efi_size; + *new_efi = p; + return p; + } else { + return efi; + } +} + /** * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image * @efi: Pointer to image @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; void *new_efi = NULL; u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; + size_t auth_size; bool ret = false; EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) return true; - /* - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. - */ - if (efi_size & 0x7) { - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); - if (!new_efi) - return false; - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); - efi = new_efi; - efi_size = new_efi_size; - } + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return false; if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, &wincerts_len)) { @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, goto err; } +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, + loaded_image_info)) + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); +#endif + /* Copy PE headers */ memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, sizeof(*dos) diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c index c8616bf31e..316eaf572b 100644 --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ #include <efi_loader.h> #include <efi_tcg2.h> #include <log.h> +#include <malloc.h> #include <version.h> #include <tpm-v2.h> +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> #include <u-boot/sha1.h> #include <u-boot/sha256.h> #include <u-boot/sha512.h> @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: return EFI_EXIT(ret); } +/** + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend + * + * Return: status code + */ +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) +{ + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; + size_t wincerts_len; + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; + void *new_efi = NULL; + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; + efi_status_t ret; + u32 active; + int i; + + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); + if (!efi) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, + &wincerts_len)) { + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; + goto out; + } + + digest_list->count = 0; + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; + + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) + continue; + switch (hash_alg) { + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); + break; + default: + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + } + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); + digest_list->count++; + } + +out: + free(new_efi); + free(regs); + + return ret; +} + +/** + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image + * + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary + * @handle: loaded image handle + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol + * + * Return: status code + */ +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) +{ + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; + efi_status_t ret; + struct udevice *dev; + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; + struct efi_device_path *device_path; + u32 device_path_length; + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; + struct efi_handler *handler; + + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + switch (handle->image_type) { + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: + pcr_index = 4; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: + pcr_index = 2; + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; + break; + default: + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; + } + + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, + &handler)); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) + return ret; + + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); + if (device_path_length > 0) { + /* add end node size */ + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); + } + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); + if (!image_load_event) + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; + + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; + + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; + + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; + } else { + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; + goto out; + } + + if (device_path_length > 0) { + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, + device_path_length); + } + + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); + +out: + free(image_load_event); + + return ret; +} + /** * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events * @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, /* * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature * Format" - * Not supported for now */ if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; - goto out; - } + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + (void **)&nt); + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); + goto out; + } + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, + &digest_list); + } else { + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, + data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); + } - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, - data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) goto out; -- 2.17.1 ^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-24 12:53 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-25 5:04 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-25 12:57 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 1 sibling, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread From: Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-24 12:53 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Masahisa Kojima Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot new_efi); > + > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > +#include <efi_api.h> > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > u8 event[]; > } __packed; > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > + u64 image_link_time_address; > + u64 length_of_device_path; > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > +}; > + > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > u8 size; > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > +/* > + * event types, cf. > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > + */ > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > + > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > struct tpms_tagged_property { > u32 property; > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > select SHA512_ALGO > select SHA384 > select SHA512 > + select HASH_CALCULATE > help > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > of the platform. > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > return 1; > } > > +/** > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > + * > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > + * > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > + */ > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > +{ > + size_t new_efi_size; > + void *p; > + > + /* > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > + */ > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > + if (!p) > + return NULL; > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; Do