From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1754002AbaBOVhi (ORCPT ); Sat, 15 Feb 2014 16:37:38 -0500 Received: from out01.mta.xmission.com ([166.70.13.231]:53451 "EHLO out01.mta.xmission.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752729AbaBOVhc (ORCPT ); Sat, 15 Feb 2014 16:37:32 -0500 From: ebiederm@xmission.com (Eric W. Biederman) To: Al Viro Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" , Linux-Fsdevel , Kernel Mailing List , Andy Lutomirski , Rob Landley , Linus Torvalds , Miklos Szeredi , Christoph Hellwig , Karel Zak , "J. Bruce Fields" References: <87a9kkax0j.fsf@xmission.com> <8761v7h2pt.fsf@tw-ebiederman.twitter.com> <87li281wx6.fsf_-_@xmission.com> <87ob28kqks.fsf_-_@xmission.com> Date: Sat, 15 Feb 2014 13:37:26 -0800 In-Reply-To: <87ob28kqks.fsf_-_@xmission.com> (Eric W. Biederman's message of "Sat, 15 Feb 2014 13:34:43 -0800") Message-ID: <87txc0jbvt.fsf_-_@xmission.com> User-Agent: Gnus/5.13 (Gnus v5.13) Emacs/24.1 (gnu/linux) MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain X-XM-AID: U2FsdGVkX1/3ZQnS4sfC2QHBCtI6PLybrb/a1IMz/Pg= X-SA-Exim-Connect-IP: 98.207.154.105 X-SA-Exim-Mail-From: ebiederm@xmission.com X-Spam-Report: * -1.0 ALL_TRUSTED Passed through trusted hosts only via SMTP * 0.0 KHOP_BIG_TO_CC Sent to 10+ recipients instaed of Bcc or a list * 1.5 XMNoVowels Alpha-numberic number with no vowels * 0.7 XMSubLong Long Subject * 0.0 T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG BODY: T_TM2_M_HEADER_IN_MSG * -0.0 BAYES_40 BODY: Bayes spam probability is 20 to 40% * [score: 0.2056] * -0.0 DCC_CHECK_NEGATIVE Not listed in DCC * [sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1] * 0.5 XM_Body_Dirty_Words Contains a dirty word * 0.0 T_TooManySym_01 4+ unique symbols in subject X-Spam-DCC: XMission; sa06 1397; Body=1 Fuz1=1 Fuz2=1 X-Spam-Combo: *;Al Viro X-Spam-Relay-Country: Subject: [PATCH 05/11] vfs: Add a function to lazily unmount all mounts from any dentry. X-Spam-Flag: No X-SA-Exim-Version: 4.2.1 (built Wed, 14 Nov 2012 14:26:46 -0700) X-SA-Exim-Scanned: Yes (on in01.mta.xmission.com) Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org v2: Always drop the lock when exiting early. v3: Make detach_mounts robust about freeing several mounts on the same mountpoint at one time, and remove the unneeded mnt_list list test. v4: Document the purpose of detach_mounts and why new_mountpoint is safe to call. Signed-off-by: Eric W. Biederman --- fs/mount.h | 2 ++ fs/namespace.c | 39 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 41 insertions(+), 0 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/mount.h b/fs/mount.h index 50a72d46e7a6..2b470f34e665 100644 --- a/fs/mount.h +++ b/fs/mount.h @@ -84,6 +84,8 @@ extern struct mount *__lookup_mnt_last(struct vfsmount *, struct dentry *); extern bool legitimize_mnt(struct vfsmount *, unsigned); +extern void detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry); + static inline void get_mnt_ns(struct mnt_namespace *ns) { atomic_inc(&ns->count); diff --git a/fs/namespace.c b/fs/namespace.c index 33db9e95bd5c..7abbf722ce18 100644 --- a/fs/namespace.c +++ b/fs/namespace.c @@ -1359,6 +1359,45 @@ static int do_umount(struct mount *mnt, int flags) return retval; } +/* + * detach_mounts - lazily unmount all mounts on the specified dentry + * + * During unlink, rmdir, and d_drop it is possible to loose the path + * to an existing mountpoint, and wind up leaking the mount. + * detach_mounts allows lazily unmounting those mounts instead of + * leaking them. + * + * The caller may hold dentry->d_inode->i_mutex. + */ +void detach_mounts(struct dentry *dentry) +{ + struct mountpoint *mp; + struct mount *mnt; + + namespace_lock(); + if (!d_mountpoint(dentry)) + goto out_unlock; + + /* + * The namespace lock and d_mountpoint being set guarantees + * that new_mountpoint will just be a lookup of the existing + * mountpoint structure. + */ + mp = new_mountpoint(dentry); + if (IS_ERR(mp)) + goto out_unlock; + + lock_mount_hash(); + while (!list_empty(&mp->m_list)) { + mnt = list_first_entry(&mp->m_list, struct mount, mnt_mp_list); + umount_tree(mnt, 1); + } + unlock_mount_hash(); + put_mountpoint(mp); +out_unlock: + namespace_unlock(); +} + /* * Is the caller allowed to modify his namespace? */ -- 1.7.5.4