From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1756487AbdKNUfW (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Nov 2017 15:35:22 -0500 Received: from mail-it0-f44.google.com ([209.85.214.44]:37307 "EHLO mail-it0-f44.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1752838AbdKNUfN (ORCPT ); Tue, 14 Nov 2017 15:35:13 -0500 X-Google-Smtp-Source: AGs4zMaqLPXIxZ3YO/R7cuoz9NpvlJiNFuIR2MevAdlBanV31yymBuiEXP4WZ1rTCTlN+QU10tQe8/gZ4t9rZbdRRC4= MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <14219.1509660259@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171108061551.GD7859@linaro.org> <20171108194626.GQ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171109014841.GF7859@linaro.org> <1510193857.4484.95.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171109044619.GG7859@linaro.org> <20171111023240.2398ca55@alans-desktop> <20171113174250.GA22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171113210848.4dc344bd@alans-desktop> <454.1510609487@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1510662098.3711.139.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 12:35:11 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: QlcnhCnFu8W6in32pU3kYFGgh30 Message-ID: Subject: Re: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown To: Matthew Garrett Cc: Mimi Zohar , David Howells , Alan Cox , "Luis R. Rodriguez" , "AKASHI, Takahiro" , Greg Kroah-Hartman , Jan Blunck , Julia Lawall , Marcus Meissner , Gary Lin , LSM List , linux-efi , Linux Kernel Mailing List Content-Type: text/plain; charset="UTF-8" Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 12:31 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > >> This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have >> been elsewhere. > > People made the same argument about Secure Boot, and then we > discovered that people *were* attacking the boot chain. As we secure > other components, the attackers move elsewhere. This is an attempt to > block off an avenue of attack before it's abused. The thing is, if you have attested the system from boot, then you've already attested the firmware before it even gets loaded. And if you haven't, then you can't trust anything else anyway. So I really don't see your point. Linus From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: torvalds@linux-foundation.org (Linus Torvalds) Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2017 12:35:11 -0800 Subject: Firmware signing -- Re: [PATCH 00/27] security, efi: Add kernel lockdown In-Reply-To: References: <150842463163.7923.11081723749106843698.stgit@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <14219.1509660259@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1509660641.3416.24.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171107230700.GJ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171108061551.GD7859@linaro.org> <20171108194626.GQ22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171109014841.GF7859@linaro.org> <1510193857.4484.95.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> <20171109044619.GG7859@linaro.org> <20171111023240.2398ca55@alans-desktop> <20171113174250.GA22894@wotan.suse.de> <20171113210848.4dc344bd@alans-desktop> <454.1510609487@warthog.procyon.org.uk> <1510662098.3711.139.camel@linux.vnet.ibm.com> Message-ID: To: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-security-module.vger.kernel.org On Tue, Nov 14, 2017 at 12:31 PM, Matthew Garrett wrote: > >> This is all theoretical security masturbation. The _real_ attacks have >> been elsewhere. > > People made the same argument about Secure Boot, and then we > discovered that people *were* attacking the boot chain. As we secure > other components, the attackers move elsewhere. This is an attempt to > block off an avenue of attack before it's abused. The thing is, if you have attested the system from boot, then you've already attested the firmware before it even gets loaded. And if you haven't, then you can't trust anything else anyway. So I really don't see your point. Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-security-module" in the body of a message to majordomo at vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html