From mboxrd@z Thu Jan  1 00:00:00 1970
From: Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>
Date: Thu, 13 May 2021 08:52:18 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/4] tools: mkeficapsule: add firmwware image signing
In-Reply-To: <CAA93ih1rJ-4NacYjdoGLO_x7M1DD=qQAGBTdo-hEMJtYmWQrxw@mail.gmail.com>
References: <20210512045753.62288-1-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
 <20210512045753.62288-2-takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
 <c6b21901-15e0-2b24-22a2-5e4b4e293311@gmx.de> <20210513030839.GC16848@laputa>
 <6876a081-8f16-e747-6036-471b48f60318@gmx.de>
 <CAA93ih3rhuWwEfn1GbqPnXc0zZcSe1pw_zc2mX5dP6Hstng4Dw@mail.gmail.com>
 <b25e1fbf-655e-6ed0-5bf5-77714cf48e41@gmx.de>
 <CAA93ih1rJ-4NacYjdoGLO_x7M1DD=qQAGBTdo-hEMJtYmWQrxw@mail.gmail.com>
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Am 13. Mai 2021 08:44:24 MESZ schrieb Masami Hiramatsu <masami.hiramatsu@linaro.org>:
>Hi Heinrich,
>
>2021?5?13?(?) 14:50 Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>:
>>
>> On 5/13/21 7:12 AM, Masami Hiramatsu wrote:
>> > Hi Heinrich,
>> >
>> > 2021?5?13?(?) 13:22 Heinrich Schuchardt <xypron.glpk@gmx.de>:
>> >>
>> >> On 5/13/21 5:08 AM, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> >>> On Wed, May 12, 2021 at 10:56:41AM +0200, Heinrich Schuchardt
>wrote:
>> >>>> On 12.05.21 06:57, AKASHI Takahiro wrote:
>> >>>>> With this enhancement, mkeficapsule will be able to create a
>capsule
>> >>>>> file with a signature which will be verified later by FMP's
>SetImage().
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> We will have to specify addtional command parameters:
>> >>>>>     -monotonic-cout <count> : monotonic count
>> >>>>>     -private-key <private key file> : private key file
>> >>>>>     -certificate <certificate file> : certificate file
>> >>>>> Only when those parameters are given, a signature will be added
>> >>>>> to a capsule file.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Users are expected to maintain the monotonic count for each
>firmware
>> >>>>> image.
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> Signed-off-by: AKASHI Takahiro <takahiro.akashi@linaro.org>
>> >>>>> ---
>> >>>>>    tools/Makefile       |   4 +
>> >>>>>    tools/mkeficapsule.c | 324
>+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
>> >>>>>    2 files changed, 303 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> diff --git a/tools/Makefile b/tools/Makefile
>> >>>>> index d020c55d6644..02eae0286e20 100644
>> >>>>> --- a/tools/Makefile
>> >>>>> +++ b/tools/Makefile
>> >>>>> @@ -231,6 +231,10 @@ hostprogs-$(CONFIG_MIPS) += mips-relocs
>> >>>>>    hostprogs-$(CONFIG_ASN1_COMPILER) += asn1_compiler
>> >>>>>    HOSTCFLAGS_asn1_compiler.o = -idirafter $(srctree)/include
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> +ifneq ($(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE),)
>> >>>>> +HOSTLDLIBS_mkeficapsule += \
>> >>>>> +   $(shell pkg-config --libs libssl libcrypto 2> /dev/null ||
>echo "-lssl -lcrypto")
>> >>>>
>> >>>> I don't expect any user wants to install two tool versions in
>parallel.
>> >>>>
>> >>>> The tool should always be able to add a signature.
>> >>>> Adding a signature must be optional.
>> >>>
>> >>> It seems to me that those two statements mutually contradict.
>> >>> Or do you intend to say that we should have a separate kconfig
>> >>> option to enable/disable signing feature in mkeficapsule?
>> >>>
>> >>> If so, I can agree.
>> >>>
>> >>> In either way, we should have an option to turn on/off this
>functionality
>> >>> as not all users use signed capsules.
>> >>
>> >> I want to have a single binary to distribute with Linux distros
>(e.g.
>> >> Debian/Ubuntu package u-boot-tools).
>> >
>> > I couldn't catch your point. If so, the distros can build u-boot
>with
>> > CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y...
>>
>> Why should the tool depend on board configuration?
