diff for duplicates of <87fu38jq98.fsf@xmission.com>

diff --git a/a/1.txt b/N1/1.txt
index ab481d0..6a1f6c5 100644
--- a/a/1.txt
+++ b/N1/1.txt
@@ -22,11 +22,11 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 >> >> instrument of policy.
 >> >
 >> > True, for those building their own kernel, they can disable the old
->> > syscalls.  The concern is not for those building their own kernels,
->> > but for those using stock kernels.  
+>> > syscalls. ?The concern is not for those building their own kernels,
+>> > but for those using stock kernels. ?
 >> >
 >> > By adding an LSM hook here in the kexec_load syscall, as opposed to an
->> > IMA specific hook, other LSMs can piggy back on top of it.  Currently,
+>> > IMA specific hook, other LSMs can piggy back on top of it. ?Currently,
 >> > both load_pin and SELinux are gating the kernel module syscalls based
 >> > on security_kernel_read_file.
 >> >
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com> writes:
 > Suppose a system owner wants to define a system wide policy that
 > requires all code be signed - kernel modules, firmware, kexec image &
 > initramfs, executables, mmapped files, etc - without having to rebuild
-> the kernel.  Without a call in kexec_load that isn't possible.
+> the kernel. ?Without a call in kexec_load that isn't possible.
 
 Of course it is.  You just make it a requirement that before an
 executable will be signed it will be audited to see that it doesn't
@@ -70,4 +70,8 @@ Signing is only a tool to enforce a policy.  Signing by itself is not a
 policy.  Enforcing any quality controls in the signed executables should
 trivially prevent kexec_load from being used.
 
-Eric
\ No newline at end of file
+Eric
+--
+To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in
+the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org
+More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/a/content_digest b/N1/content_digest
index 7412c7c..814f0c9 100644
--- a/a/content_digest
+++ b/N1/content_digest
@@ -17,23 +17,13 @@
   "From\0ebiederm\@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman)\0"
 ]
 [
-  "Subject\0Re: [PATCH 0/3] kexec: limit kexec_load syscall\0"
+  "Subject\0[PATCH 0/3] kexec: limit kexec_load syscall\0"
 ]
 [
   "Date\0Thu, 03 May 2018 18:03:47 -0500\0"
 ]
 [
-  "To\0Mimi Zohar <zohar\@linux.vnet.ibm.com>\0"
-]
-[
-  "Cc\0Kees Cook <keescook\@chromium.org>",
-  " David Howells <dhowells\@redhat.com>",
-  " Matthew Garrett <mjg59\@google.com>",
-  " linux-integrity\@vger.kernel.org",
-  " linux-security-module\@vger.kernel.org",
-  " kexec\@lists.infradead.org",
-  " linux-kernel\@vger.kernel.org",
-  " kernel-hardening\@lists.openwall.com\0"
+  "To\0linux-security-module\@vger.kernel.org\0"
 ]
 [
   "\0000:1\0"
@@ -66,11 +56,11 @@
   ">> >> instrument of policy.\n",
   ">> >\n",
   ">> > True, for those building their own kernel, they can disable the old\n",
-  ">> > syscalls. \302\240The concern is not for those building their own kernels,\n",
-  ">> > but for those using stock kernels. \302\240\n",
+  ">> > syscalls. ?The concern is not for those building their own kernels,\n",
+  ">> > but for those using stock kernels. ?\n",
   ">> >\n",
   ">> > By adding an LSM hook here in the kexec_load syscall, as opposed to an\n",
-  ">> > IMA specific hook, other LSMs can piggy back on top of it. \302\240Currently,\n",
+  ">> > IMA specific hook, other LSMs can piggy back on top of it. ?Currently,\n",
   ">> > both load_pin and SELinux are gating the kernel module syscalls based\n",
   ">> > on security_kernel_read_file.\n",
   ">> >\n",
@@ -87,7 +77,7 @@
   "> Suppose a system owner wants to define a system wide policy that\n",
   "> requires all code be signed - kernel modules, firmware, kexec image &\n",
   "> initramfs, executables, mmapped files, etc - without having to rebuild\n",
-  "> the kernel. \302\240Without a call in kexec_load that isn't possible.\n",
+  "> the kernel. ?Without a call in kexec_load that isn't possible.\n",
   "\n",
   "Of course it is.  You just make it a requirement that before an\n",
   "executable will be signed it will be audited to see that it doesn't\n",
@@ -114,7 +104,11 @@
   "policy.  Enforcing any quality controls in the signed executables should\n",
   "trivially prevent kexec_load from being used.\n",
   "\n",
-  "Eric"
+  "Eric\n",
+  "--\n",
+  "To unsubscribe from this list: send the line \"unsubscribe linux-security-module\" in\n",
+  "the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org\n",
+  "More majordomo info at  http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html"
 ]
 
-a2ccf036a0320a30c6f8fb361284236834926a43f742d0208bbdbcb9584d5955
+982688310c0c2599b7e2f5a028b50c396ce8d69539988075bc339675ecbde189
