From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: rgb@redhat.com (Richard Guy Briggs) Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:53 -0400 Subject: [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status In-Reply-To: References: Message-ID: <9e3f99d3c2cbfee24fb3af7ec9b4cf93e4430112.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effec *effective = true; } +#define cap_gained(field, target, source) \ + !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field) +#define cap_grew(target, source, cred) \ + !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source) +#define cap_full(field, cred) \ + cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -541,10 +547,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. * @@ -552,8 +557,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); - if ((is_setid || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && + if ((is_setid || cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -605,8 +609,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { - if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || + if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { + if (!cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); -- 1.7.1 -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Richard Guy Briggs Subject: [PATCH V3 02/10] capabilities: intuitive names for cap gain status Date: Wed, 23 Aug 2017 06:12:53 -0400 Message-ID: <9e3f99d3c2cbfee24fb3af7ec9b4cf93e4430112.1503459890.git.rgb@redhat.com> References: Return-path: In-Reply-To: In-Reply-To: References: Sender: owner-linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-audit@redhat.com Cc: Richard Guy Briggs , Andy Lutomirski , "Serge E. Hallyn" , Kees Cook , James Morris , Eric Paris , Paul Moore , Steve Grubb List-Id: linux-audit@redhat.com Introduce macros cap_gained, cap_grew, cap_full to make the use of the negation of is_subset() easier to read and analyse. Signed-off-by: Richard Guy Briggs --- security/commoncap.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index b7fbf77..6f05ec0 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -513,6 +513,12 @@ void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_cap, bool *effec *effective = true; } +#define cap_gained(field, target, source) \ + !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field) +#define cap_grew(target, source, cred) \ + !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source) +#define cap_full(field, cred) \ + cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -541,10 +547,9 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_cap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + if (cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. * @@ -552,8 +557,7 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) */ is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); - if ((is_setid || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && + if ((is_setid || cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -605,8 +609,8 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think * that is interesting information to audit. */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { - if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || + if (cap_grew(effective, ambient, new)) { + if (!cap_full(effective, new) || !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); -- 1.7.1