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From: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
To: James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
	Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	Linux SCSI List <linux-scsi@vger.kernel.org>,
	Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [GIT PULL] SCSI fixes for 4.18-rc3
Date: Fri, 6 Jul 2018 19:39:25 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <CA+55aFxQ8QzGTWsVdVQVok9cLbgZDFjG2g3JZtWJd+G9jHkYoQ@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CA+55aFy-o3fRtkQnJU=0zv7CPUtgfKiwhfQi_05K25Y_-mx+_w@mail.gmail.com>

On Fri, Jul 6, 2018 at 7:31 PM Linus Torvalds
<torvalds@linux-foundation.org> wrote:
>
> Who actually does direct read/write to /dev/sg? Could we perhaps just
> add a config option to disable it entirely?

On the IB side, the argument was that there was some crazy binary-only
vendor management code that really wanted to use this completely crazy
interface.

I also think that the warnings are dubious. I'd rather add a
deprecation warning to the whole "read/write to /dev/sg" itself, and
then do what we did for ib_safe_file_access(), which was to just have
the permission checks.

It's not like a normal person should have access to /dev/sg to begin
with. So it's not like you can open /dev/sg0 and then try to fool a
suid program into doing the actual IO.

I'd hope.

Maybe I'm wrong, and there's some crazy "let's make /dev/sg available
to normal users" setup out there somewhere. At least for me, /dev/sg
isn't accessible to normal people:

  [torvalds@i7 linux]$ cat /dev/sg0
  cat: /dev/sg0: Permission denied

but maybe some distro decided that everybody should have direct device access..

Jann?

                 Linus

  reply	other threads:[~2018-07-07  2:39 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-07-06 21:38 [GIT PULL] SCSI fixes for 4.18-rc3 James Bottomley
2018-07-07  2:31 ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-07  2:39   ` Linus Torvalds [this message]
2018-07-07  2:48     ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-07  5:22       ` James Bottomley
2018-07-10  0:41         ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-10 17:36           ` Jann Horn
2018-07-10 17:49             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-10 18:04               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-10 21:53           ` Tony Battersby
2018-07-10 22:24             ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-11  0:40               ` Linus Torvalds
2018-07-11  6:45             ` Christoph Hellwig
2018-07-11 13:56               ` Tony Battersby
2018-07-16 16:20           ` Jann Horn
2018-07-07  3:08     ` Jann Horn
2018-07-07  3:25       ` Linus Torvalds

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