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27 Nov 2023 16:00:50 -0800 Message-ID: <82b2e0d5-edcc-44f3-b759-d6b8c8788ea6@intel.com> Date: Mon, 27 Nov 2023 16:00:50 -0800 MIME-Version: 1.0 User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird From: Dave Hansen Subject: AMD Memory encryption vs. kexec To: Tom Lendacky , Borislav Petkov , "Shutemov, Kirill" , Ashish Kalra , Kai Huang Content-Language: en-US Cc: LKML , the arch/x86 maintainers Autocrypt: addr=dave.hansen@intel.com; keydata= xsFNBE6HMP0BEADIMA3XYkQfF3dwHlj58Yjsc4E5y5G67cfbt8dvaUq2fx1lR0K9h1bOI6fC oAiUXvGAOxPDsB/P6UEOISPpLl5IuYsSwAeZGkdQ5g6m1xq7AlDJQZddhr/1DC/nMVa/2BoY 2UnKuZuSBu7lgOE193+7Uks3416N2hTkyKUSNkduyoZ9F5twiBhxPJwPtn/wnch6n5RsoXsb ygOEDxLEsSk/7eyFycjE+btUtAWZtx+HseyaGfqkZK0Z9bT1lsaHecmB203xShwCPT49Blxz VOab8668QpaEOdLGhtvrVYVK7x4skyT3nGWcgDCl5/Vp3TWA4K+IofwvXzX2ON/Mj7aQwf5W iC+3nWC7q0uxKwwsddJ0Nu+dpA/UORQWa1NiAftEoSpk5+nUUi0WE+5DRm0H+TXKBWMGNCFn c6+EKg5zQaa8KqymHcOrSXNPmzJuXvDQ8uj2J8XuzCZfK4uy1+YdIr0yyEMI7mdh4KX50LO1 pmowEqDh7dLShTOif/7UtQYrzYq9cPnjU2ZW4qd5Qz2joSGTG9eCXLz5PRe5SqHxv6ljk8mb ApNuY7bOXO/A7T2j5RwXIlcmssqIjBcxsRRoIbpCwWWGjkYjzYCjgsNFL6rt4OL11OUF37wL QcTl7fbCGv53KfKPdYD5hcbguLKi/aCccJK18ZwNjFhqr4MliQARAQABzUVEYXZpZCBDaHJp c3RvcGhlciBIYW5zZW4gKEludGVsIFdvcmsgQWRkcmVzcykgPGRhdmUuaGFuc2VuQGludGVs LmNvbT7CwXgEEwECACIFAlQ+9J0CGwMGCwkIBwMCBhUIAgkKCwQWAgMBAh4BAheAAAoJEGg1 lTBwyZKwLZUP/0dnbhDc229u2u6WtK1s1cSd9WsflGXGagkR6liJ4um3XCfYWDHvIdkHYC1t MNcVHFBwmQkawxsYvgO8kXT3SaFZe4ISfB4K4CL2qp4JO+nJdlFUbZI7cz/Td9z8nHjMcWYF IQuTsWOLs/LBMTs+ANumibtw6UkiGVD3dfHJAOPNApjVr+M0P/lVmTeP8w0uVcd2syiaU5jB aht9CYATn+ytFGWZnBEEQFnqcibIaOrmoBLu2b3fKJEd8Jp7NHDSIdrvrMjYynmc6sZKUqH2 I1qOevaa8jUg7wlLJAWGfIqnu85kkqrVOkbNbk4TPub7VOqA6qG5GCNEIv6ZY7HLYd/vAkVY E8Plzq/NwLAuOWxvGrOl7OPuwVeR4hBDfcrNb990MFPpjGgACzAZyjdmYoMu8j3/MAEW4P0z F5+EYJAOZ+z212y1pchNNauehORXgjrNKsZwxwKpPY9qb84E3O9KYpwfATsqOoQ6tTgr+1BR CCwP712H+E9U5HJ0iibN/CDZFVPL1bRerHziuwuQuvE0qWg0+0SChFe9oq0KAwEkVs6ZDMB2 P16MieEEQ6StQRlvy2YBv80L1TMl3T90Bo1UUn6ARXEpcbFE0/aORH/jEXcRteb+vuik5UGY 5TsyLYdPur3TXm7XDBdmmyQVJjnJKYK9AQxj95KlXLVO38lczsFNBFRjzmoBEACyAxbvUEhd GDGNg0JhDdezyTdN8C9BFsdxyTLnSH31NRiyp1QtuxvcqGZjb2trDVuCbIzRrgMZLVgo3upr MIOx1CXEgmn23Zhh0EpdVHM8IKx9Z7V0r+rrpRWFE8/wQZngKYVi49PGoZj50ZEifEJ5qn/H Nsp2+Y+bTUjDdgWMATg9DiFMyv8fvoqgNsNyrrZTnSgoLzdxr89FGHZCoSoAK8gfgFHuO54B lI8QOfPDG9WDPJ66HCodjTlBEr/Cwq6GruxS5i2Y33YVqxvFvDa1tUtl+iJ2SWKS9kCai2DR 3BwVONJEYSDQaven/EHMlY1q8Vln3lGPsS11vSUK3QcNJjmrgYxH5KsVsf6PNRj9mp8Z1kIG