From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 Return-Path: Received: (majordomo@vger.kernel.org) by vger.kernel.org via listexpand id S1762964Ab3IDQFz (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:05:55 -0400 Received: from mail-oa0-f54.google.com ([209.85.219.54]:37529 "EHLO mail-oa0-f54.google.com" rhost-flags-OK-OK-OK-OK) by vger.kernel.org with ESMTP id S1756855Ab3IDQFx (ORCPT ); Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:05:53 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 In-Reply-To: References: <1378252218-18798-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:05:53 -0400 X-Google-Sender-Auth: Ev-Ly-ixKvLS8kUdsjKhJYLiYNg Message-ID: Subject: Re: From: Josh Boyer To: Kees Cook Cc: Matthew Garrett , LKML , "linux-efi@vger.kernel.org" , "H. Peter Anvin" Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Sender: linux-kernel-owner@vger.kernel.org List-ID: X-Mailing-List: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett > wrote: >> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling >> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted >> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to >> relax the restrictions. >> >> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to >> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to >> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering >> the existing restrictions useless. >> >> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points >> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement >> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the >> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically >> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger >> guarantee of kernel integrity. >> >> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp. > > Looks good to me. Consider the entire series: > > Acked-by: Kees Cook I spent yesterday rebasing and testing Fedora 20 secure boot support to this series, and things have tested out fine on both SB and non-SB enabled machines. For the series: Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer Tested-by: Josh Boyer josh From mboxrd@z Thu Jan 1 00:00:00 1970 From: Josh Boyer Subject: Re: Date: Wed, 4 Sep 2013 12:05:53 -0400 Message-ID: References: <1378252218-18798-1-git-send-email-matthew.garrett@nebula.com> Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: text/plain; charset=ISO-8859-1 Return-path: In-Reply-To: Sender: linux-efi-owner-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org To: Kees Cook Cc: Matthew Garrett , LKML , "linux-efi-u79uwXL29TY76Z2rM5mHXA@public.gmane.org" , "H. Peter Anvin" List-Id: linux-efi@vger.kernel.org On Wed, Sep 4, 2013 at 11:53 AM, Kees Cook wrote: > On Tue, Sep 3, 2013 at 4:50 PM, Matthew Garrett > wrote: >> We have two in-kernel mechanisms for restricting module loading - disabling >> it entirely, or limiting it to the loading of modules signed with a trusted >> key. These can both be configured in such a way that even root is unable to >> relax the restrictions. >> >> However, right now, there's several other straightforward ways for root to >> modify running kernel code. At the most basic level these allow root to >> reset the configuration such that modules can be loaded again, rendering >> the existing restrictions useless. >> >> This patchset adds additional restrictions to various kernel entry points >> that would otherwise make it straightforward for root to disable enforcement >> of module loading restrictions. It also provides a patch that allows the >> kernel to be configured such that module signing will be automatically >> enabled when the system is booting via UEFI Secure Boot, allowing a stronger >> guarantee of kernel integrity. >> >> V3 addresses some review feedback and also locks down uswsusp. > > Looks good to me. Consider the entire series: > > Acked-by: Kees Cook I spent yesterday rebasing and testing Fedora 20 secure boot support to this series, and things have tested out fine on both SB and non-SB enabled machines. For the series: Reviewed-by: Josh Boyer Tested-by: Josh Boyer josh