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From: "Tian, Kevin" <kevin.tian@intel.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Nakajima, Jun" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
	"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: Re: [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/vvmx: Fix nested virt on VMCS-Shadow capable hardware
Date: Fri, 23 Aug 2019 02:37:08 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <AADFC41AFE54684AB9EE6CBC0274A5D19D545937@SHSMSX104.ccr.corp.intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190730144255.6126-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

> From: Andrew Cooper [mailto:andrew.cooper3@citrix.com]
> Sent: Tuesday, July 30, 2019 10:43 PM
> 
> c/s e9986b0dd "x86/vvmx: Simplify per-CPU memory allocations" had the
> wrong
> indirection on its pointer check in nvmx_cpu_up_prepare(), causing the
> VMCS-shadowing buffer never be allocated.  Fix it.
> 
> This in turn results in a massive quantity of logspam, as every virtual
> vmentry/exit hits both gdprintk()s in the *_bulk() functions.
> 
> Switch these to using printk_once().  The size of the buffer is chosen at
> compile time, so complaining about it repeatedly is of no benefit.
> 
> Finally, drop the runtime NULL pointer checks.  It is not terribly appropriate
> to be repeatedly checking infrastructure which is set up from start-of-day,
> and in this case, actually hid the above bug.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

Reviewed-by: Kevin Tian <kevin.tian@intel.com>
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      parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-23  2:37 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-07-30 14:42 [Xen-devel] [PATCH] x86/vvmx: Fix nested virt on VMCS-Shadow capable hardware Andrew Cooper
2019-08-05 12:52 ` Jan Beulich
2019-08-05 13:14   ` Andrew Cooper
2019-08-05 13:32     ` Jan Beulich
2019-08-23  2:37 ` Tian, Kevin [this message]

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