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From: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
To: <openembedded-core@lists.openembedded.org>
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] bind: CVE-2015-8704 and CVE-2015-8705
Date: Wed, 27 Jan 2016 01:35:27 -0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e0b58e482f76607503178a41c09e5287e3fea3c.1453877220.git.liezhi.yang@windriver.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1453877220.git.liezhi.yang@windriver.com>

From: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>

CVE-2015-8704:
Allows remote authenticated users to cause a denial of service via a malformed Address Prefix List record

CVE-2015-8705:
When debug logging is enabled, allows remote attackers to cause a denial of service or have possibly unspecified impact via OPT data or ECS option

[YOCTO 8966]

References:
https://kb.isc.org/article/AA-01346/0/BIND-9.10.3-P3-Release-Notes.html
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-8704
https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2015-8705

Signed-off-by: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>
Signed-off-by: Robert Yang <liezhi.yang@windriver.com>
---
 .../bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch                  |   28 +++++++++++++
 .../bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch                  |   44 ++++++++++++++++++++
 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb   |    2 +
 3 files changed, 74 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch
 create mode 100644 meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch

diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d5bf740
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8704.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+a buffer size check can cause denial of service under certain circumstances 
+
+[security]
+The following flaw in BIND was reported by ISC:
+
+A buffer size check used to guard against overflow could cause named to exit with an INSIST failure In apl_42.c.
+
+A server could exit due to an INSIST failure in apl_42.c when performing certain string formatting operations.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2015-8704
+
+[The patch is taken from BIND 9.10.3:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2015-8704]
+
+Signed-off-by: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>
+diff --git a/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c b/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
+index bedd38e..28eb7f2 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
++++ b/lib/dns/rdata/in_1/apl_42.c
+@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ totext_in_apl(ARGS_TOTEXT) {
+	isc_uint8_t len;
+	isc_boolean_t neg;
+	unsigned char buf[16];
+-	char txt[sizeof(" !64000")];
++	char txt[sizeof(" !64000:")];
+	const char *sep = "";
+	int n;
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4a052d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind/CVE-2015-8705.patch
@@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
+a crash or assertion failure can during format processing 
+
+[security]
+The following flaw in BIND was reported by ISC:
+
+In versions of BIND 9.10, errors can occur when OPT pseudo-RR data or ECS options are formatted to text. In 9.10.3 through 9.10.3-P2, the issue may result in a REQUIRE assertion failure in buffer.c.
+
+This issue can affect both authoritative and recursive servers if they are performing debug logging. (It may also crash related tools which use the same code, such as dig or delv.)
+
+A server could exit due to an INSIST failure in apl_42.c when performing certain string formatting operations.
+
+Upstream-Status: Backport
+CVE: CVE-2015-8705
+
+[The patch is taken from BIND 9.10.3:
+https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=CVE-2015-8705]
+
+Signed-off-by: Derek Straka <derek@asterius.io>
+diff --git a/lib/dns/message.c b/lib/dns/message.c
+index ea7b93a..810c58e 100644
+--- a/lib/dns/message.c
++++ b/lib/dns/message.c
+@@ -3310,9 +3310,19 @@
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_SIT) {
+ 				ADD_STRING(target, "; SIT");
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_CLIENT_SUBNET) {
++				isc_buffer_t ecsbuf;
+ 				ADD_STRING(target, "; CLIENT-SUBNET: ");
+-				render_ecs(&optbuf, target);
+-				ADD_STRING(target, "\n");
++				isc_buffer_init(&ecsbuf,
++							isc_buffer_current(&optbuf),
++							optlen);
++				isc_buffer_add(&ecsbuf, optlen);
++				result = render_ecs(&ecsbuf, target);
++				if (result == ISC_R_NOSPACE)
++					return (result);
++				if (result == ISC_R_SUCCESS) {
++					isc_buffer_forward(&optbuf, optlen);
++                                        ADD_STRING(target, "\n");
++                }
+ 				continue;
+ 			} else if (optcode == DNS_OPT_EXPIRE) {
+ 				if (optlen == 4) {
diff --git a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
index 1e1e726..c9a7acd 100644
--- a/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
+++ b/meta/recipes-connectivity/bind/bind_9.10.2-P4.bb
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ SRC_URI = "ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind9/${PV}/${BPN}-${PV}.tar.gz \
            file://bind-ensure-searching-for-json-headers-searches-sysr.patch \
            file://0001-gen.c-extend-DIRNAMESIZE-from-256-to-512.patch \
            file://0001-lib-dns-gen.c-fix-too-long-error.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8704.patch \
+           file://CVE-2015-8705.patch \
            "
 
 SRC_URI[md5sum] = "8b1f5064837756c938eadc1537dec5c7"
-- 
1.7.9.5



      parent reply	other threads:[~2016-01-27  9:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 8+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-01-27  9:35 [PATCH 0/7] [jethro] Consolidated pull Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 1/7] glibc: CVE-2015-8777.patch Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 2/7] glibc: CVE-2015-8779 Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 3/7] glibc: CVE-2015-9761 Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 4/7] glibc: CVE-2015-8776 Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 5/7] openssh: CVE-2016-1907 Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` [PATCH 6/7] rpmresolve.c: Fix unfreed pointers that keep DB opened Robert Yang
2016-01-27  9:35 ` Robert Yang [this message]

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