All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: "Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>
To: Tim Chen <tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com>,
	Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
	Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>,
	David Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
	"Mallick, Asit K" <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>,
	Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>,
	Jon Masters <jcm@redhat.com>, Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>,
	"linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org" <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	"x86@kernel.org" <x86@kernel.org>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	linux-security-module <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: RE: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability
Date: Tue, 30 Oct 2018 21:53:20 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <99FC4B6EFCEFD44486C35F4C281DC6732148DCEC@ORSMSX110.amr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <f63e412c-d768-9f47-7a47-953a15db5850@linux.intel.com>

> -----Original Message-----
> From: Tim Chen [mailto:tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, October 30, 2018 2:31 PM
> To: Schaufler, Casey <casey.schaufler@intel.com>; Jiri Kosina
> <jikos@kernel.org>; Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
> Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>; Ingo Molnar
> <mingo@redhat.com>; Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>; Josh Poimboeuf
> <jpoimboe@redhat.com>; Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>; David
> Woodhouse <dwmw@amazon.co.uk>; Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>;
> Hansen, Dave <dave.hansen@intel.com>; Mallick, Asit K
> <asit.k.mallick@intel.com>; Arjan van de Ven <arjan@linux.intel.com>; Jon
> Masters <jcm@redhat.com>; Waiman Long <longman9394@gmail.com>;
> linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org; x86@kernel.org; linux-security-module <linux-
> security-module@vger.kernel.org>
> Subject: Re: [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when
> modifying its dumpability
> 
> On 10/30/2018 01:57 PM, Schaufler, Casey wrote:
> 
> >
> > This isn't an LSM hook and hence does not belong in this file.
> > arch_set_security() isn't descriptive, and is in fact a bad choice
> > as task_struct has a field "security". This function has nothing
> > to do with the task->security field, which is what I would expect
> > based on the name.
> >
> 
> What file will be a logical place for this function?

kernel/cpu.c ? You're working with CPU localized mitigations, right?

You don't want it under security/ as that's all supposed to
be bits of the LSM infrastructure.

> >> +
> >> +int update_process_security(struct task_struct *task)
> >
> > Again, this isn't an LSM hook and does not belong in this file.
> > Also again, "security" isn't descriptive in the name.
> >
> 
> Thanks.
> 
> Tim

  reply	other threads:[~2018-10-30 21:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-30 18:49 [Patch v4 00/18] Provide process property based options to enable Spectre v2 userspace-userspace protection* Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 01/18] x86/speculation: Clean up spectre_v2_parse_cmdline() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 02/18] x86/speculation: Remove unnecessary ret variable in cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 03/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize cpu_show_common() Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:07   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 19:12     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 19:17       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 04/18] x86/speculation: Add X86_FEATURE_USE_IBRS_ENHANCED Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 05/18] x86/speculation: Disable STIBP when enhanced IBRS is in use Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 06/18] smt: Create cpu_smt_enabled static key for SMT specific code Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 07/18] x86/smt: Convert cpu_smt_control check to cpu_smt_enabled static key Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:29   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  1:43     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-08 11:18       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 08/18] sched: Deprecate sched_smt_present and use " Tim Chen
2018-11-03 18:20   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-09 22:08     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 09/18] x86/speculation: Rename SSBD update functions Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 10/18] x86/speculation: Reorganize speculation control MSRs update Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 11/18] x86/speculation: Update comment on TIF_SSBD Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 12/18] x86: Group thread info flags by functionality Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 13/18] security: Update security level of a process when modifying its dumpability Tim Chen
2018-10-30 20:57   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:30     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:53       ` Schaufler, Casey [this message]
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 14/18] x86/speculation: Turn on or off STIBP according to a task's TIF_STIBP Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 15/18] x86/speculation: Add Spectre v2 app to app protection modes Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 16/18] x86/speculation: Enable STIBP to protect security sensitive tasks Tim Chen
2018-10-30 21:07   ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 21:34     ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 22:02       ` Schaufler, Casey
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 17/18] x86/speculation: Update SPEC_CTRL MSRs of remote CPUs Tim Chen
2018-11-04 19:49   ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 22:02     ` Tim Chen
2018-11-05 23:04       ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-05 23:59         ` Tim Chen
2018-11-06  7:46           ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-07  0:18             ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 18:33               ` Waiman Long
2018-11-07 23:15                 ` Tim Chen
2018-11-07 23:03               ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-11-08  0:22                 ` Tim Chen
2018-10-30 18:49 ` [Patch v4 18/18] x86/speculation: Create PRCTL interface to restrict indirect branch speculation Tim Chen

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=99FC4B6EFCEFD44486C35F4C281DC6732148DCEC@ORSMSX110.amr.corp.intel.com \
    --to=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
    --cc=aarcange@redhat.com \
    --cc=ak@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=arjan@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=asit.k.mallick@intel.com \
    --cc=dave.hansen@intel.com \
    --cc=dwmw@amazon.co.uk \
    --cc=jcm@redhat.com \
    --cc=jikos@kernel.org \
    --cc=jpoimboe@redhat.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=longman9394@gmail.com \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=peterz@infradead.org \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=tim.c.chen@linux.intel.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.