Re: [Qemu-devel] [PATCH v2] vnc: disable VNC password authentication (security type 2) when in FIPS mode

[Alexander Graf <agraf@suse.de>]

On 07.06.2012, at 05:10, Anthony Liguori wrote:

> On 06/07/2012 06:56 AM, Paul Moore wrote:
>> On Wednesday, June 06, 2012 01:56:52 AM Alexander Graf wrote:
>>> The other one (FIPS) is basically a list of encryption algorithms that are
>>> deemed OK and not crackable within seconds by anyone.
>>> 
>>> Only one of the 2 doesn't help much. In combination they actually enhance
>>> security. This patch is only about FIPS though.
>> 
>> I don't have much to add beyond what Alex already posted.  FIPS 140-2 outlines
>> a set of security requirements for systems implementing cryptography in a
>> variety of forms; the full requirements are likely beyond the scope here but
>> you can always read the full specification (Google knows where to find the
>> document).
>> 
>> The relevant portion appears to be annex A which lists the approved ciphers
>> and their approved uses; DES is not listed as an approved cipher and that is
>> the main problem we are trying to solve right now.
> 
> But does FIPS mandate that it's impossible for a user to use an unapproved cipher?
> 
> IOW, is just having this feature implemented at the libvirt level good enough to satisfy FIPS?  Do we really need to do this in QEMU?

What would implementing it in libvirt buy us? That only stacks using libvirt can be FIPS certified? That any time a management stack that does not use libvirt they need to duplicate that code to be FIPS certified?

I would rather have the "FIPS certified" stamp on QEMU than on libvirt ;). The same way you would usually certify openssl and any user of it (usually) inherits the certification. So by having QEMU FIPS certified, we could reasonably assume libvirt to be FIPS certified. And Ganesi (or whatever it's called). And other stacks that don't go through libvirt hell.


Alex