we really need new_efi here? I might be missing some context for the original code, but since we return the new pointer, can't we just use that in the caller? If so the whole void **new_efi is not needed? > + [...] > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; __get_active_pcr_banks is supposed to return the correct efi_status_t code. I don't think we need EFI_DEVICE_ERROR here. Thanks! /Ilias ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-24 12:53 ` Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-25 5:04 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-25 5:04 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Ilias Apalodimas Cc: Heinrich Schuchardt, Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot On Mon, 24 May 2021 at 21:53, Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> wrote: > > new_efi); > > + > > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > > > +#include <efi_api.h> > > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > > u8 event[]; > > } __packed; > > > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > > + u64 image_link_time_address; > > + u64 length_of_device_path; > > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > > +}; > > + > > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > > u8 size; > > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > > > +/* > > + * event types, cf. > > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > > + */ > > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > > + > > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > > struct tpms_tagged_property { > > u32 property; > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > > select SHA512_ALGO > > select SHA384 > > select SHA512 > > + select HASH_CALCULATE > > help > > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > > of the platform. > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > > return 1; > > } > > > > +/** > > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > > + * > > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > > + * > > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > > + */ > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > > +{ > > + size_t new_efi_size; > > + void *p; > > + > > + /* > > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > + */ > > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > > + if (!p) > > + return NULL; > > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; > > Do we really need new_efi here? I might be missing some context for the > original code, but since we return the new pointer, can't we just > use that in the caller? If so the whole void **new_efi is not needed? new_efi is required. The caller uses returned pointer, it will be the pointer to the original efi image or newly allocated buffer. Caller will need new_efi to free the newly allocated buffer. > > > + > > [...] > > > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > > __get_active_pcr_banks is supposed to return the correct efi_status_t code. > I don't think we need EFI_DEVICE_ERROR here. Thank you. I will just use return value of __get_active_pcr_banks(). > + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > + &wincerts_len)) { > + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + goto out; I re-checked TCG spec, if PE/COFF image is corrupted or not understood, the function shall return EFI_UNSUPPORTED. I will also update. Thanks, Masahisa Kojima > > > Thanks! > /Ilias ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-24 12:53 ` Ilias Apalodimas @ 2021-05-25 12:57 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-25 13:47 ` Masahisa Kojima 1 sibling, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread From: Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-25 12:57 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Masahisa Kojima Cc: Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Ilias Apalodimas, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot On 14.05.21 02:53, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" > requires to measure every attempt to load and execute > a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. > This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, > and appends measurement into Event Log. > > Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > --- > > (no changes since v7) > > Changes in v7: > - include hash-checksum.h instead of rsa.h > - select HASH_CALCULATE in Kconfig, not to update lib/Makefile > - rebased the base code > > Changes in v6: > - update lib/Makefile to add hash-checksum.c as a compilation target > > (no changes since v2) > > Changes in v2: > - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include > - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute > - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition > - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image > - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and > EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER > - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path > - Add function comment > > include/efi_loader.h | 6 + > include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ > include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 1 + > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- > lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > 6 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h > index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 > --- a/include/efi_loader.h > +++ b/include/efi_loader.h > @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); > efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); > /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ > efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); > +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); > /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ > int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, > const char *if_typename, int diskid, > @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); > > bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); > + > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > +#include <efi_api.h> > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > u8 event[]; > } __packed; > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > + u64 image_link_time_address; > + u64 length_of_device_path; > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > +}; > + > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > u8 size; > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > +/* > + * event types, cf. > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > + */ > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > + > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > struct tpms_tagged_property { > u32 property; > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > select SHA512_ALGO > select SHA384 > select SHA512 > + select HASH_CALCULATE > help > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > of the platform. > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > return 1; > } > > +/** > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > + * > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > + * > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > + */ > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > +{ > + size_t new_efi_size; > + void *p; > + > + /* > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > + */ > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { Why don't you unconditionally copy to a new buffer? Then the caller can free the return value unconditionally. > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > + if (!p) > + return NULL; > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; > + *new_efi = p; > + return p; > + } else { > + return efi; > + } > +} > + > /** > * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image > * @efi: Pointer to image > @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > void *new_efi = NULL; > u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; > - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; > + size_t auth_size; > bool ret = false; > > EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > return true; > > - /* > - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > - */ > - if (efi_size & 0x7) { > - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; > - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > - if (!new_efi) > - return false; > - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); > - efi = new_efi; > - efi_size = new_efi_size; > - } > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); > + if (!efi) > + return false; > > if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > &wincerts_len)) { > @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > goto err; > } > > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) > + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ > + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, > + loaded_image_info)) > + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); > +#endif > + > /* Copy PE headers */ > memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, > sizeof(*dos) > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > index c8616bf31e..316eaf572b 100644 > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ > #include <efi_loader.h> > #include <efi_tcg2.h> > #include <log.h> > +#include <malloc.h> > #include <version.h> > #include <tpm-v2.h> > +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> > #include <u-boot/sha1.h> > #include <u-boot/sha256.h> > #include <u-boot/sha512.h> > @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: > return EFI_EXIT(ret); > } > > +/** > + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash > + * > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend > + * > + * Return: status code > + */ > +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) > +{ > + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; > + size_t wincerts_len; > + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; > + void *new_efi = NULL; > + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; > + efi_status_t ret; > + u32 active; > + int i; > + > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); > + if (!efi) > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + > + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > + &wincerts_len)) { > + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + goto out; > + } > + > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > + goto out; > + } > + > + digest_list->count = 0; > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { > + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; > + > + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) > + continue; > + switch (hash_alg) { > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: > + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: > + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: > + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: > + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > + break; > + default: > + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + } > + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; > + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); > + digest_list->count++; > + } > + > +out: > + free(new_efi); new_efi may be a buffer allocated with calloc() in efi_prepare_aligned_image() or it may be a buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage(). You must not free() memory that was never allocated via calloc() or malloc(). Best regards Heinrich > + free(regs); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > +/** > + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image > + * > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > + * @handle: loaded image handle > + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol > + * > + * Return: status code > + */ > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) > +{ > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > + efi_status_t ret; > + struct udevice *dev; > + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; > + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; > + struct efi_device_path *device_path; > + u32 device_path_length; > + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > + struct efi_handler *handler; > + > + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + switch (handle->image_type) { > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: > + pcr_index = 4; > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; > + break; > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: > + pcr_index = 2; > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; > + break; > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: > + pcr_index = 2; > + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; > + break; > + default: > + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > + } > + > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, > + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, > + &handler)); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > + return ret; > + > + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); > + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > + /* add end node size */ > + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); > + } > + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; > + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); > + if (!image_load_event) > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > + > + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; > + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; > + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; > + > + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; > + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); > + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; > + > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > + } else { > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > + goto out; > + } > + > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, > + device_path_length); > + } > + > + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, > + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); > + > +out: > + free(image_load_event); > + > + return ret; > +} > + > /** > * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events > * > @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, > /* > * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not > * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with > - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > * Format" > - * Not supported for now > */ > if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { > - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > - goto out; > - } > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > + (void **)&nt); > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); > + goto out; > + } > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > + &digest_list); > + } else { > + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > + data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > + } > > - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > - data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > goto out; > > + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > + > ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > goto out; > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-25 12:57 ` Heinrich Schuchardt @ 2021-05-25 13:47 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-26 3:14 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 1 reply; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-25 13:47 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Heinrich Schuchardt Cc: Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Ilias Apalodimas, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 21:57, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > On 14.05.21 02:53, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" > > requires to measure every attempt to load and execute > > a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. > > This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, > > and appends measurement into Event Log. > > > > Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > > Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > > --- > > > > (no changes since v7) > > > > Changes in v7: > > - include hash-checksum.h instead of rsa.h > > - select HASH_CALCULATE in Kconfig, not to update lib/Makefile > > - rebased the base code > > > > Changes in v6: > > - update lib/Makefile to add hash-checksum.c as a compilation target > > > > (no changes since v2) > > > > Changes in v2: > > - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include > > - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute > > - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition > > - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image > > - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and > > EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER > > - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path > > - Add function comment > > > > include/efi_loader.h | 6 + > > include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ > > include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ > > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 1 + > > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- > > lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > 6 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h > > index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 > > --- a/include/efi_loader.h > > +++ b/include/efi_loader.h > > @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); > > efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); > > /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ > > efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); > > +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ > > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); > > /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ > > int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, > > const char *if_typename, int diskid, > > @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); > > > > bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); > > > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); > > + > > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > > > +#include <efi_api.h> > > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > > u8 event[]; > > } __packed; > > > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > > + u64 image_link_time_address; > > + u64 length_of_device_path; > > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > > +}; > > + > > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > > u8 size; > > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > > > +/* > > + * event types, cf. > > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > > + */ > > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > > + > > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > > struct tpms_tagged_property { > > u32 property; > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > > select SHA512_ALGO > > select SHA384 > > select SHA512 > > + select HASH_CALCULATE > > help > > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > > of the platform. > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > > return 1; > > } > > > > +/** > > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > > + * > > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > > + * > > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > > + */ > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > > +{ > > + size_t new_efi_size; > > + void *p; > > + > > + /* > > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > + */ > > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > > Why don't you unconditionally copy to a new buffer? Then the caller can > free the return value unconditionally. > > > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > > + if (!p) > > + return NULL; > > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; > > + *new_efi = p; > > + return p; > > + } else { > > + return efi; > > + } > > +} > > + > > /** > > * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image > > * @efi: Pointer to image > > @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > > void *new_efi = NULL; > > u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; > > - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; > > + size_t auth_size; > > bool ret = false; > > > > EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > > return true; > > > > - /* > > - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > - */ > > - if (efi_size & 0x7) { > > - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; > > - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > > - if (!new_efi) > > - return false; > > - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); > > - efi = new_efi; > > - efi_size = new_efi_size; > > - } > > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); > > + if (!efi) > > + return false; > > > > if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > > &wincerts_len)) { > > @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > goto err; > > } > > > > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) > > + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ > > + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, > > + loaded_image_info)) > > + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); > > +#endif > > + > > /* Copy PE headers */ > > memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, > > sizeof(*dos) > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > index c8616bf31e..316eaf572b 100644 > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ > > #include <efi_loader.h> > > #include <efi_tcg2.h> > > #include <log.h> > > +#include <malloc.h> > > #include <version.h> > > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> > > #include <u-boot/sha1.h> > > #include <u-boot/sha256.h> > > #include <u-boot/sha512.h> > > @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: > > return EFI_EXIT(ret); > > } > > > > +/** > > + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash > > + * > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend > > + * > > + * Return: status code > > + */ > > +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) > > +{ > > + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; > > + size_t wincerts_len; > > + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; > > + void *new_efi = NULL; > > + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > + efi_status_t ret; > > + u32 active; > > + int i; > > + > > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); > > + if (!efi) > > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > > + > > + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > > + &wincerts_len)) { > > + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + digest_list->count = 0; > > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { > > + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; > > + > > + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) > > + continue; > > + switch (hash_alg) { > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: > > + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > + break; > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: > > + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > + break; > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: > > + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > + break; > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: > > + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > + break; > > + default: > > + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); > > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > + } > > + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; > > + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); > > + digest_list->count++; > > + } > > + > > +out: > > + free(new_efi); > > new_efi may be a buffer allocated with calloc() in > efi_prepare_aligned_image() or it may be a buffer passed by an EFI > application to LoadImage(). You must not free() memory that was never > allocated via calloc() or malloc(). new_efi will possibly point two kinds of pointer, calloced buffer in efi_prepare_aligned_image() or NULL. Buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage() is preserved in variable "efi" and will not be freed in my code. Ilias also pointed that efi_prepare_aligned_image() returns and stores the same pointer looks a bit weird, current implementation is easy to get misunderstood. So I would like to remove **new_efi parameter from efi_prepare_aligned_image(), code will be something like: + new_efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size); - if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, + if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, <--snip--> + if (new_efi != efi) free(new_efi); "new_efi" will point newly calloced buffer or Buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage(). "efi" always preserves the buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage(). Thanks, Masahisa Kojima > > Best regards > > Heinrich > > > + free(regs); > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > +/** > > + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image > > + * > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > + * @handle: loaded image handle > > + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol > > + * > > + * Return: status code > > + */ > > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) > > +{ > > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > > + efi_status_t ret; > > + struct udevice *dev; > > + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; > > + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; > > + struct efi_device_path *device_path; > > + u32 device_path_length; > > + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > + struct efi_handler *handler; > > + > > + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > + return ret; > > + > > + switch (handle->image_type) { > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: > > + pcr_index = 4; > > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; > > + break; > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: > > + pcr_index = 2; > > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; > > + break; > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: > > + pcr_index = 2; > > + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; > > + break; > > + default: > > + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > > + } > > + > > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > + return ret; > > + > > + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > + return ret; > > + > > + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, > > + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, > > + &handler)); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > + return ret; > > + > > + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); > > + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); > > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > > + /* add end node size */ > > + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); > > + } > > + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; > > + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); > > + if (!image_load_event) > > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > > + > > + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; > > + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; > > + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; > > + > > + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; > > + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); > > + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; > > + > > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > > + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > > + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { > > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > > + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > > + } else { > > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > + goto out; > > + } > > + > > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > > + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, > > + device_path_length); > > + } > > + > > + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, > > + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); > > + > > +out: > > + free(image_load_event); > > + > > + return ret; > > +} > > + > > /** > > * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events > > * > > @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, > > /* > > * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not > > * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with > > - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > > - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > > + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > > + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > > * Format" > > - * Not supported for now > > */ > > if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { > > - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > > - goto out; > > - } > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > > > - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > > - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > > + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > > + (void **)&nt); > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); > > + goto out; > > + } > > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > > + &digest_list); > > + } else { > > + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > > + data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > > + } > > > > - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > > - data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > goto out; > > > > + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > > + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > > + > > ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > goto out; > > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement 2021-05-25 13:47 ` Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-26 3:14 ` Masahisa Kojima 0 siblings, 0 replies; 10+ messages in thread From: Masahisa Kojima @ 2021-05-26 3:14 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Heinrich Schuchardt Cc: Alexander Graf, Simon Glass, Ilias Apalodimas, Dhananjay Phadke, Takahiro Akashi, Alexandru Gagniuc, u-boot Hi Heinrich, > > > + /* > > > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > > + */ > > > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > > > > Why don't you unconditionally copy to a new buffer? Then the caller can > > free the return value unconditionally. I sent out v9 just now. I don't include unconditionally copy to a new buffer, because new version increases the readability I think. If you still prefer to copy, I will do so. Thanks, Masahisa Kojima On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 22:47, Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> wrote: > > On Tue, 25 May 2021 at 21:57, Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de> wrote: > > > > On 14.05.21 02:53, Masahisa Kojima wrote: > > > "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification" > > > requires to measure every attempt to load and execute > > > a OS Loader(a UEFI application) into PCR[4]. > > > This commit adds the PE/COFF image measurement, extends PCR, > > > and appends measurement into Event Log. > > > > > > Acked-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > > > Tested-by: Ilias Apalodimas <ilias.apalodimas@linaro.org> > > > Signed-off-by: Masahisa Kojima <masahisa.kojima@linaro.org> > > > --- > > > > > > (no changes since v7) > > > > > > Changes in v7: > > > - include hash-checksum.h instead of rsa.h > > > - select HASH_CALCULATE in Kconfig, not to update lib/Makefile > > > - rebased the base code > > > > > > Changes in v6: > > > - update lib/Makefile to add hash-checksum.c as a compilation target > > > > > > (no changes since v2) > > > > > > Changes in v2: > > > - Remove duplicate <efi.h> include > > > - Remove unnecessary __packed attribute > > > - Add all EV_EFI_* event definition > > > - Create common function to prepare 8-byte aligned image > > > - Add measurement for EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER and > > > EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER > > > - Use efi_search_protocol() to get device_path > > > - Add function comment > > > > > > include/efi_loader.h | 6 + > > > include/efi_tcg2.h | 9 ++ > > > include/tpm-v2.h | 18 +++ > > > lib/efi_loader/Kconfig | 1 + > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c | 59 +++++++-- > > > lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c | 207 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-- > > > 6 files changed, 276 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-) > > > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_loader.h b/include/efi_loader.h > > > index de1a496a97..9f2854a255 100644 > > > --- a/include/efi_loader.h > > > +++ b/include/efi_loader.h > > > @@ -426,6 +426,10 @@ efi_status_t efi_disk_register(void); > > > efi_status_t efi_rng_register(void); > > > /* Called by efi_init_obj_list() to install EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL */ > > > efi_status_t efi_tcg2_register(void); > > > +/* measure the pe-coff image, extend PCR and add Event Log */ > > > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image_info); > > > /* Create handles and protocols for the partitions of a block device */ > > > int efi_disk_create_partitions(efi_handle_t parent, struct blk_desc *desc, > > > const char *if_typename, int diskid, > > > @@ -847,6 +851,8 @@ bool efi_secure_boot_enabled(void); > > > > > > bool efi_capsule_auth_enabled(void); > > > > > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi); > > > + > > > bool efi_image_parse(void *efi, size_t len, struct efi_image_regions **regp, > > > WIN_CERTIFICATE **auth, size_t *auth_len); > > > > > > diff --git a/include/efi_tcg2.h b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > > index 40e241ce31..bcfb98168a 100644 > > > --- a/include/efi_tcg2.h > > > +++ b/include/efi_tcg2.h > > > @@ -9,6 +9,7 @@ > > > #if !defined _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > > #define _EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_H_ > > > > > > +#include <efi_api.h> > > > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > > > > > #define EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL_GUID \ > > > @@ -53,6 +54,14 @@ struct efi_tcg2_event { > > > u8 event[]; > > > } __packed; > > > > > > +struct uefi_image_load_event { > > > + efi_physical_addr_t image_location_in_memory; > > > + u64 image_length_in_memory; > > > + u64 image_link_time_address; > > > + u64 length_of_device_path; > > > + struct efi_device_path device_path[]; > > > +}; > > > + > > > struct efi_tcg2_boot_service_capability { > > > u8 size; > > > struct efi_tcg2_version structure_version; > > > diff --git a/include/tpm-v2.h b/include/tpm-v2.h > > > index 7de7d6a57d..247b386967 100644 > > > --- a/include/tpm-v2.h > > > +++ b/include/tpm-v2.h > > > @@ -70,6 +70,24 @@ struct udevice; > > > #define EV_TABLE_OF_DEVICES ((u32)0x0000000B) > > > #define EV_COMPACT_HASH ((u32)0x0000000C) > > > > > > +/* > > > + * event types, cf. > > > + * "TCG PC Client Platform Firmware Profile Specification", Family "2.0" > > > + * rev 1.04, June 3, 2019 > > > + */ > > > +#define EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE ((u32)0x80000000) > > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG ((u32)0x80000001) > > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT ((u32)0x80000002) > > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION ((u32)0x80000003) > > > +#define EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000004) > > > +#define EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER ((u32)0x80000005) > > > +#define EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT ((u32)0x80000006) > > > +#define EV_EFI_ACTION ((u32)0x80000007) > > > +#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB ((u32)0x80000008) > > > +#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES ((u32)0x80000009) > > > +#define EV_EFI_HCRTM_EVENT ((u32)0x80000010) > > > +#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY ((u32)0x800000E0) > > > + > > > /* TPMS_TAGGED_PROPERTY Structure */ > > > struct tpms_tagged_property { > > > u32 property; > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > > index 98845b8ba3..0e6200fa25 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/Kconfig > > > @@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ config EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL > > > select SHA512_ALGO > > > select SHA384 > > > select SHA512 > > > + select HASH_CALCULATE > > > help > > > Provide a EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL implementation using the TPM hardware > > > of the platform. > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > > index fe1ee198e2..f37a85e56e 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_image_loader.c > > > @@ -302,6 +302,40 @@ static int cmp_pe_section(const void *arg1, const void *arg2) > > > return 1; > > > } > > > > > > +/** > > > + * efi_prepare_aligned_image() - prepare 8-byte aligned image > > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > > + * @new_efi: pointer to the newly allocated image > > > + * > > > + * If @efi is not 8-byte aligned, this function newly allocates > > > + * the image buffer and updates @efi_size. > > > + * > > > + * Return: valid pointer to a image, return NULL if allocation fails. > > > + */ > > > +void *efi_prepare_aligned_image(void *efi, u64 *efi_size, void **new_efi) > > > +{ > > > + size_t new_efi_size; > > > + void *p; > > > + > > > + /* > > > + * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > > + * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > > + */ > > > + if (!IS_ALIGNED(*efi_size, 8)) { > > > > Why don't you unconditionally copy to a new buffer? Then the caller can > > free the return value unconditionally. > > > > > + new_efi_size = ALIGN(*efi_size, 8); > > > + p = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > > > + if (!p) > > > + return NULL; > > > + memcpy(p, efi, *efi_size); > > > + *efi_size = new_efi_size; > > > + *new_efi = p; > > > + return p; > > > + } else { > > > + return efi; > > > + } > > > +} > > > + > > > /** > > > * efi_image_parse() - parse a PE image > > > * @efi: Pointer to image > > > @@ -561,7 +595,7 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > > struct efi_signature_store *db = NULL, *dbx = NULL; > > > void *new_efi = NULL; > > > u8 *auth, *wincerts_end; > > > - size_t new_efi_size, auth_size; > > > + size_t auth_size; > > > bool ret = false; > > > > > > EFI_PRINT("%s: Enter, %d\n", __func__, ret); > > > @@ -569,19 +603,9 @@ static bool efi_image_authenticate(void *efi, size_t efi_size) > > > if (!efi_secure_boot_enabled()) > > > return true; > > > > > > - /* > > > - * Size must be 8-byte aligned and the trailing bytes must be > > > - * zero'ed. Otherwise hash value may be incorrect. > > > - */ > > > - if (efi_size & 0x7) { > > > - new_efi_size = (efi_size + 0x7) & ~0x7ULL; > > > - new_efi = calloc(new_efi_size, 1); > > > - if (!new_efi) > > > - return false; > > > - memcpy(new_efi, efi, efi_size); > > > - efi = new_efi; > > > - efi_size = new_efi_size; > > > - } > > > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size, &new_efi); > > > + if (!efi) > > > + return false; > > > > > > if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > > > &wincerts_len)) { > > > @@ -891,6 +915,13 @@ efi_status_t efi_load_pe(struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > > goto err; > > > } > > > > > > +#if CONFIG_IS_ENABLED(EFI_TCG2_PROTOCOL) > > > + /* Measure an PE/COFF image */ > > > + if (tcg2_measure_pe_image(efi, efi_size, handle, > > > + loaded_image_info)) > > > + log_err("PE image measurement failed\n"); > > > +#endif > > > + > > > /* Copy PE headers */ > > > memcpy(efi_reloc, efi, > > > sizeof(*dos) > > > diff --git a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > > index c8616bf31e..316eaf572b 100644 > > > --- a/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > > +++ b/lib/efi_loader/efi_tcg2.c > > > @@ -13,8 +13,10 @@ > > > #include <efi_loader.h> > > > #include <efi_tcg2.h> > > > #include <log.h> > > > +#include <malloc.h> > > > #include <version.h> > > > #include <tpm-v2.h> > > > +#include <u-boot/hash-checksum.h> > > > #include <u-boot/sha1.h> > > > #include <u-boot/sha256.h> > > > #include <u-boot/sha512.h> > > > @@ -706,6 +708,183 @@ out: > > > return EFI_EXIT(ret); > > > } > > > > > > +/** > > > + * tcg2_hash_pe_image() - calculate PE/COFF image hash > > > + * > > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > > + * @digest_list: list of digest algorithms to extend > > > + * > > > + * Return: status code > > > + */ > > > +static efi_status_t tcg2_hash_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > > + struct tpml_digest_values *digest_list) > > > +{ > > > + WIN_CERTIFICATE *wincerts = NULL; > > > + size_t wincerts_len; > > > + struct efi_image_regions *regs = NULL; > > > + void *new_efi = NULL; > > > + u8 hash[TPM2_SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE]; > > > + efi_status_t ret; > > > + u32 active; > > > + int i; > > > + > > > + efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, &efi_size, &new_efi); > > > + if (!efi) > > > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > > > + > > > + if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > > > + &wincerts_len)) { > > > + log_err("Parsing PE executable image failed\n"); > > > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = __get_active_pcr_banks(&active); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > > + ret = EFI_DEVICE_ERROR; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + digest_list->count = 0; > > > + for (i = 0; i < MAX_HASH_COUNT; i++) { > > > + u16 hash_alg = hash_algo_list[i].hash_alg; > > > + > > > + if (!(active & alg_to_mask(hash_alg))) > > > + continue; > > > + switch (hash_alg) { > > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA1: > > > + hash_calculate("sha1", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > > + break; > > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA256: > > > + hash_calculate("sha256", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > > + break; > > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA384: > > > + hash_calculate("sha384", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > > + break; > > > + case TPM2_ALG_SHA512: > > > + hash_calculate("sha512", regs->reg, regs->num, hash); > > > + break; > > > + default: > > > + EFI_PRINT("Unsupported algorithm %x\n", hash_alg); > > > + return EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > > + } > > > + digest_list->digests[i].hash_alg = hash_alg; > > > + memcpy(&digest_list->digests[i].digest, hash, (u32)alg_to_len(hash_alg)); > > > + digest_list->count++; > > > + } > > > + > > > +out: > > > + free(new_efi); > > > > new_efi may be a buffer allocated with calloc() in > > efi_prepare_aligned_image() or it may be a buffer passed by an EFI > > application to LoadImage(). You must not free() memory that was never > > allocated via calloc() or malloc(). > > new_efi will possibly point two kinds of pointer, calloced buffer in > efi_prepare_aligned_image() or NULL. > Buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage() is preserved in > variable "efi" > and will not be freed in my code. > > Ilias also pointed that efi_prepare_aligned_image() returns and stores > the same pointer looks a bit weird, current implementation is easy to > get misunderstood. > So I would like to remove **new_efi parameter from efi_prepare_aligned_image(), > code