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From: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
To: openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org
Subject: [dora][PATCH 2/6] openssl: use upstream fix for CVE-2014-0198
Date: Mon,  9 Jun 2014 16:53:44 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <98c455809c3eed9af94f05080e7d9fdd9904626d.1402329159.git.paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1402329156.git.paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
In-Reply-To: <cover.1402329156.git.paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>

This replaces the fix for CVE-2014-0198 with one borrowed from Fedora,
which is the same as the patch which was actually applied upstream for
the issue, i.e.:

https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commit;h=b107586c0c3447ea22dba8698ebbcd81bb29d48c

Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
---
 .../openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch             | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++
 .../openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch | 23 -------------
 .../recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb |  2 +-
 3 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
 delete mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..12dcfb7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
+Date: Sun, 11 May 2014 23:38:37 +0000 (+0100)
+Subject: Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+X-Git-Url: https://git.openssl.org/gitweb/?p=openssl.git;a=commitdiff_plain;h=b107586
+
+Fixed NULL pointer dereference. See PR#3321
+
+Patch borrowed from Fedora
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+Signed-off-by: Paul Eggleton <paul.eggleton@linux.intel.com>
+
+---
+
+diff --git a/ssl/s3_pkt.c b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+index 40eb0dd..d961d12 100644
+--- a/ssl/s3_pkt.c
++++ b/ssl/s3_pkt.c
+@@ -657,9 +657,6 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 	SSL3_BUFFER *wb=&(s->s3->wbuf);
+ 	SSL_SESSION *sess;
+ 
+- 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
+-		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
+-			return -1;
+ 
+ 	/* first check if there is a SSL3_BUFFER still being written
+ 	 * out.  This will happen with non blocking IO */
+@@ -675,6 +672,10 @@ static int do_ssl3_write(SSL *s, int type, const unsigned char *buf,
+ 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
+ 		}
+ 
++ 	if (wb->buf == NULL)
++		if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
++			return -1;
++
+ 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
+ 		return 0;
+ 
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch
deleted file mode 100644
index 4c51d74..0000000
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl-1.0.1e/openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-Upstream-Status: Backport
-
-Reference: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1093837
-
-CVE-2014-0198: An attacker can trigger generation of an SSL
-alert which could cause a null pointer dereference.
-
-Signed-off-by: Maxin B. John <maxin.john@enea.com>
----
-diff -Naur openssl-1.0.1g-orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/s3_pkt.c
---- openssl-1.0.1g-orig/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-03-17 17:14:20.000000000 +0100
-+++ openssl-1.0.1g/ssl/s3_pkt.c	2014-05-06 02:32:43.862587660 +0200
-@@ -657,6 +657,10 @@
- 		if (i <= 0)
- 			return(i);
- 		/* if it went, fall through and send more stuff */
-+		/* we may have released our buffer, so get it again */
-+		if (wb->buf == NULL)
-+			if (!ssl3_setup_write_buffer(s))
-+				return -1;
- 		}
- 
- 	if (len == 0 && !create_empty_fragment)
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
index 7783206..38cdb3f 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/openssl/openssl_1.0.1e.bb
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ SRC_URI += "file://configure-targets.patch \
             file://0001-Fix-DTLS-retransmission-from-previous-session.patch \
             file://0001-Use-version-in-SSL_METHOD-not-SSL-structure.patch \
             file://CVE-2014-0160.patch \
-            file://openssl-CVE-2014-0198-fix.patch \
             file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0195.patch \
+            file://openssl-1.0.1e-cve-2014-0198.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "66bf6f10f060d561929de96f9dfe5b8c"
-- 
1.9.3



  parent reply	other threads:[~2014-06-09 15:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2014-06-09 15:53 [dora][PATCH 0/6] OpenSSL CVE fixes for the dora branch Paul Eggleton
2014-06-09 15:53 ` [dora][PATCH 1/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0195 Paul Eggleton
2014-06-09 15:53 ` Paul Eggleton [this message]
2014-06-09 15:53 ` [dora][PATCH 3/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0221 Paul Eggleton
2014-06-09 15:53 ` [dora][PATCH 4/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-0224 Paul Eggleton
2014-06-09 15:53 ` [dora][PATCH 5/6] openssl: fix CVE-2014-3470 Paul Eggleton
2014-06-09 15:53 ` [dora][PATCH 6/6] openssl: fix for CVE-2010-5298 Paul Eggleton

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