>
>Yeah, at this point I agreed. I think there should be a separated
>CONFIG
>for tools or forcibly link those libraries. (I think most people don't
>mind if it requires new libraries to be built, that usually happens.)
>
>> Who would want capsule updates without authentication?
>
>Hm, so you think even CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE is
>only for development. Capsule must be signed, right?
>Then, all distro should build u-boot with
>CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y, isn't it?

There will still be U-Boot images without capsule updates.

>
>> > BTW, IMHO, if u-boot.bin can not find the ESL in the device tree,
>> > it should skip authentication too.
>>
>> In this case the capsule should be rejected (if
>> CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE=y).
>
>I meant U-Boot has NO key to authenticate the capsule. I think in that
>case U-Boot build process must require the key (ESL) and if user
>doesn't
>provide it, the build should fail (if it doesn't skip capsule
>authentication.)
>Or, we have no way to update U-Boot anymore.
>
>> > Then, user can choose whether enabling capsule authentication or
>not
>> > by embedding ESL into their devicetree.
>>
>> The user shall not be able to decide anything that might hamper
>> security. The U-Boot binary must dictate if a capsule is safe.
>
>Hmm, I think the root issue is that the ESL embedding process is not
>integrated into the build process yet. For the safe capsule update,
>we must enable capsule authentication with keys. (unsafe one is only
>for testing/development)
>Moreover, the key is stored in the U-Boot itself OR, in the secure
>storage
>outside of U-Boot (Hardware OTP or TPM/HSM are preferable.)
>
>Thus,
>CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE must depend on (or select)
>a new config which points the path for the ESL file (this is embedded
>while
>the build process), OR, the platform driver provides key from its
>hardware
>secure storage.
>
>What would you think about this idea?

That is the direction I would like to go.

Best regards

Heinrich

>
>Thank you,
>
>>
>> Best regards
>>
>> Heinrich
>>
>> >
>> > Thank you
>> >
>> >>
>> >> This should allow both
>> >>
>> >> - create signed capsules
>> >> - create unsigned capsules
>> >>
>> >> The user shall select signing via command line parameters.
>> >>
>> >> Support for signing via the tool shall not depend on board Kconfig
>> >> parameters.
>> >>
>> >> Best regards
>> >>
>> >> Heinrich
>> >>
>> >>>
>> >>>>> +endif
>> >>>>>    mkeficapsule-objs := mkeficapsule.o $(LIBFDT_OBJS)
>> >>>>>    hostprogs-$(CONFIG_EFI_HAVE_CAPSULE_SUPPORT) += mkeficapsule
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> diff --git a/tools/mkeficapsule.c b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
>> >>>>> index de0a62898886..34ff1bdd82eb 100644
>> >>>>> --- a/tools/mkeficapsule.c
>> >>>>> +++ b/tools/mkeficapsule.c
>> >>>>> @@ -18,7 +18,17 @@
>> >>>>>    #include <sys/stat.h>
>> >>>>>    #include <sys/types.h>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> -#include "fdt_host.h"
>> >>>>> +#include <linux/kconfig.h>
>> >>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> see above
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/asn1.h>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/bio.h>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/evp.h>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/err.h>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/pem.h>
>> >>>>> +#include <openssl/pkcs7.h>
>> >>>>> +#endif
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +#include <linux/libfdt.h>
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>    typedef __u8 u8;
>> >>>>>    typedef __u16 u16;
>> >>>>> @@ -46,6 +56,13 @@ efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_fit =
>> >>>>>              EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_FIT_GUID;
>> >>>>>    efi_guid_t efi_guid_image_type_uboot_raw =
>> >>>>>              EFI_FIRMWARE_IMAGE_TYPE_UBOOT_RAW_GUID;
>> >>>>> +efi_guid_t efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7 =
>EFI_CERT_TYPE_PKCS7_GUID;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> see above
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:D:K:P:C:m:dOh";
>> >>>>> +#else
>> >>>>> +static const char *opts_short = "f:r:i:I:v:D:K:Oh";
>> >>>>> +#endif
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>>    static struct option options[] = {
>> >>>>>      {"fit", required_argument, NULL, 'f'},
>> >>>>> @@ -54,6 +71,12 @@ static struct option options[] = {
>> >>>>>      {"instance", required_argument, NULL, 'I'},
>> >>>>>      {"dtb", required_argument, NULL, 'D'},
>> >>>>>      {"public key", required_argument, NULL, 'K'},
>> >>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>> >>>>> +   {"private-key", required_argument, NULL, 'P'},
>> >>>>> +   {"certificate", required_argument, NULL, 'C'},
>> >>>>> +   {"monotonic-count", required_argument, NULL, 'm'},
>> >>>>
>> >>>> These options should not be required.