will be something like: > > + new_efi = efi_prepare_aligned_image(efi, (u64 *)&efi_size); > > - if (!efi_image_parse(efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > + if (!efi_image_parse(new_efi, efi_size, ®s, &wincerts, > > <--snip--> > > + if (new_efi != efi) > free(new_efi); > > "new_efi" will point newly calloced buffer or Buffer passed by an EFI > application to LoadImage(). > "efi" always preserves the buffer passed by an EFI application to LoadImage(). > > Thanks, > Masahisa Kojima > > > > > Best regards > > > > Heinrich > > > > > + free(regs); > > > + > > > + return ret; > > > +} > > > + > > > +/** > > > + * tcg2_measure_pe_image() - measure PE/COFF image > > > + * > > > + * @efi: pointer to the EFI binary > > > + * @efi_size: size of @efi binary > > > + * @handle: loaded image handle > > > + * @loaded_image: loaded image protocol > > > + * > > > + * Return: status code > > > + */ > > > +efi_status_t tcg2_measure_pe_image(void *efi, u64 efi_size, > > > + struct efi_loaded_image_obj *handle, > > > + struct efi_loaded_image *loaded_image) > > > +{ > > > + struct tpml_digest_values digest_list; > > > + efi_status_t ret; > > > + struct udevice *dev; > > > + u32 pcr_index, event_type, event_size; > > > + struct uefi_image_load_event *image_load_event; > > > + struct efi_device_path *device_path; > > > + u32 device_path_length; > > > + IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *dos; > > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > > + struct efi_handler *handler; > > > + > > > + ret = platform_get_tpm2_device(&dev); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + switch (handle->image_type) { > > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_APPLICATION: > > > + pcr_index = 4; > > > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_APPLICATION; > > > + break; > > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_BOOT_SERVICE_DRIVER: > > > + pcr_index = 2; > > > + event_type = EV_EFI_BOOT_SERVICES_DRIVER; > > > + break; > > > + case IMAGE_SUBSYSTEM_EFI_RUNTIME_DRIVER: > > > + pcr_index = 2; > > > + event_type = EV_EFI_RUNTIME_SERVICES_DRIVER; > > > + break; > > > + default: > > > + return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image(efi, efi_size, &digest_list); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + ret = EFI_CALL(efi_search_protocol(&handle->header, > > > + &efi_guid_loaded_image_device_path, > > > + &handler)); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > + return ret; > > > + > > > + device_path = EFI_CALL(handler->protocol_interface); > > > + device_path_length = efi_dp_size(device_path); > > > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > > > + /* add end node size */ > > > + device_path_length += sizeof(struct efi_device_path); > > > + } > > > + event_size = sizeof(struct uefi_image_load_event) + device_path_length; > > > + image_load_event = (struct uefi_image_load_event *)malloc(event_size); > > > + if (!image_load_event) > > > + return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES; > > > + > > > + image_load_event->image_location_in_memory = (efi_physical_addr_t)efi; > > > + image_load_event->image_length_in_memory = efi_size; > > > + image_load_event->length_of_device_path = device_path_length; > > > + > > > + dos = (IMAGE_DOS_HEADER *)efi; > > > + nt = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *)(efi + dos->e_lfanew); > > > + if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR64_MAGIC) { > > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *nt64 = (IMAGE_NT_HEADERS64 *)nt; > > > + > > > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > > > + nt64->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > > > + } else if (nt->OptionalHeader.Magic == IMAGE_NT_OPTIONAL_HDR32_MAGIC) { > > > + image_load_event->image_link_time_address = > > > + nt->OptionalHeader.ImageBase; > > > + } else { > > > + ret = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER; > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + > > > + if (device_path_length > 0) { > > > + memcpy(image_load_event->device_path, device_path, > > > + device_path_length); > > > + } > > > + > > > + ret = tcg2_agile_log_append(pcr_index, event_type, &digest_list, > > > + event_size, (u8 *)image_load_event); > > > + > > > +out: > > > + free(image_load_event); > > > + > > > + return ret; > > > +} > > > + > > > /** > > > * efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event() - extend and optionally log events > > > * > > > @@ -758,24 +937,32 @@ efi_tcg2_hash_log_extend_event(struct efi_tcg2_protocol *this, u64 flags, > > > /* > > > * if PE_COFF_IMAGE is set we need to make sure the image is not > > > * corrupted, verify it and hash the PE/COFF image in accordance with > > > - * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > > > - * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > > > + * the procedure specified in "Calculating the PE Image Hash" > > > + * section of the "Windows Authenticode Portable Executable Signature > > > * Format" > > > - * Not supported for now > > > */ > > > if (flags & PE_COFF_IMAGE) { > > > - ret = EFI_UNSUPPORTED; > > > - goto out; > > > - } > > > + IMAGE_NT_HEADERS32 *nt; > > > > > > - pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > > > - event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > > > + ret = efi_check_pe((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > > > + (void **)&nt); > > > + if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) { > > > + log_err("Not a valid PE-COFF file\n"); > > > + goto out; > > > + } > > > + ret = tcg2_hash_pe_image((void *)data_to_hash, data_to_hash_len, > > > + &digest_list); > > > + } else { > > > + ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > > > + data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > > > + } > > > > > > - ret = tcg2_create_digest((u8 *)(uintptr_t)data_to_hash, > > > - data_to_hash_len, &digest_list); > > > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > goto out; > > > > > > + pcr_index = efi_tcg_event->header.pcr_index; > > > + event_type = efi_tcg_event->header.event_type; > > > + > > > ret = tcg2_pcr_extend(dev, pcr_index, &digest_list); > > > if (ret != EFI_SUCCESS) > > > goto out; > > > > > ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 10+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2021-05-26 3:14 UTC | newest] Thread overview: 10+ messages (download: mbox.gz / follow: Atom feed) -- links below jump to the message on this page -- 2021-05-14 0:53 [PATCH v8 0/3] PE/COFF measurement support Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 1/3] lib: introduce HASH_CALCULATE option Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-24 13:25 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 2/3] efi_loader: expose efi_image_parse() even if UEFI Secure Boot is disabled Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-14 0:53 ` [PATCH v8 3/3] efi_loader: add PE/COFF image measurement Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-24 12:53 ` Ilias Apalodimas 2021-05-25 5:04 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-25 12:57 ` Heinrich Schuchardt 2021-05-25 13:47 ` Masahisa Kojima 2021-05-26 3:14 ` Masahisa Kojima
This is an external index of several public inboxes, see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror all data and code used by this external index.