On 11/10/2016 08:24 PM, Kees Cook wrote:
> On Fri, Nov 4, 2016 at 7:45 AM, Juerg Haefliger <juerg.haefliger@hpe.com> wrote:
>> This patch adds support for XPFO which protects against 'ret2dir' kernel
>> attacks. The basic idea is to enforce exclusive ownership of page frames
>> by either the kernel or userspace, unless explicitly requested by the
>> kernel. Whenever a page destined for userspace is allocated, it is
>> unmapped from physmap (the kernel's page table). When such a page is
>> reclaimed from userspace, it is mapped back to physmap.
>>
>> Additional fields in the page_ext struct are used for XPFO housekeeping.
>> Specifically two flags to distinguish user vs. kernel pages and to tag
>> unmapped pages and a reference counter to balance kmap/kunmap operations
>> and a lock to serialize access to the XPFO fields.
>>
>> Known issues/limitations:
>>   - Only supports x86-64 (for now)
>>   - Only supports 4k pages (for now)
>>   - There are most likely some legitimate uses cases where the kernel needs
>>     to access userspace which need to be made XPFO-aware
>>   - Performance penalty
>>
>> Reference paper by the original patch authors:
>>   http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~vpk/papers/ret2dir.sec14.pdf
> 
> Would it be possible to create an lkdtm test that can exercise this protection?

I'll look into it.


>> diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
>> index 118f4549404e..4502e15c8419 100644
>> --- a/security/Kconfig
>> +++ b/security/Kconfig
>> @@ -6,6 +6,25 @@ menu "Security options"
>>
>>  source security/keys/Kconfig
>>
>> +config ARCH_SUPPORTS_XPFO
>> +       bool
> 
> Can you include a "help" section here to describe what requirements an
> architecture needs to support XPFO? See HAVE_ARCH_SECCOMP_FILTER and
> HAVE_ARCH_VMAP_STACK or some examples.

Will do.


>> +config XPFO
>> +       bool "Enable eXclusive Page Frame Ownership (XPFO)"
>> +       default n
>> +       depends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_XPFO
>> +       select PAGE_EXTENSION
>> +       help
>> +         This option offers protection against 'ret2dir' kernel attacks.
>> +         When enabled, every time a page frame is allocated to user space, it
>> +         is unmapped from the direct mapped RAM region in kernel space
>> +         (physmap). Similarly, when a page frame is freed/reclaimed, it is
>> +         mapped back to physmap.
>> +
>> +         There is a slight performance impact when this option is enabled.
>> +
>> +         If in doubt, say "N".
>> +
>>  config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT
>>         bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog"
>>         default n
> 
> I've added these patches to my kspp tree on kernel.org, so it should
> get some 0-day testing now...

Very good. Thanks!


> Thanks!

Appreciate the feedback.

...Juerg


> -Kees
>