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From: Bruce Mitchell <Bruce_Mitchell@phoenix.com>
To: James Feist <james.feist@linux.intel.com>,
	OpenBMC Maillist <openbmc@lists.ozlabs.org>
Subject: RE: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
Date: Wed, 6 Nov 2019 22:18:52 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <8e3e3633bd1946adbac73657816e049a@SCL-EXCHMB-13.phoenix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cd9008e5-2501-29d4-57e8-7831eb558160@linux.intel.com>



> -----Original Message-----
> From: openbmc [mailto:openbmc-
> bounces+bruce_mitchell=phoenix.com@lists.ozlabs.org] On Behalf Of
> James Feist
> Sent: Wednesday, November 6, 2019 13:52
> To: Bruce Mitchell; OpenBMC Maillist
> Subject: Re: OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue.
> 
> On 11/6/19 11:31 AM, Bruce Mitchell wrote:
> >  From my investigations on TLS there seems to be 2 issues that could be
> corrected with OpenBMC's https:
> >    1  Secure Client-Initiated Renegotiation     VULNERABLE (NOT ok), DoS
> threat
> 
> This CVE is disputed https://www.cvedetails.com/cve/CVE-2011-1473/ due
> to CPU consumption issues that might make it easier to cause a DOS
> (which is arguably already not that difficult on a BMC). That being said
> the fix is a 1 liner, so I implemented it and it seems to work, but I
> need to see if there are any consequences.
> 
> https://gerrit.openbmc-project.xyz/c/openbmc/bmcweb/+/26992
> 
> 
> 
> >    2  LUCKY13 (CVE-2013-0169), experimental     potentially VULNERABLE,
> uses cipher block chaining (CBC) ciphers with TLS
> >       and xc023   ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-SHA256         ECDH 521   AES         128
> TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256
> 
> Based on this https://wiki.crashtest-security.com/prevent-ssl-lucky13,
> we are using the recommended ciphers,
> https://github.com/openbmc/bmcweb/blob/1f8c7b5d6a679a38b8226106031
> 0b876079d0f8b/include/ssl_key_handler.hpp#L330.
> And based on this comment from the maintainer of test ssl, no tool can
> determine this externally, and it's just a warning:
> https://github.com/drwetter/testssl.sh/issues/1011#issuecomment-
> 372953654.
> Do you have any suggestions on if there is anything to change for this one?
> 
> Thanks
> 
> -James
> 

Thanks James, I accept your assessment.

-Bruce

> 
> >
> > Present standard of practice seems to be to not allow Secure Client-
> Initiated Renegotiation and to not allow CBC ciphers.
> >
> > Is this your understanding as well?
> >
> > Thank you!
> >


  reply	other threads:[~2019-11-06 22:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-11-06 19:31 OpenBMC and https Vulnerable issue Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 21:52 ` James Feist
2019-11-06 22:18   ` Bruce Mitchell [this message]
2019-11-06 22:38     ` Bruce Mitchell
2019-11-06 22:43       ` James Feist
2019-11-15 22:45         ` Joseph Reynolds

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