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From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: jejb@linux.ibm.com, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org
Cc: zohar@linux.ibm.com, serge@hallyn.com,
	christian.brauner@ubuntu.com, containers@lists.linux.dev,
	dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com, ebiederm@xmission.com,
	krzysztof.struczynski@huawei.com, roberto.sassu@huawei.com,
	mpeters@redhat.com, lhinds@redhat.com, lsturman@redhat.com,
	puiterwi@redhat.com, jamjoom@us.ibm.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	rgb@redhat.com, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	jmorris@namei.org
Subject: Re: [RFC 20/20] ima: Setup securityfs_ns for IMA namespace
Date: Wed, 1 Dec 2021 16:34:35 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8d7b6d47-9001-1f47-bce8-e7fae28fafcf@linux.ibm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <c6d7b9363991b80b2f55bbdb7e44c18ea45489da.camel@linux.ibm.com>


On 12/1/21 16:11, James Bottomley wrote:
> On Wed, 2021-12-01 at 15:25 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>> On 12/1/21 14:21, James Bottomley wrote:
>>> On Wed, 2021-12-01 at 13:11 -0500, Stefan Berger wrote:
>>>> On 12/1/21 12:56, James Bottomley wrote:
>>> [...]
>>>> I tried this with runc and a user namespace active mapping uid
>>>> 1000 on the host to uid 0 in the container. There I run into the
>>>> problem that  all of the files and directories without the above
>>>> work-around are mapped to 'nobody', just like all the files in
>>>> sysfs in this case are also mapped to nobody. This code resolved
>>>> the issue.
>>> So I applied your patches with the permission shift commented out
>>> and instrumented inode_alloc() to see where it might be failing and
>>> I actually find it all works as expected for me:
>>>
>>> ejb@testdeb:~> unshare -r --user --mount --ima
>>> root@testdeb:~# mount -t securityfs_ns none /sys/kernel/security
>>> root@testdeb:~# ls -l /sys/kernel/security/ima/
>>> total 0
>>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Dec  1 19:11 ascii_runtime_measurements
>>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Dec  1 19:11 binary_runtime_measurements
>>> -rw------- 1 root root 0 Dec  1 19:11 policy
>>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Dec  1 19:11 runtime_measurements_count
>>> -r--r----- 1 root root 0 Dec  1 19:11 violations
>>>
>>> I think your problem is something to do with how runc is installing
>>> the uid/gid mappings.  If it's installing them after the
>>> security_ns inodes are created then they get the -1 value (because
>>> no mappings exist in s_user_ns).  I can even demonstrate this by
>>> forcing unshare to enter the IMA namespace before writing the
>>> mapping values and I'll see "nobody nogroup" above like you do.
>> I am surprised you get this mapping even after commenting the
>> permission adjustments... it doesn't work for me when I comment them
>> out:
>>
>> [stefanb@ima-ns-dev rootfs]$ unshare -r --user --mount
>> [root@ima-ns-dev rootfs]# mount -t securityfs_ns none
>> /sys/kernel/security/
>> [root@ima-ns-dev rootfs]# cd /sys/kernel/security/ima/
>> [root@ima-ns-dev ima]# ls -l
>> total 0
>> -r--r-----. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 15:20 ascii_runtime_measurements
>> -r--r-----. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 15:20
>> binary_runtime_measurements
>> -rw-------. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 15:20 policy
>> -r--r-----. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 15:20 runtime_measurements_count
>> -r--r-----. 1 nobody nobody 0 Dec  1 15:20 violations
>> [root@ima-ns-dev ima]# cat /proc/self/uid_map
>>            0       1000          1
>> [root@ima-ns-dev ima]# cat /proc/self/gid_map
>>            0       1000          1
>>
>> The initialization of securityfs and setup of files and directories
>> happens at the same time as the IMA namespace is created. At this
>> time there are no user mappings available, so that's why I need to
>> make the adjustments 'late'.
> There is one other possible difference:  To get the correct s_user_ns

I am currently wondering why I cannot re-create your setup while 
disabling the remapping...




> on the securityfs_ns mount, the mount namespace itself has to be owned
> by the user namespace ... is runc doing that correctly?  I always

Following an strace of 'runc create' I see an unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) by 
a process before it does an 
unshare(CLONE_NEWNS|CLONE_NEWUTS|CLONE_NEWIPC|CLONE_NEWPID|CLONE_NEWNET), 
so this seems to be doing it in the order you suggest.