qjRx08+nnyStWC0gZH6NrYyS9rpqH3j+hA2WcI7De51L4Rv9pFwzp161mvtc6eC/GxaiUGuH BNAVP0PY0fqvIC68p3rLIAW3f97uv4ce2RSQ7LbsPsimOeCo/5vgS6YQsj83E+AipPr09Caj 0hloj+hFoqiticNpmsxdWKoOsV0PftcQvBCCYuhKbZV9s5hjt9qn8CE86A5g5KqDf83Fxqm/ vXKgHNFHE5zgXGZnrmaf6resQzbvJHO0Fb0CcIohzrpPaL3YepcLDoCCgElGMGQjdCcSQ+Ci FCRl0Bvyj1YZUql+ZkptgGjikQARAQABwsFfBBgBAgAJBQJUY85qAhsMAAoJEGg1lTBwyZKw l4IQAIKHs/9po4spZDFyfDjunimEhVHqlUt7ggR1Hsl/tkvTSze8pI1P6dGp2XW6AnH1iayn yRcoyT0ZJ+Zmm4xAH1zqKjWplzqdb/dO28qk0bPso8+1oPO8oDhLm1+tY+cOvufXkBTm+whm +AyNTjaCRt6aSMnA/QHVGSJ8grrTJCoACVNhnXg/R0g90g8iV8Q+IBZyDkG0tBThaDdw1B2l asInUTeb9EiVfL/Zjdg5VWiF9LL7iS+9hTeVdR09vThQ/DhVbCNxVk+DtyBHsjOKifrVsYep WpRGBIAu3bK8eXtyvrw1igWTNs2wazJ71+0z2jMzbclKAyRHKU9JdN6Hkkgr2nPb561yjcB8 sIq1pFXKyO+nKy6SZYxOvHxCcjk2fkw6UmPU6/j/nQlj2lfOAgNVKuDLothIxzi8pndB8Jju KktE5HJqUUMXePkAYIxEQ0mMc8Po7tuXdejgPMwgP7x65xtfEqI0RuzbUioFltsp1jUaRwQZ MTsCeQDdjpgHsj+P2ZDeEKCbma4m6Ez/YWs4+zDm1X8uZDkZcfQlD9NldbKDJEXLIjYWo1PH hYepSffIWPyvBMBTW2W5FRjJ4vLRrJSUoEfJuPQ3vW9Y73foyo/qFoURHO48AinGPZ7PC7TF vUaNOTjKedrqHkaOcqB185ahG2had0xnFsDPlx5y Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org ... actually cc'd the mailing lists and x86@ exploder on this one. Please reply here. --- There are two kexec-related wbinvd's: One for the kexec boot CPU in relocate_kernel() which is driven by CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT: > image->start = relocate_kernel((unsigned long)image->head, > (unsigned long)page_list, > image->start, > image->preserve_context, > cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT)); the other is for non-boot CPUs in stop_this_cpu(): > if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x8000001f && (cpuid_eax(0x8000001f) & BIT(0))) > native_wbinvd(); By my reading, the CC_ATTR_HOST_MEM_ENCRYPT is basically a check for whether the current kernel has enabled SME but not SEV while the stop_this_cpu() site is driven purely by whether the hardware *supports* SME. The whole supposed reason stop_this_cpu() checks CPUID directly is that the current kernel SME/SEV enabling might not match the _next_ kernel's enabling choices. So, why is a _current_ kernel check OK for relocate_kernel(), but not OK for stop_this_cpu()? It seems to me like both sites might need to use the stop_this_cpu()-style "raw" hardware support checks. Why do I care? TDX potentially needs wbinvd at the same two spots. It would be nice to have a common cc_attr for both sites, but I need to reconcile the apparently disparate AMD uses first.