>> >>>
>> >>> I don't get you. What do you mean?
>> >>>
>> >>>>> +   {"dump-sig", no_argument, NULL, 'd'},
>> >>>>> +#endif
>> >>>>>      {"overlay", no_argument, NULL, 'O'},
>> >>>>>      {"help", no_argument, NULL, 'h'},
>> >>>>>      {NULL, 0, NULL, 0},
>> >>>>> @@ -70,6 +93,12 @@ static void print_usage(void)
>> >>>>>             "\t-I, --instance <instance>   update hardware
>instance\n"
>> >>>>>             "\t-K, --public-key <key file> public key esl
>file\n"
>> >>>>>             "\t-D, --dtb <dtb file>        dtb file\n"
>> >>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> see above
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +          "\t-P, --private-key <privkey file>  private key
>file\n"
>> >>>>> +          "\t-C, --certificate <cert file>     signer's
>certificate file\n"
>> >>>>> +          "\t-m, --monotonic-count <count>     monotonic
>count\n"
>> >>>>> +          "\t-d, --dump_sig              dump signature
>(*.p7)\n"
>> >>>>> +#endif
>> >>>>>             "\t-O, --overlay               the dtb file is an
>overlay\n"
>> >>>>>             "\t-h, --help                  print a help
>message\n",
>> >>>>>             tool_name);
>> >>>>> @@ -249,12 +278,167 @@ err:
>> >>>>>      return ret;
>> >>>>>    }
>> >>>>>
>> >>>>> +struct auth_context {
>> >>>>> +   char *key_file;
>> >>>>> +   char *cert_file;
>> >>>>> +   u8 *image_data;
>> >>>>> +   size_t image_size;
>> >>>>> +   struct efi_firmware_image_authentication auth;
>> >>>>> +   u8 *sig_data;
>> >>>>> +   size_t sig_size;
>> >>>>> +};
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +static int dump_sig;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_EFI_CAPSULE_AUTHENTICATE)
>> >>>>
>> >>>> see above
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +static EVP_PKEY *fileio_read_pkey(const char *filename)
>> >>>>> +{
>> >>>>> +   EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   BIO *bio;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
>> >>>>> +   if (!bio)
>> >>>>> +           goto out;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   key = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +out:
>> >>>>> +   BIO_free_all(bio);
>> >>>>> +   if (!key) {
>> >>>>> +           printf("Can't load key from file '%s'\n",
>filename);
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Please, you use fprintf(stderr,) for error messages.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +           ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
>> >>>>> +   }
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   return key;
>> >>>>> +}
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +static X509 *fileio_read_cert(const char *filename)
>> >>>>> +{
>> >>>>> +   X509 *cert = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   BIO *bio;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   bio = BIO_new_file(filename, "r");
>> >>>>> +   if (!bio)
>> >>>>> +           goto out;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   cert = PEM_read_bio_X509(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL);
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +out:
>> >>>>> +   BIO_free_all(bio);
>> >>>>> +   if (!cert) {
>> >>>>> +           printf("Can't load certificate from file '%s'\n",
>filename);
>> >>>>
>> >>>> fprintf(stderr,)
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +           ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr);
>> >>>>> +   }
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   return cert;
>> >>>>> +}
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +static int create_auth_data(struct auth_context *ctx)
>> >>>>> +{
>> >>>>> +   EVP_PKEY *key = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   X509 *cert = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   BIO *data_bio = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   const EVP_MD *md;
>> >>>>> +   PKCS7 *p7;
>> >>>>> +   int flags, ret = -1;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   OpenSSL_add_all_digests();
>> >>>>> +   OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers();
>> >>>>> +   ERR_load_crypto_strings();
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   key = fileio_read_pkey(ctx->key_file);
>> >>>>> +   if (!key)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +   cert = fileio_read_cert(ctx->cert_file);
>> >>>>> +   if (!cert)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   /*
>> >>>>> +    * create a BIO, containing:
>> >>>>> +    *  * firmware image
>> >>>>> +    *  * monotonic count
>> >>>>> +    * in this order!