Also, runc seems to have its own set of struggles. I am not sure we 
would be able to ask them to accommodate us to do it 'correctly' - it 
doesn't sound so 'easy' for them either to get everything under the hood:

https://github.com/opencontainers/runc/blob/master/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c#L919

      * In order for this unsharing code to be more extensible we need 
to split
      * up unshare(CLONE_NEWUSER) and clone() in various ways. The ideal 
case
      * would be if we did clone(CLONE_NEWUSER) and the other namespaces
      * separately, but because of SELinux issues we cannot really do 
that. But

[...]

      * However, if we unshare(2) the user namespace *before* we 
clone(2), then
      * all hell breaks loose.

sounds like fun

So, I am not quite sure whether I am working around an issue of runc but 
for that I would like to first be able to re-create your successful 
setup to see what's different.

    Stefan


> forget this detail because unshare does it correctly automatically but
> it means you must unshare the user namespace first and then unshare the
> mount namespace (or do it in the same sys call because the kernel will
> get the correct order).
>
> James
>
>

  reply	other threads:[~2021-12-01 21:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 70+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-11-30 16:06 [RFC 00/20] ima: Namespace IMA with audit support in IMA-ns Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 01/20] ima: Add IMA namespace support Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 21:53   ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 21:53     ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 22:03   ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 22:03     ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 22:42   ` [RFC PATCH] ima: imans_cache_init() can be static kernel test robot
2021-11-30 22:44   ` [RFC 01/20] ima: Add IMA namespace support kernel test robot
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 02/20] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 23:21   ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 23:21     ` kernel test robot
2021-12-01  0:31   ` [RFC PATCH] ima: insert_ns_status() can be static kernel test robot
2021-12-01  0:33   ` [RFC 02/20] ima: Define ns_status for storing namespaced iint data kernel test robot
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 03/20] ima: Namespace audit status flags Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 04/20] ima: Move delayed work queue and variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 05/20] ima: Move IMA's keys queue related " Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 06/20] ima: Move policy " Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 19:29   ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 07/20] ima: Move ima_htable " Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 08/20] ima: Move measurement list related variables " Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 12:46   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02 13:41     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 16:29       ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02 16:45         ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 17:44           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02 18:03             ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 20:03               ` James Bottomley
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 09/20] ima: Only accept AUDIT rules for IMA non-init_ima_ns namespaces for now Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 10/20] ima: Implement hierarchical processing of file accesses Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 11/20] securityfs: Prefix global variables with securityfs_ Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 12/20] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions Stefan Berger
2021-12-01  3:55   ` [RFC PATCH] securityfs: _securityfs_create_symlink() can be static kernel test robot
2021-12-01  4:02   ` [RFC 12/20] securityfs: Pass static variables as parameters from top level functions kernel test robot
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 13/20] securityfs: Build securityfs_ns for namespacing support Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 13:35   ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-02 13:47     ` Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 14/20] ima: Move some IMA policy and filesystem related variables into ima_namespace Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 15/20] capabilities: Introduce CAP_INTEGRITY_ADMIN Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 17:27   ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-30 17:41     ` Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 17:50       ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 16/20] ima: Use ns_capable() for namespace policy access Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 17/20] ima: Use integrity_admin_ns_capable() to check corresponding capability Stefan Berger
2021-12-01 16:58   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-01 17:35     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-01 19:29       ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02  7:16         ` Denis Semakin
2021-12-02 12:33           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02 17:54           ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 12:59         ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-02 13:01           ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-02 15:58             ` Casey Schaufler
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 18/20] userns: Introduce a refcount variable for calling early teardown function Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 19/20] ima/userns: Define early teardown function for IMA namespace Stefan Berger
2021-11-30 20:42   ` kernel test robot
2021-11-30 16:06 ` [RFC 20/20] ima: Setup securityfs_ns " Stefan Berger
2021-12-01  2:14   ` [RFC PATCH] ima: ima_fs_ns_permission() can be static kernel test robot
2021-12-01  2:15   ` [RFC 20/20] ima: Setup securityfs_ns for IMA namespace kernel test robot
2021-12-01 17:56   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-01 18:11     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-01 19:21       ` James Bottomley
2021-12-01 20:25         ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-01 21:11           ` James Bottomley
2021-12-01 21:34             ` Stefan Berger [this message]
2021-12-01 22:01               ` James Bottomley
2021-12-01 22:09                 ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-01 22:19                   ` James Bottomley
2021-12-02  0:02                     ` Stefan Berger
2021-12-02 13:18   ` Christian Brauner
2021-12-02 13:52     ` Stefan Berger

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