From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1755243Ab2ALUBW (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:01:22 -0500 Received: from mail-yw0-f46.google.com ([209.85.213.46]:44596 "EHLO mail-yw0-f46.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1755162Ab2ALUBU convert rfc822-to-8bit (ORCPT ); Thu, 12 Jan 2012 15:01:20 -0500 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1326302710-9427-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326302710-9427-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326383015.7642.77.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1326385635.7642.89.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> From: Linus Torvalds Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:00:58 -0800 X-Google-Sender-Auth: aqRUSrPtBrZGIH1-1WXS4i33D9w Message-ID: Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF To: Andrew Lutomirski Cc: Will Drewry , Steven Rostedt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org, mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8BIT Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 11:46 AM, Andrew Lutomirski wrote: > > I think securebits and cred didn't exist the first time I did this, > and sticking it in struct cred might unnecessarily prevent sharing > cred (assuming that even happens).  So I'd say task_struct. I think it almost has to be task state, since we very much want to make sure it's trivial to see that nothing ever clears that bit, and that it always gets copied right over a fork/exec/whatever. Putting it in some cred or capability bit or somethin would make that kind of transparency pretty much totally impossible. Linus From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Linus Torvalds Subject: Re: [RFC,PATCH 1/2] seccomp_filters: system call filtering using BPF Date: Thu, 12 Jan 2012 12:00:58 -0800 Message-ID: References: <1326302710-9427-1-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326302710-9427-2-git-send-email-wad@chromium.org> <1326383015.7642.77.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> <1326385635.7642.89.camel@gandalf.stny.rr.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Content-Transfer-Encoding: QUOTED-PRINTABLE Cc: Will Drewry , Steven Rostedt , linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, keescook@chromium.org, john.johansen@canonical.com, serge.hallyn@canonical.com, coreyb@linux.vnet.ibm.com, pmoore@redhat.com, eparis@redhat.com, djm@mindrot.org, segoon@openwall.com, jmorris@namei.org, scarybeasts@gmail.com, avi@redhat.com, penberg@cs.helsinki.fi, viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk, mingo@elte.hu, akpm@linux-foundation.org, khilman@ti.com, borislav.petkov@amd.com, amwang@redhat.com, oleg@redhat.com, ak@linux.intel.com, eric.dumazet@gmail.com, gregkh@suse.de, dhowells@redhat.com, daniel.lezcano@free.fr, linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, olofj@chromium.org, mhalcrow@google.com, dlaor@redhat.com To: Andrew Lutomirski Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-security-module-owner@vger.kernel.org List-Id: linux-fsdevel.vger.kernel.org On Thu, Jan 12, 2012 at 11:46 AM, Andrew Lutomirski wrot= e: > > I think securebits and cred didn't exist the first time I did this, > and sticking it in struct cred might unnecessarily prevent sharing > cred (assuming that even happens). =A0So I'd say task_struct. I think it almost has to be task state, since we very much want to make sure it's trivial to see that nothing ever clears that bit, and that it always gets copied right over a fork/exec/whatever. Putting it in some cred or capability bit or somethin would make that kind of transparency pretty much totally impossible. Linus -- To unsubscribe from this list: send the line "unsubscribe linux-securit= y-module" in the body of a message to majordomo@vger.kernel.org More majordomo info at http://vger.kernel.org/majordomo-info.html