>> >>>>> +    * See EDK2's FmpAuthenticatedHandlerRsa2048Sha256()
>> >>>>> +    */
>> >>>>> +   data_bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem());
>> >>>>> +   BIO_write(data_bio, ctx->image_data, ctx->image_size);
>> >>>>> +   BIO_write(data_bio, &ctx->auth.monotonic_count,
>> >>>>> +             sizeof(ctx->auth.monotonic_count));
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   md = EVP_get_digestbyname("SHA256");
>> >>>>> +   if (!md)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   /* create signature */
>> >>>>> +   /* TODO: maybe add PKCS7_NOATTR and PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP */
>> >>>>
>> >>>> PKCS7_NOATTR is a value without any documentation in the code.
>> >>>
>> >>> Nak.
>> >>> Those macros are part of openssl library. See openssl/pkcs7.h.
>> >>>
>> >>>> Please, replace variable names by a long text describing what it
>missing.
>> >>>>
>> >>>>> +   flags = PKCS7_BINARY | PKCS7_DETACHED;
>> >>>>
>> >>>> Those constants lack documentation in the code.
>> >>>
>> >>> Nak again.
>> >>>
>> >>>>> +   p7 = PKCS7_sign(NULL, NULL, NULL, data_bio, flags |
>PKCS7_PARTIAL);
>> >>>>> +   if (!p7)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +   if (!PKCS7_sign_add_signer(p7, cert, key, md, flags))
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +   if (!PKCS7_final(p7, data_bio, flags))
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   /* convert pkcs7 into DER */
>> >>>>> +   ctx->sig_data = NULL;
>> >>>>> +   ctx->sig_size = ASN1_item_i2d((ASN1_VALUE *)p7,
>&ctx->sig_data,
>> >>>>> +                                 ASN1_ITEM_rptr(PKCS7));
>> >>>>> +   if (!ctx->sig_size)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   /* fill auth_info */
>> >>>>> +   ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.dwLength =
>sizeof(ctx->auth.auth_info)
>> >>>>> +                                           + ctx->sig_size;
>> >>>>> +   ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wRevision = WIN_CERT_REVISION_2_0;
>> >>>>> +   ctx->auth.auth_info.hdr.wCertificateType =
>WIN_CERT_TYPE_EFI_GUID;
>> >>>>> +   memcpy(&ctx->auth.auth_info.cert_type,
>&efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7,
>> >>>>> +          sizeof(efi_guid_cert_type_pkcs7));
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   ret = 0;
>> >>>>> +err:
>> >>>>> +   BIO_free_all(data_bio);
>> >>>>> +   EVP_PKEY_free(key);
>> >>>>> +   X509_free(cert);
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   return ret;
>> >>>>> +}
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +static int dump_signature(const char *path, u8 *signature,
>size_t sig_size)
>> >>>>> +{
>> >>>>> +   char *sig_path;
>> >>>>> +   FILE *f;
>> >>>>> +   size_t size;
>> >>>>> +   int ret = -1;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   sig_path = malloc(strlen(path) + 3 + 1);
>> >>>>> +   if (!sig_path)
>> >>>>> +           return ret;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   sprintf(sig_path, "%s.p7", path);
>> >>>>> +   f = fopen(sig_path, "w");
>> >>>>> +   if (!f)
>> >>>>> +           goto err;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   size = fwrite(signature, 1, sig_size, f);
>> >>>>> +   if (size == sig_size)
>> >>>>> +           ret = 0;
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>> +   fclose(f);
>> >>>>> +err:
>> >>>>> +   free(sig_path);
>> >>>>> +   return ret;
>> >>>>> +}
>> >>>>> +#endif
>> >>>>> +
>> >>>>>    static int create_fwbin(char *path, char *bin, efi_guid_t
>*guid,
>> >>>>> -                   unsigned long index, unsigned long
>instance)
>> >>>>> +                   unsigned long index, unsigned long
>instance,
>> >>>>> +                   uint64_t mcount, char *privkey_file, char
>*cert_file)
>> >>>>>    {
>> >>>>>      struct efi_capsule_header header;
>> >>>>>      struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_header capsule;
>> >>>>>      struct efi_firmware_management_capsule_image_header image;
>> >>>>> +   struct auth_context auth_context;
>> >>>>>      FILE *f, *g;
>> >>>>>      struct stat bin_stat;
>> >>>>>      u8 *data;
>> >>>>> @@ -266,6 +450,7 @@ static int create_fwbin(char *path, char
>*bin, efi_guid_t *guid,
>> >>>>>      printf("\tbin: %s\n\ttype: %pUl\n", bin, guid);