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From: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: rkrcmar@redhat.com, liran.alon@oracle.com, jmattson@google.com,
	aliguori@amazon.com, thomas.lendacky@amd.com, dwmw@amazon.co.uk,
	bp@alien8.de, x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 5/8] KVM: SVM: fix comment
Date: Mon, 15 Jan 2018 10:53:22 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <9e1504dc-514c-8bbd-f941-f1edca5e8f50@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180109120311.27565-6-pbonzini@redhat.com>

On 09.01.2018 13:03, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> If always==true, then read/write bits are cleared from
> the MSR permission bitmap, thus passing-through the MSR.
> Fix the comment to match reality.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
>  arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 +-
>  1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 55dde3896898..31ace8d7774a 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
>  
>  static const struct svm_direct_access_msrs {
>  	u32 index;   /* Index of the MSR */
> -	bool always; /* True if intercept is always on */
> +	bool always; /* True if intercept is always off */
>  } direct_access_msrs[] = {
>  	{ .index = MSR_STAR,				.always = true  },
>  	{ .index = MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS,		.always = true  },
> 

The function set_msr_interception() is really named confusingly.

If we pass in a "1", we clear the bit, resulting in no interception.

So 1==no intercept, 0==intercept. This function would be better named
"disable_msr_interception" or sth. like that.

Reviewed-by: David Hildenbrand <david@redhat.com>

-- 

Thanks,

David / dhildenb

  reply	other threads:[~2018-01-15  9:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 47+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 1/8] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT accessors Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15  9:42   ` David Hildenbrand
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 2/8] x86/msr: add definitions for indirect branch predictor MSRs Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 3/8] kvm: vmx: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to the guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13 10:16   ` Longpeng (Mike)
2018-01-15  9:23     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15  9:34       ` Thomas Gleixner
     [not found]   ` <1515839272.22302.520.camel@amazon.co.uk>
2018-01-15  9:23     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 4/8] kvm: vmx: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-12  1:49   ` Wanpeng Li
2018-01-12 17:03     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-13  9:29       ` Woodhouse, David
2018-01-15  9:21         ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 5/8] KVM: SVM: fix comment Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-15  9:53   ` David Hildenbrand [this message]
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:22   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 16:05     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:08     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11 10:45       ` Wanpeng Li
2018-01-10 20:13   ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-11 10:33     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 7/8] x86/svm: Set IBPB when running a different VCPU Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:23   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 8/8] KVM: x86: add SPEC_CTRL and IBPB_SUPPORT to MSR and CPUID lists Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-13  1:25   ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-13  8:00     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-16  0:40       ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-16  7:39         ` R: " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 9/8] KVM: x86: limit MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL access based on CPUID availability Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-16  0:55   ` Eric Wheeler
2018-01-16 12:59     ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-30 13:21   ` [9/8] " Mihai Carabas
2018-01-30 16:33     ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 16:43       ` Mihai Carabas
2018-01-30 16:57         ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 17:14           ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-30 17:38             ` Jim Mattson
2018-01-30 17:45             ` Thomas Gleixner
2018-01-30 23:11               ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-30 23:47                 ` David Woodhouse
2018-01-31  1:06                   ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-02-05 11:10                 ` Ingo Molnar
2018-02-05 11:15                   ` David Woodhouse
2018-02-05 12:10                     ` Ingo Molnar
2018-01-09 13:17 [PATCH 5/8] KVM: SVM: fix comment Liran Alon

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