From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 3.4.0 (2014-02-07) on aws-us-west-2-korg-lkml-1.web.codeaurora.org X-Spam-Level: X-Spam-Status: No, score=-6.7 required=3.0 tests=HEADER_FROM_DIFFERENT_DOMAINS, INCLUDES_PATCH,MAILING_LIST_MULTI,SIGNED_OFF_BY,SPF_HELO_NONE,SPF_PASS, URIBL_BLOCKED autolearn=unavailable autolearn_force=no version=3.4.0 Received: from mail.kernel.org (mail.kernel.org [198.145.29.99]) by smtp.lore.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 44B9AC433E1 for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:51:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: from vger.kernel.org (vger.kernel.org [23.128.96.18]) by mail.kernel.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id 2A79B20897 for ; Fri, 29 May 2020 16:51:34 +0000 (UTC) Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1727786AbgE2Qvc (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:51:32 -0400 Received: from out02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.232]:60806 "EHLO out02.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1725601AbgE2QvZ (ORCPT ); Fri, 29 May 2020 12:51:25 -0400 Received: from in02.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.52]) by out02.mta.xmission.com with esmtps (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_128_GCM_SHA256:128) (Exim 4.90_1) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiE7-0002O4-Ci; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:51:23 -0600 Received: from ip68-227-160-95.om.om.cox.net ([68.227.160.95] helo=x220.xmission.com) by in02.mta.xmission.com with esmtpsa (TLS1.2:ECDHE_RSA_AES_256_GCM_SHA384:256) (Exim 4.87) (envelope-from ) id 1jeiE5-0003HU-Nf; Fri, 29 May 2020 10:51:23 -0600 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Cc: Linus Torvalds , Oleg Nesterov , Jann Horn , Kees Cook , Greg Ungerer , Rob Landley , Bernd Edlinger , , Al Viro , Alexey Dobriyan , Andrew Morton , Casey Schaufler , linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, James Morris , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Andy Lutomirski References: <87h7wujhmz.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87sgga6ze4.fsf@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87v9l4zyla.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <877dx822er.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87k10wysqz.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> Date: Fri, 29 May 2020 11:47:29 -0500 In-Reply-To: <87d06mr8ps.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Fri, 29 May 2020 11:45:19 -0500") Message-ID: <871rn2r8m6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/26.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-SPF: eid=1jeiE5-0003HU-Nf;;;mid=<871rn2r8m6.fsf_-_@x220.int.ebiederm.org>;;;hst=in02.mta.xmission.com;;;ip=68.227.160.95;;;frm=ebiederm@xmission.com;;;spf=neutral X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX181wX+NRhhP4m1CiH+i9ON3W6pa6AHjXFY= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 68.227.160.95 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com Subject: [PATCH 2/2] exec: Compute file based creds only once X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Thu, 05 May 2016 13:38:54 -0600) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in02.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org Precedence: bulk List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org Move the computation of creds from prepare_binfmt into begin_new_exec so that the creds need only be computed once. This is just code reorganization no semantic changes of any kind are made. Moving the computation is safe. I have looked through the kernel and verified none of the binfmts look at bprm->cred directly, and that there are no helpers that look at bprm->cred indirectly. Which means that it is not a problem to compute the bprm->cred later in the execution flow as it is not used until it becomes current->cred. A new function bprm_creds_from_file is added to contain the work that needs to be done. bprm_creds_from_file first computes which file bprm->executable or most likely bprm->file that the bprm->creds will be computed from. The funciton bprm_fill_uid is updated to receive the file instead of accessing bprm->file. The now unnecessary work needed to reset the bprm->cred->euid, and bprm->cred->egid is removed from brpm_fill_uid. A small comment to document that bprm_fill_uid now only deals with the work to handle suid and sgid files. The default case is already heandled by prepare_exec_creds. The function security_bprm_repopulate_creds is renamed security_bprm_creds_from_file and now is explicitly passed the file from which to compute the creds. The documentation of the bprm_creds_from_file security hook is updated to explain when the hook is called and what it needs to do. The file is passed from cap_bprm_creds_from_file into get_file_caps so that the caps are computed for the appropriate file. The now unnecessary work in cap_bprm_creds_from_file to reset the ambient capabilites has been removed. A small comment to document that the work of cap_bprm_creds_from_file is to read capabilities from the files secureity attribute and derive capabilities from the fact the user had uid 0 has been added. Signed-off-by: "Eric W. Biederman" --- fs/binfmt_misc.c | 2 +- fs/exec.c | 63 +++++++++++++++-------------------- include/linux/binfmts.h | 14 ++------ include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 2 +- include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 22 ++++++------ include/linux/security.h | 9 ++--- security/commoncap.c | 24 +++++++------ security/security.c | 4 +-- 8 files changed, 61 insertions(+), 79 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/binfmt_misc.c b/fs/binfmt_misc.c index 53968ea07b57..bc5506619b7e 100644 --- a/fs/binfmt_misc.c +++ b/fs/binfmt_misc.c @@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ static int load_misc_binary(struct linux_binprm *bprm) bprm->interpreter = interp_file; if (fmt->flags & MISC_FMT_CREDENTIALS) - bprm->preserve_creds = 1; + bprm->execfd_creds = 1; retval = 0; ret: diff --git a/fs/exec.c b/fs/exec.c index 0f793536e393..e8599236290d 100644 --- a/fs/exec.c +++ b/fs/exec.c @@ -72,6 +72,8 @@ #include +static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm); + int suid_dumpable = 0; static LIST_HEAD(formats); @@ -1304,6 +1306,11 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) struct task_struct *me = current; int retval; + /* Once we are committed compute the creds */ + retval = bprm_creds_from_file(bprm); + if (retval) + return retval; + /* * Ensure all future errors are fatal. */ @@ -1354,7 +1361,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) me->flags &= ~(PF_RANDOMIZE | PF_FORKNOEXEC | PF_KTHREAD | PF_NOFREEZE | PF_NO_SETAFFINITY); flush_thread(); - bprm->per_clear |= bprm->pf_per_clear; me->personality &= ~bprm->per_clear; /* @@ -1365,13 +1371,6 @@ int begin_new_exec(struct linux_binprm * bprm) */ do_close_on_exec(me->files); - /* - * Once here, prepare_binrpm() will not be called any more, so - * the final state of setuid/setgid/fscaps can be merged into the - * secureexec flag. - */ - bprm->secureexec |= bprm->active_secureexec; - if (bprm->secureexec) { /* Make sure parent cannot signal privileged process. */ me->pdeath_signal = 0; @@ -1587,29 +1586,21 @@ static void check_unsafe_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) spin_unlock(&p->fs->lock); } -static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { + /* Handle suid and sgid on files */ struct inode *inode; unsigned int mode; kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; - /* - * Since this can be called multiple times (via prepare_binprm), - * we must clear any previous work done when setting set[ug]id - * bits from any earlier bprm->file uses (for example when run - * first for a setuid script then again for its interpreter). - */ - bprm->cred->euid = current_euid(); - bprm->cred->egid = current_egid(); - - if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt)) + if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return; if (task_no_new_privs(current)) return; - inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; + inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode; mode = READ_ONCE(inode->i_mode); if (!(mode & (S_ISUID|S_ISGID))) return; @@ -1629,19 +1620,31 @@ static void bprm_fill_uid(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return; if (mode & S_ISUID) { - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->euid = uid; } if ((mode & (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) == (S_ISGID | S_IXGRP)) { - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; bprm->cred->egid = gid; } } +/* + * Compute brpm->cred based upon the final binary. + */ +static int bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +{ + /* Compute creds based on which file? */ + struct file *file = bprm->execfd_creds ? bprm->executable : bprm->file; + + bprm_fill_uid(bprm, file); + return security_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); +} + /* * Fill the binprm structure from the inode. - * Check permissions, then read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes + * Read the first BINPRM_BUF_SIZE bytes * * This may be called multiple times for binary chains (scripts for example). */ @@ -1649,20 +1652,6 @@ static int prepare_binprm(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { loff_t pos = 0; - /* Can the interpreter get to the executable without races? */ - if (!bprm->preserve_creds) { - int retval; - - /* Recompute parts of bprm->cred based on bprm->file */ - bprm->active_secureexec = 0; - bprm->pf_per_clear = 0; - bprm_fill_uid(bprm); - retval = security_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); - if (retval) - return retval; - } - bprm->preserve_creds = 0; - memset(bprm->buf, 0, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE); return kernel_read(bprm->file, bprm->buf, BINPRM_BUF_SIZE, &pos); } diff --git a/include/linux/binfmts.h b/include/linux/binfmts.h index 50025ead0b72..aece1b340e7d 100644 --- a/include/linux/binfmts.h +++ b/include/linux/binfmts.h @@ -29,13 +29,8 @@ struct linux_binprm { /* Should an execfd be passed to userspace? */ have_execfd:1, - /* It is safe to use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */ - preserve_creds:1, - /* - * True if most recent call to security_bprm_set_creds - * resulted in elevated privileges. - */ - active_secureexec:1, + /* Use the creds of a script (see binfmt_misc) */ + execfd_creds:1, /* * Set by bprm_creds_for_exec hook to indicate a * privilege-gaining exec has happened. Used to set @@ -55,11 +50,6 @@ struct linux_binprm { struct file * file; struct cred *cred; /* new credentials */ int unsafe; /* how unsafe this exec is (mask of LSM_UNSAFE_*) */ - /* - * bits to clear in current->personality - * recalculated for each bprm->file. - */ - unsigned int pf_per_clear; unsigned int per_clear; /* bits to clear in current->personality */ int argc, envc; const char * filename; /* Name of binary as seen by procps */ diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h index 1e295ba12c0d..adbc6603abba 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h @@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, settime, const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, vm_enough_memory, struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_for_exec, struct linux_binprm *bprm) -LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_repopulate_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) +LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_creds_from_file, struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) LSM_HOOK(int, 0, bprm_check_security, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committing_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, bprm_committed_creds, struct linux_binprm *bprm) diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h index cd3dd0afceb5..37bb3df751c6 100644 --- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h +++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h @@ -44,18 +44,18 @@ * request libc enable secure mode. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. - * @bprm_repopulate_creds: - * Assuming that the relevant bits of @bprm->cred->security have been - * previously set, examine @bprm->file and regenerate them. This is - * so that the credentials derived from the interpreter the code is - * actually going to run are used rather than credentials derived - * from a script. This done because the interpreter binary needs to - * reopen script, and may end up opening something completely different. - * This hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for - * transitions between security domains). - * The hook must set @bprm->active_secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to + * @bprm_creds_from_file: + * If @file is setpcap, suid, sgid or otherwise marked to change + * privilege upon exec, update @bprm->cred to reflect that change. + * This is called after finding the binary that will be executed. + * without an interpreter. This ensures that the credentials will not + * be derived from a script that the binary will need to reopen, which + * when reopend may end up being a completely different file. This + * hook may also optionally check permissions (e.g. for transitions + * between security domains). + * The hook must set @bprm->secureexec to 1 if AT_SECURE should be set to * request libc enable secure mode. - * The hook must set @bprm->pf_per_clear to the personality flags that + * The hook must set @bprm->per_clear to the personality flags that * should be cleared from current->personality. * @bprm contains the linux_binprm structure. * Return 0 if the hook is successful and permission is granted. diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h index 6dcec9375e8f..8444fae7c5b9 100644 --- a/include/linux/security.h +++ b/include/linux/security.h @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ extern int cap_capset(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, const kernel_cap_t *effective, const kernel_cap_t *inheritable, const kernel_cap_t *permitted); -extern int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +extern int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file); extern int cap_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags); extern int cap_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name); @@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ int security_syslog(int type); int security_settime64(const struct timespec64 *ts, const struct timezone *tz); int security_vm_enough_memory_mm(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages); int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm); -int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); +int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file); int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void security_bprm_committed_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); @@ -575,9 +575,10 @@ static inline int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return 0; } -static inline int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +static inline int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, + struct file *file) { - return cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(bprm); + return cap_bprm_creds_from_file(bprm, file); } static inline int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6de72d22dc6c..59bf3c1674c8 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -647,7 +647,8 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being * constructed by execve(). */ -static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) +static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file, + bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) { int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -657,7 +658,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f if (!file_caps_enabled) return 0; - if (!mnt_may_suid(bprm->file->f_path.mnt)) + if (!mnt_may_suid(file->f_path.mnt)) return 0; /* @@ -665,10 +666,10 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_f * explicit that capability bits are limited to s_user_ns and its * descendants. */ - if (!current_in_userns(bprm->file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns)) + if (!current_in_userns(file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb->s_user_ns)) return 0; - rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(bprm->file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); + rc = get_vfs_caps_from_disk(file->f_path.dentry, &vcaps); if (rc < 0) { if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "Invalid argument reading file caps for %s\n", @@ -797,26 +798,27 @@ static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, } /** - * cap_bprm_repopulate_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). + * cap_bprm_creds_from_file - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds + * @file: The file to pull the credentials from * * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being * constructed by execve(). The proposed creds in @bprm->cred is altered, * which won't take effect immediately. Returns 0 if successful, -ve on error. */ -int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int cap_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { + /* Process setpcap binaries and capabilities for uid 0 */ const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; - new->cap_ambient = old->cap_ambient; if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) return -EPERM; - ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap); + ret = get_file_caps(bprm, file, &effective, &has_fcap); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -826,7 +828,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) - bprm->pf_per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; + bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. @@ -889,7 +891,7 @@ int cap_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) (!__is_real(root_uid, new) && (effective || __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)))) - bprm->active_secureexec = 1; + bprm->secureexec = 1; return 0; } @@ -1346,7 +1348,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, cap_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, cap_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, cap_capset), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_repopulate_creds, cap_bprm_repopulate_creds), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_creds_from_file, cap_bprm_creds_from_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_need_killpriv, cap_inode_need_killpriv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_killpriv, cap_inode_killpriv), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, cap_inode_getsecurity), diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index b890b7e2a765..259b8e750aa2 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -828,9 +828,9 @@ int security_bprm_creds_for_exec(struct linux_binprm *bprm) return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_for_exec, 0, bprm); } -int security_bprm_repopulate_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) +int security_bprm_creds_from_file(struct linux_binprm *bprm, struct file *file) { - return call_int_hook(bprm_repopulate_creds, 0, bprm); + return call_int_hook(bprm_creds_from_file, 0, bprm, file); } int security_bprm_check(struct linux_binprm *bprm) -- 2.25.0