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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>, LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, "Paul E. McKenney" <paulmck@kernel.org>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
	Frederic Weisbecker <frederic@kernel.org>,
	Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
	Masami Hiramatsu <mhiramat@kernel.org>,
	Petr Mladek <pmladek@suse.com>,
	Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>,
	Joel Fernandes <joel@joelfernandes.org>,
	Boris Ostrovsky <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
	Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>,
	Mathieu Desnoyers <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [patch V4 part 2 15/18] x86/kvm/svm: Handle hardirqs proper on guest enter/exit
Date: Wed, 06 May 2020 10:48:22 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <87imh9o3e1.fsf@nanos.tec.linutronix.de> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <baf61125-72f4-5fd1-9ba1-6d55a2efdddd@redhat.com>

Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> writes:

> On 05/05/20 15:41, Thomas Gleixner wrote:
>>  	/*
>> -	 * Tell context tracking that this CPU is back.
>> +	 * VMEXIT disables interrupts (host state, see the CLI in the ASM
>> +	 * above),
>
> Apart from the small inaccuracy in that CLI has moved to vmenter.S, the

yes, that's a leftover from an earlier version.

> comments and commit message don't really help my understanding of why
> this is needed.
>
> It's true that interrupts cause a vmexit, and therefore from the
> processor point of view it's as if they are enabled.  However, the
> interrupt remains latched until local_irq_enable() in vcpu_enter_guest,
> so from the point of view of the kernel interrupts are still disabled. I
> don't understand why it's necessary to inform tracing and lockdep about
> a processor-internal state that doesn't percolate up to the kernel.
>
> For VMX indeed some care is necessary, because we the interrupt is eaten
> rather than latched.  Therefore, we call the interrupt handler from
> handle_external_interrupt_irqoff while EFLAGS.IF is still clear.
> However, if informing trace and lockdep turns out to be unnecessary
> after all for SVM, it should be okay (and clearer) to place the code in
> handle_external_interrupt_irqoff (also in arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c) .
>
> Instead, if I'm wrong, the four steps above are the same in code and
> comment, and same for the three steps in the comment below.  Can you
> replace them with the "why" of this change?

Sorry, yes the changelog and the comments are not really helpful.

From an instrumentation point of view, entering guest mode or returning
to user mode is more or less the same.

On return to user mode the kernel disables interrupts and the
sysret/iret reenables them. When entering the kernel from user mode via
syscall/exception the entry disables interrupts again. So for
instrumentation, especially interrupt disabled tracing we must track
that change otherwise a latency analysis would claim that interrupts
were disabled for the full time a task spent in user mode.

For guest mode this is practically the same. Before we enter the guest
the host state has to flip back to 'interrupts enabled' and on vmexit
reestablish the interrupt disabled state. The reason of the vmexit
(interrupt, trapped access, halt) is irrelevant from a host state
perspective so the tracking really needs to be right at the edge like we
do for the user mode transitions.

I'll sit down and write up more coherent comments and changelog.

Thanks,

        tglx

  reply	other threads:[~2020-05-06  8:48 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 69+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-05-05 13:41 [patch V4 part 2 00/18] x86/entry: Entry/exception code rework, syscall and KVM changes Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 01/18] x86/entry/64: Move non entry code into .text section Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06 15:51   ` Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-08  1:31   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-08 23:53   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-10 13:39     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 02/18] x86/entry/32: " Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 13:15   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-05-07 14:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 03/18] x86/entry: Mark enter_from_user_mode() noinstr Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08  8:21   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 04/18] x86/entry/common: Protect against instrumentation Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 13:39   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-05-07 14:13     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 05/18] x86/entry: Move irq tracing on syscall entry to C-code Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 13:55   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-05-07 14:10     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 15:03       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 17:06         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 06/18] x86/entry: Move irq flags tracing to prepare_exit_to_usermode() Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08 23:57   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-09 10:16     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 07/18] context_tracking: Ensure that the critical path cannot be instrumented Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08  8:23   ` Masami Hiramatsu
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 08/18] lib/smp_processor_id: Move it into noinstr section Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] x86/speculation/mds: Mark mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() __always_inline tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] lib/smp_processor_id: Move it into noinstr section tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 09/18] x86/speculation/mds: Mark mds_user_clear_cpu_buffers() __always_inline Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 10/18] x86/entry/64: Check IF in __preempt_enable_notrace() thunk Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-07 14:15   ` Alexandre Chartre
2020-05-09  0:10   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-09 10:25     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-10 18:47       ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-11 18:27         ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-12  1:48     ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-12  1:51   ` Steven Rostedt
2020-05-12  8:14     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 11/18] x86/entry/64: Mark ___preempt_schedule_notrace() thunk noinstr Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 12/18] x86,objtool: Make entry_64_compat.S objtool clean Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-09  0:11   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-09 10:06     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] x86/entry: " tip-bot2 for Peter Zijlstra
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 13/18] x86/kvm: Move context tracking where it belongs Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06  7:42   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-09  0:14   ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-05-09 10:12     ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 14/18] x86/kvm/vmx: Add hardirq tracing to guest enter/exit Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06  7:55   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 15/18] x86/kvm/svm: Handle hardirqs proper on " Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06  8:15   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-06  8:48     ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2020-05-06  9:21       ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-07 14:44         ` [patch V5 " Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-08 13:45           ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-08 14:01             ` Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 16/18] context_tracking: Make guest_enter/exit() .noinstr ready Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-19 19:58   ` [tip: x86/entry] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 17/18] x86/kvm/vmx: Move guest enter/exit into .noinstr.text Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06  8:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-05 13:41 ` [patch V4 part 2 18/18] x86/kvm/svm: " Thomas Gleixner
2020-05-06  8:17   ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-05-07 14:47   ` Alexandre Chartre

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